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Abstract
The determinants and e ects of political connections in banking have
received extensive attention from academics and policymakers, especially
after the outburst of the global financial crisis. The overarching theme
and primary objective of the present thesis is to contribute to the afore-
mentioned stream of research by attempting to answer the following
question: What is the role of political connections in the banking sector?
The output of this thesis contributes to the extant knowledge in three
ways. First, it sheds light on whether and how less direct channels of
political influence impact regulatory enforcement. Second, it provides
a solid explanation in regard to the motives behind lobbying, as well
as evidence on how successful it can be for the lobbying firm. Third, it
provides evidence on the impact of political connectedness on banking
sector profitability under a cross-country scope. To do this, the thesis
includes three substantive chapters, each of which examines a certain
topic that falls under the above common thematic area. The first two
chapters have a narrower focus in the sense that they aim to provide
evidence regarding how certain types of political connections influence
bank-level regulatory outcomes. The first chapter (Chapter 3) uses a data
set of the universe of US Commercial Banks over the period 2000-2015
and shows that being headquartered in a state where an elected o -
cial holds a chair position on a Congressional committee related to the
banking and financial services industry, reduces a bank’s probability of
receiving a formal regulatory enforcement action. This pattern appears
to be conditional to certain state-level characteristics, such as economic
freedom, corruption, religiosity and political polarization. The second
chapter (Chapter 4) aims to shed light on certain fundamental patterns
between lobbying and regulatory enforcement in the banking industry
by making use of a theoretical model, which yields a set of predictions
which are tested empirically. Using a panel data set of 173 large US
Bank Holding Companies and their subsidiaries for the years 2002-2017,
the findings show that Bank Holding Companies with good corporate
governance but a poorly performing portfolio of subsidiaries are more
likely to lobby. Moreover, it appears that subsidiaries of lobbying, high
governance parent companies are less likely to receive a regulatory en-
forcement action, but the opposite is true for poor-governance parent
companies. The final chapter (Chapter 5) intends to provide evidence
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regarding the broader e ect that political connections may have on a
country’s banking sector performance. Using a sample of 59 countries
over the years 2003-2007, the main findings suggest that, as political con-
nectedness increases, banking sector performance increases as well. The
results of the study are retained when addressing endogeneity concerns.
Moreover, findings are robust for a set of alternative sensitivity tests
including alternative model specification, sample restriction, as well as
controlling for additional country-level characteristics.
3
To my grandfather, Antonis.
4
Declaration
Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been
registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions
embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have
not been submitted for any other academic award.
Word count: 62,646
5
Acknowledgements
My passion for research emerged from an early stage of my higher ed-
ucation, as I have always found very intriguing the fact that one could
gather a set of raw numbers, analyse them and eventually come up with
a sensible -at least in most cases- inference. Pursuing a PhD therefore,
had been one of my greatest aspirations and thus, a natural pathway
to follow. To realise this desire, a number of people have invaluably
supported me and have played a key role in bringing my aspiration into
reality. First, I would like to express my warmest thanks and gratitude
to my supervisory team for their support and encouragement throughout
these three years. In particular, I would like to thank my first supervisor,
Ansgar Wohlschlgel, for his constant support, guidance, and willingness
to help, but also for his very thoughtful and considerate advice in times
of uncertainty. Also, I would like to thank my second supervisor, Gioia
Pescetto, for her directions and advice, as well as for her willingness
to provide her support at all times. Last but not least, I would like to
express my gratefulness to my third supervisor Fotis Pasiouras, whose
guidance, assistance and continuous encouragement contributed signif-
icantly throughout my PhD.Accomplishing this piece of work has also
been a result of being inspired and motivated by a number of individuals,
who I am more than fortuitous to have cross paths with. First, I would
like to thank Chrysovalantis Gaganis, who since the early days of my
undergraduate studies inspired, encouraged and gave me the opportunity
to explore the charm of research. Also, I would like to thank Manthos
Delis, who as my supervisor during my postgraduate studies inspired and
motivated me with his work and attitude towards research excellence.
Finally, I would like to thank Alexia Ventouri, whose advice, guidance
and encouragement has been very valuable. Pursuing my aspirations
would not have been possible without my family’s material support and
unconditional love. Therefore, I would like to express my sincerest grat-
itude and appreciation to my parents, Giannis, Katerina and brother,
Nick. I would like to also thank my partner, Menelaos for his constant
encouragement, patience and support throughout my PhD journey.
6
Dissemination
WORKING PAPERS
• Papadimitri, P, Wohlschlegel, A. (2019), Lobbying, regulatory en-
forcement and corporate governance: Theory and Evidence from
regulatory enforcement actions against US Banks
• Papadimitri, P. Pasiouras, F., Pescetto, G., Wohlschlegel, A. (2018).
Does political influence distort banking supervision? Evidence from
the US Banking sector
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
• MMF 50th Anniversary Conference, London School of Economics,
UK; “ Lobbying, regulatory enforcement and corporate governance:
Theory and Evidence from regulatory enforcement actions against
US Banks ", (4th - 5th September, 2019).
• PBS PGRS Conference, University of Portsmouth, UK; “Is political
influence distorting banking supervision? Evidence from the US
banking sector", (11th June, 2018).
• EFiC Conference in Banking and Finance, University of Essex, UK;
“Is political influence distorting banking supervision? Evidence from
the US banking sector", (5th-6th June, 2018).
• 5th Young Finance Scholars’ Conference, University of Sussex, UK;
“Is political influence distorting banking supervision? Evidence from
the US banking sector", (8th June, 2018).
• 8th International Conference of the Financial Engineering and
Banking Society, University Rome III, Rome, Italy; “Is political
influence distorting banking supervision? Evidence from the US
banking sector", (4th - 6th June, 2018).
• Economics and Finance Research Seminar Series, University of
Portsmouth, UK; “Is political influence distorting banking supervi-
sion? Evidence from the US banking sector", (31st of May, 2018).
7
AWARDS
• Best presentation award, PBS PGRS Conference, University of
Portsmouth, UK (11th June, 2018).
• Best paper award in Banking, 2018 EFiC in Banking and Finance,
University of Essex, UK (5th-6th June, 2018).
8
List of Abbreviations
ATT Average Treatment E ects
BHC Bank Holding Company
CMP Civil Money Penalty
CPP Capital Purchase Program
CR-P Call Report Penalty
DoJ Department of Justice
EU European Union
FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Council
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FRB Federal Reserve Bank
NPL Non-performing loans
IMF International Monetary Fund
IV Instrumental Variable
PACS Political Action Committees
PSA Propensity Score Analysis
OCC O ce of the Comptroller of the Currency
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
ROA Return on Assets ratio
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SOPR Senate O ce of Public Records
TARP Troubled Asset Relief Program
US United States
UFIRS Uniform Financial Institutions Rating system
WEF World Economic Forum
WGI World Governance Indicators
2SLS Two-stage Least Squares model
2SRI Two-stage Residual Inclusion model
9
Contents
Contents 10
List of Figures 14
List of Tables 15
1 Introduction 17
1.1 Background Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2 This thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.1 Research Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.2 Aims, Objectives & Contribution to Knowledge . . . 22
1.2.3 Thesis Structure & chapter overview . . . . . . . . . 24
2 Literature Review 28
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 The value relevance of political connections . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 The motives behind political connections . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4 The nexus between political connections and regulation . . 35
3 Does political influence distort banking regulation? Evi-
dence from the US 40
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2 Institutional background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.1 US Senate, House of Representatives and Congres-
sional Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.2 Enforcement Actions & US Banking supervision . . 44
3.3 Background and hypotheses development . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.1 Key related studies and contribution to literature . 46
3.3.2 Hypotheses development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4 Sample, data and variable selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4.1 Sample description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4.2 Enforcement action variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4.3 Political influence variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10
3.4.4 Financial variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.5 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5 Empirical framework and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5.1 Empirical model and baseline results . . . . . . . . 61
3.5.2 Robustness Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5.2.1 The impact of the Financial Crisis . . . . . 65
3.5.2.2 Controlling for systematically important
and Highly capitalised banks . . . . . . . . 65
3.5.2.3 Alternative channels of influence . . . . . . 65
3.5.2.4 Di erences among regulatory agencies and
distance to regulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5.2.5 State-related analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5.3 Addressing endogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.5.3.1 Background discussion on endogeneity . . 71
3.5.3.2 Instrumental Variable analysis . . . . . . . 74
3.5.3.3 Propensity score matching . . . . . . . . . 76
3.6 Further Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.6.1 Committee and politician related factors . . . . . . 79
3.6.1.1 Politician’s power and influence . . . . . . . 79
3.6.1.2 Political influence, committee membership
and sub-committee chairmanship . . . . . 82
3.6.2 Variation across bank-related traits . . . . . . . . . 84
3.6.3 Social and political environment . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.6.3.1 State economic freedom and corruption . . 86
3.6.3.2 Social norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.6.3.3 State political polarization . . . . . . . . . 91
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Appendix 3A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4 Lobbying, regulatory enforcement and corporate governance:
Theory and evidence from regulatory enforcement actions
against US banks 96
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.2 Key related studies and contribution to literature . . . . . 98
4.3 A Simple Theory of Lobbying of an Enforcement Agency . 100
4.3.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3.2 Optimal Enforcement with Symmetric Information 102
4.3.3 Asymmetric Information and No Lobbying . . . . . 103
4.3.4 Asymmetric Information and Lobbying . . . . . . . 104
4.3.5 Predictions of model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.3.6 Discussion: Incentives to Invest in Quality . . . . . 109
11
4.4 Sample, data and variable selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.4.1 Bank Holding Company sample . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.4.2 Subsidiary level sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.4.3 Descriptive statistics for Bank Holding Company
and Subsidiary level sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.5 Empirical analysis on BHCs’ Lobbying Decision . . . . . . 121
4.5.1 Baseline model and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.6 Empirical analysis on Lobbying Success . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.6.1 Baseline model and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.6.2 Robustness Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.6.3 Addressing endogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.7 Empirical analysis on Lobbying and performance . . . . . . 133
4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Appendix 4A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5 Political connections and banking industry performance:
A cross country analysis 143
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.2 Background and hypothesis development . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.2.1 Key related studies and contribution to literature . 146
5.2.2 Hypothesis development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.3 Sample, data and variable selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.3.1 Sample description and data sources . . . . . . . . . 149
5.3.2 Variable Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.3.2.1 Banking industry performance . . . . . . . 150
5.3.2.2 Political Connection measures . . . . . . . 151
5.3.2.3 Financial and country-related variables . . 154
5.3.3 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.4 Empirical framework and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.4.1 Empirical model and baseline results . . . . . . . . 164
5.4.2 Robustness Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.4.2.1 Alternative model and sample specifications167
5.4.2.2 Controlling for country-level characteristics171
5.4.3 Addressing endogeneity concerns . . . . . . . . . . . 174
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6 Concluding remarks, limitations and future research 181
6.1 Summary of key findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.2 Contributions, policy implications and limitations of research183
12
References 187
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
I Appendix 198
Attachment 1 199
Certificate of ethics review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Attachment 2 202
Certificate of ethics review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
13
List of Figures
1.1 Annual Lobbying trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1 Margins Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.3.1Fraction of connected banks per country - Private banks only160
5.3.2Fraction of connected banks per country - All banks . . . . 161
5.3.3Fraction of connected bankers per country - All banks . . . 162
5.3.4Fraction of connected bankers per country - Private banks
only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
14
List of Tables
3.1 Variable description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2 Summary statistics of enforcement actions . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3 Summary information of banking committee chairs . . . . 56
3.4 Descriptive statistics of core and financial variables . . . . 58
3.5 Univariate test of means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Correlation matrix of core and financial variables . . . . . 60
3.7 Baseline results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.8 Robustness analysis (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.9 Robustness analysis (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.10 Robustness analysis (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.11 Addressing endogeneity (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.12 Addressing endogeneity (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.13 Politician’s power and influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.14 Committee membership and subcommittee chairmanship . 85
3.15 Bank-related traits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.16 State economic freedom and corruption . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.17 State religiosity and political polarization . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.1 Variable description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.2 Descriptive statistics for BHC characteristics . . . . . . . . 115
4.3 Correlation matrix for BHC characteristics . . . . . . . . . 116
4.4 Summary statistics of enforcement actions . . . . . . . . . 118
4.5 Descriptive statistics for Subsidiary banks . . . . . . . . . 119
4.6 Correlation matrix for Subsidiary banks . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.7 Probability to lobby (BHC level) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.8 Probability to receive a regulatory enforcement action (Sub-
sidiary level) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.9 Average marginal e ects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.10 Probability to receive a regulatory enforcement action: Ad-
dressing endogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.11 Lobbying and performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.12 Lobbying and performance: Addressing endogeneity . . . . 136
15
5.1 Variable Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.2 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.3 Correlation matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.4 Baseline results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.5 Robustness analysis (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.6 Robustness analysis (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.7 Robustness analysis (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
5.8 Addressing endogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
16
Chapter 1
Introduction
The primary focus of the present thesis is to examine the role of polit-
ical connections in the banking industry. This topic has attracted the
attention of policymakers and academics, especially after the outburst of
the global financial crisis. To begin with, the interdependence between
politics and banking has been considered as one of the key factors that
led to the financial crisis. Apart from the excessive risk-taking, complex
financial instruments, lack of transparency and failure to develop and
implement appropriate regulatory policies many have argued that the
close ties between government o cials, regulators and banks formed
part of what led to the failure of banking systems across the globe. The
presence of tight relationships between politics and banking is not a
surprising, nor a non-anticipated phenomenon, given that the financial
services industry is considered to be one of the most regulated industries.
Hence, connections can be a useful tool in influencing the development
and implementation of regulation, as well as its enforcement. It is there-
fore, essential to be able to delve into these matters, whilst focusing
on identifying the threats, but also the best practises within this envi-
ronment in order to eliminate risks and encourage financial safety and
soundness in the banking industry, which makes up the cornerstone of
a country’s economy and society. Therefore, the monitoring and proper
function of these institutions is crucial not only for their sound operation,
but also to avoid failures on an economic and social scale - as the ones
observed during and after the crisis.
It is worth mentioning that the importance and scope of this topic
speaks to an audience of a global scale. Political influence is present
and perhaps in many cases an established part of a country’s banking
sector. It is possible to prove this through ample of anecdotal evidence
available on how politicians, banks and regulators interact. For instance,
as will be shown in the following section, in the United States, according
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to the figures reported by the Center of Responsive Politics, lobbying in
the financial services industry has been increasing in an accelerating
pace at least since the financial crisis. In the EU context, anecdotal
evidence reveals the interaction between bankers and regulators prior the
announcement of key decisions.1Although political influence in banking
can be described as a global phenomenon, its e ect on various areas
of bank behavior and outcomes do not need to be homogeneous across
countries. This is because banking sector structure di ers from country
to country, and this is an element that is important to be taken into
account in this area of research.
This section of the thesis serves as an introduction to the general topic
of political connections, whilst highlighting the motivation and rationale
behind the research undertaken. The aims and objectives, as well as
the key contributions are also outlined. Finally, this chapter provides
an overview of the thesis structure and ends with the summary of the
chapters that follow.
1.1 Background Discussion
A question that has largely attracted the interest of political scientists
for a prolonged period of time is how individuals, societal groups or corpo-
rations are able to achieve favourable treatment by government o cials
or regulatory agencies. Notwithstanding, the topic has been increasingly
receiving the attention of scholars working in the field of banking and
finance. This is not surprising, given the rise of incidents pointing out to-
wards the interdependence of politics and the financial services industry.
One straightforward way to demonstrate this is through the "revolving
door" phenomenon. This phenomenon refers to the flow of professionals
holding high-level positions in legislative or regulatory bodies towards
the private sector and vice versa. A typical example would involve an
individual holding a position in a regulatory agency and then undertak-
ing a position either in a firm operating in the industry he or she once
regulated, or even as a lobbyist. Of course, it is possible to argue that
such flow of employment could be beneficial in the sense that transfer of
knowledge and expertise from the public to the private sector could be
beneficial. However, it has been broadly argued that this phenomenon
could also be tied to preferential treatment of the regulated firm 2. In
1For instance, see "ECB o cials met bankers before key decisions", Financial Times,
November, 2015.
2For a discussion regarding academic studies around this phenomenon please see
Shive and Forster (2016).
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the banking industry context there are plenty of examples to discuss.
For instance, Robert Rubin, the co-head of Goldman Sachs, became Sec-
retary of the Treasury (1995-1999) and then returned to the industry
as a Senior O cial at Citigroup in 2007. Another interesting example
is that of Gerald Corrigan, who was the President (1985-1993) of the
New York Federal Reserve and then joined Goldman Sachs, where he
became a partner and managing director in 1996. It is also worth noting
that Gerald Corrigan served as the Chairman of the Basel Committee on
Banking supervision between 1991-1993. Another case is that of William
Dudley, who was an economist for Goldman Sachs (1986-2007) and then
became the 10th President of the New York Federal Reserve in 2009,
after being hired by Timothy Geithner in 2007. The list of such incidents
is of course non-exhaustive, and one could mention many more examples.
But, the point is that cases such as the above demonstrate the link that
exists between government and regulators, and the financial services
industry.
On the same note, banks actively engage in political strategies (such
as lobbying) in order to influence legislation or regulatory decisions.
Specifically, in the US this is clearly evident from the total amount spent
on lobbying by financial firms. According to information provided by the
Centre for Responsive politics, the US financial sector is ranked second in
terms of its lobbying expenses, which reached up to $260,000,000 in 2019.
Looking at some within-sector demographics, Commercial Banks rank
4th in terms of their lobbying expenditures, which equal to $31,000,000,
whilst, the insurance industry tops the list with expenditures being equal
to $80,000,000. In regard to the trend of lobbying expenditures over
time, the figures appear to have an increased direction overall, while the
steepest is observed in the years prior to the global financial crisis. This
trend is evident in Figure 1.1 .
As a starting point for the discussion to follow, it is important to
mention that firms can choose their own pathway (or combinations of
pathways) of influence, which could be classified in two main groups.
The first consists of strategies, such as lobbying and campaign contribu-
tions, that are identifiable and directly quantifiable. The second form
of strategies refers to indirect ways of measuring political connections.
Such strategies stem from social network relationships, employment, or
even location. Practically speaking, the related literature has explored
the determinants and e ects by considering both routes of influence. For
instance, Lambert (2019) considers bank lobbying expenditures, whereas
Correia (2014) considers both lobbying and campaign contributions. More
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Figure 1.1: Annual Lobbying trend
Source: Open Secrets
recently, Shive and Forster (2016) consider prior employment, whereas
Gropper et al. (2013, 2015) explore connections through the location of
bank headquarters and home states of politicians.
Through the adoption of these strategies, firms aim (or hope) to achieve
favorable treatment. According to Grossman and Helpman (2001), special
interest groups seek to achieve at least three key outcomes:
1. "Buy access", in the sense that lobbying for instance gives the op-
portunity to the lobbyist/firm/group to reveal to the policy maker/
regulator his/her intentions.
2. "Buy credibility", in terms of giving the opportunity to the insti-
tution engaged in lobbying to reveal its true intentions. Consider
the following example. In some cases, the members of a group (e.g.,
association or corporation) may express their interest/ agreement
regarding a particular issue or piece of proposed legislation. Under-
standably, only expressing their interest does not ensure their real
intentions. When these groups, however, pay money (e.g., through
campaign contributions in this case), then the story slightly changes.
In particular, when the policy maker or legislator observes that
the group spends money on a particular piece of proposed legisla-
tion, then this increases its credibility, and the probability that the
intentions are genuine.
3. "Buy influence", which is perhaps the most popular. Lobbyists or
contributing firms may be able, through their selected strategies, to
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influence the process of legislation or decision making of regulators,
politicians or other authorities with power.
Political connections have indeed empirically shown to be beneficial,
or, put di erently, a value-adding strategy (Mathur et al., 2013). For
instance, empirical precedent in the field of banking has shown that politi-
cal connections are tied to better performance (Gropper et al., 2013, 2015)
and preferential regulatory treatment (Lambert, 2019). Interestingly, po-
litical connections play a distinctive role specifically in heavily regulated
industries such as the financial services. In fact, Holburn and Bergh
(2008), who develop a theoretical argument, suggest that firms operating
in heavily regulated industries have a higher probability of engaging
in political strategies in order to influence changes in legislation/laws
towards their own interest. Indeed,the banking industry is characterised
by a complex regulatory environment in which complicated policies and
legislation direct the functioning of banks and other financial institutions.
Moreover, banks form the cornerstone of a country’s economy, as they
are in charge of important tasks, such as capital allocation, facilitating
transactions and savings and monitoring investments, to name a few.
Therefore, the special nature and structure of the banking industry does
in a way form a "welcoming" environment to political connections. This in
turn has motivated researchers to explore the drivers and e ects behind,
especially after the outburst of the financial crisis. It is worth mentioning
however, that in spite of being a suitable laboratory for research of this
kind, the study of financial institutions has received considerably less
attention in comparison to non-financial firms 3. Thus, it still remains
an unsaturated and open area for research of new ideas.
1.2 This thesis
1.2.1 Research Rationale
The purpose of the previous section was to introduce to the readership
several key aspects of political connections, particularly in the area of
finance and banking. Moreover, it is intended to make clear that political
connections in the financial services industry exist in a rather promi-
nent manner. As briefly mentioned in the previous section (and will be
discussed in detail in the relevant literature review Chapter), existing
research on political connections in banking is rather limited. Although
there are numerous areas one could suggest not having received adequate
3 This is also evident in the overview of literature section (Chapter 2).
21
research attention, below I list some of these key areas, which form the
core topics of investigation of the chapters of this thesis:
1. Exploring the e ect of di erent types of connections beyond the main-
stream ones. While there is evidence on the e ect of direct type
of connections (such as lobbying and campaign contributions) and
their e ect on bank behaviour, such as lending (Igan et al., 2012)
or regulatory treatment (Lambert, 2019); the need to further ex-
plore indirect ways of influence either individually or collectively, is
essential to provide a more conclusive picture.
2. Explaining fundamental patterns identified in the empirical litera-
ture. Despite the existing theoretical literature attempting to pro-
vide explanations in regard to the interplay between influence and
favourable outcomes, such explanations are rather limited when
it comes to the influence stemming from lobbying in the field of
banking.In particular, the extant literature focuses on explanations
based on the exchange of favours (e.g. Polinsky and Shavell, 2001)
rather than lobbying as a means of information transmission.
3. Evidence from cross country studies. The literature examining the
role of political connections in banking focuses on the analysis of
a single country in all but one case. The majority of research in
this field regards the US, which is not surprising given the richness
of the data available. In fact, there is only one study by Braun
and Raddatz (2010) who use a cross country sample to examine
the extent of political connections in the banking industry. This,
therefore, immediately establishes the need for additional academic
studies providing evidence which points out or, depending on the
objective, considers di erences in country-level characteristics.
The above identified areas have motivated the research conducted in
the following chapters of the present thesis. In particular, point (1) is
addressed in Chapter 3, point (2) is addressed in Chapter 4 and finally,
point (3) is addressed in Chapter 5. In the section that follows, the
specific aims, objectives and key contributions of this thesis are discussed
in further detail.
1.2.2 Aims, Objectives & Contribution to Knowledge
Examining the role of political connections in the banking industry forms
the common thematic concept of the present thesis. As pointed out in
the previous section, there are still areas in the literature that need
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to be addressed in order to have a more in-depth understanding of the
causes and e ects of various types of political connections in the banking
industry. The analysis carried out and presented in this thesis aims to
improve our understanding around this topic, and to contribute to the
general literature examining the role of political connections in banking
and finance. Given the limited evidence in the points (1) - (3) outlined in
the previous section, the main objectives of this thesis are the following:
1. Provide evidence on how other types of influence, that is, beyond lob-
bying and campaign contributions, influence regulatory outcomes
(Chapter 3).
2. Provide a more solid explanation regarding the decision of banks to
engage in lobbying activity, through the use of a theoretical model,
which is empirically tested to further understand the mechanism
behind the motives and e ects of political connections (Chapter 4).
3. To improve the understanding of the impact of political connections
on aggregate banking sector performance, under a cross-country
setting (Chapter 5).
By addressing the aforementioned objectives this will contribute to
the extant knowledge within this field of research in the following ways.
First, the underlying importance and contribution of this work will enable
to shed light on the overall impact that political connections have in influ-
encing bank behaviour in its broader sense. Second, a great area of focus
of this thesis refers to banking supervision and how regulatory decisions
are driven by political influence. The output therefore of those parts
of the analysis is expected to add to the knowledge regarding banking
supervision.
The thesis will contribute from a policy-making perspective, too. In
particular, the findings of the analysis will assist policy-makers to assess
which supervisory and regulatory approaches enhance -or not- the overall
stability and performance of their country’s banking sector - a task that
has been ongoing at least since the outburst of the global financial crisis.
In addition, the parts of the thesis that incorporate banking supervision
in their core analysis, will be beneficial in the further understanding
on whether political influence enhances or impedes the e ectiveness of
banking supervision on achieving bank compliance. Finally, the output
will also shed light on the further understanding of the mechanics behind
lobbying, thus, enabling policy-makers and regulators to design rules
towards lobbying, focusing on the potential benefits and commitment
powers they could yield.
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1.2.3 Thesis Structure & chapter overview
The core topic of this thesis as already outlined in earlier sections is to
shed light on the role of political connections in the banking sector. The
approach followed involves examining the topic both from a general, as
from a narrower angle. To achieve this, the thesis is structured in 6
separate chapters, the purpose of which are briefly outlined below:
• Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter presents a critical overview of the literature related
to the overarching theme of the thesis. In particular it presents
academic studies in the following three key areas: (i) The value of
political connections, (ii) Motives behind political connections and
(iii) The nexus between political connections and regulation. These
strands of literature are relevant to one or more than one of the
analyses performed in each chapter. Therefore, each of the chapters
include a specific section which discusses the studies that are most
relevant to the research question examined, by pointing out the
points of similarity and di erentiation.
• Chapter 3
"Does political influence distort banking regulation?"
This chapter carries a precise thematic focus in the sense that it
examines the interplay between political influence and regulatory
outcomes at the bank-level. Focusing on the US banking indus-
try, it intends to shed light on the impact of political connections
on regulatory outcomes, by capturing political influence through
whether a bank is headquartered in a state where an elected o cial
holds a chair position on a congressional committee related to the
banking and financial services industry. Regulatory outcomes are
captured by the enforcement actions issued by the three regulatory
agencies operating in the United States (Federal Reserve, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the O ce of Comptroller of the
Currency) against banks.This chapter relates to the extant liter-
ature strand examining the interplay between political economy
and general regulation, as well as that examining the impact of
political influence and regulatory decision making. Despite the
availability of empirical evidence (e.g. Lambert, 2019) suggesting
that direct forms of political influence, such as lobbying, lead to
preferential treatment of banks, less attention has been attributed
to other less direct forms of influence, such as those stemming from
24
the side of politicians. Therefore, the contribution of this chapter is
to provide evidence on the impact of political influence on regulatory
outcomes by focusing on a less direct channel that has not been yet
examined within this context. The key findings suggest a positive
relationship between political influence and regulatory enforcement
likelihood. The pattern of the results holds when alternative sam-
ples or variables are used. Moreover, results hold when alternative
methodological approaches are implemented in order to alleviate
endogeneity concerns. Finally, the findings appear to be conditional
to certain state-level socio-economic characteristics, such as reli-
giosity, political polarization and economic freedom. From a policy
making perspective the findings also contribute to the understand-
ing of whether less direct routes of political influence impact the
extent to which bank supervisory practises are e ective. Last but
not least, it is important to mention that one of the limitations of the
analysis of this chapter as well as that of the following two Chapters
4 and 5 is that other, less direct and potentially non-observable
relationships cannot be accounted for at this time. Therefore, being
able to control for those types of connections would advance even
further our knowledge within this field of research.
• Chapter 4
"Lobbying, regulatory enforcement and corporate governance: The-
ory and evidence from regulatory enforcement actions against US
banks"
This chapter retains the narrow dimension of Chapter 3, however it
focuses on lobbying, which is a more direct form of political strategy
than the politician’s influence proxy employed in Chapter 3. The
core purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between
lobbying, corporate governance quality and regulatory enforcement.
As in Chapter 3, the present chapter relates to the literature exam-
ining political influence and regulatory outcomes. It also relates
to the literature focusing on the drivers of bank lobbying. More-
over, the impact of lobbying on bank profitability is performed as an
"Additional Analysis" of this chapter, thus, contributing to the litera-
ture examining the value of political connections. A key feature and
strength of this chapter is that it develops a theoretical model, which
yields a set of predictions, which are then tested empirically. Briefly,
the theoretical model treats lobbying as a mechanism of conveying
information related to a bank’s quality to the regulator. This itself
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provides a novel explanation in the theoretical literature, which has
thus far considered lobbying as a mechanism of exchange of favours.
Furthermore, the present analysis incorporates an additional di-
mension not yet considered in the extant empirical literature, which
is the quality of a bank’s corporate governance. Using a sample
of US Bank Holding Companies and their subsidiaries, the analy-
sis is executed in two stages. First, using the sample of 173 large
Bank Holding Companies, the aim is to assess whether corporate
governance quality is a determinant of lobbying activity, while con-
trolling for other financial aspects. Second, using a sample of the
subsidiaries of the BHCs employed in the second stage, the aim is to
explore whether and how the relationship between lobbying and en-
forcement likelihood is driven by corporate governance quality. The
overall findings show that lobbying incentives depend on a bank’s
quality, which is proxied by its corporate governance. In particular,
it appears that Bank Holding Companies with high corporate gov-
ernance quality are more likely to lobby, which is associated with
lower enforcement probability and higher long-run performance for
their subsidiaries, whereas the reverse holds for low- governance
Bank Holding Companies.
From a policy perspective, similarly to Chapter 3, the findings en-
hance our understanding regarding the decision making of financial
regulators and how and at what extent their enforcement is im-
pacted by direct forms of influence, such as lobbying. Furthermore,
this chapter sheds light on the lobbying perspective as well. As will
be discussed in detail in the relevant chapter, lobbying appears to
be welfare enhancing in the sense that it enables the regulator to
be informed of the quality of the lobbying bank, thus focusing its
costly enforcement e orts to more "harmful" cases of misconduct.
• Chapter 5
"Political connections and banking industry performance: A cross
country analysis"
This final chapter entails a more international flavor and intends
to contribute to the cross-country studies examining the e ects
of political connections on bank behavior, thus providing evidence
from a broader angle to that of Chapters 3 & 4. More precisely,
the objective is to assess how the extent to which banking sector
connectedness can influence its performance, while controlling for
country-level characteristics. Banking sector connectedness is cap-
tured by making use of the aggregate data of political connections
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provided by the study of Braun and Raddatz (2010). The analysis
of this chapter contributes to the literature examining the impact
of political connections under a cross-country set-up. As in Chapter
4, it also relates and contributes to the literature examining the im-
pact of political connections on bank performance. The key feature
of this chapter is its international scope. Studies thus far assess the
impact of direct or indirect strategies on bank-level performance
and outcomes. However, none have yet explored political connection
impact on overall banking sector outcomes. Using an international
sample of 59 countries for the years between 2003-2007, the overall
findings reveal a positive relationship between banking sector con-
nectedness and performance. The findings are consistent with the
bank-level analysis assessing the impact of lobbying on bank prof-
itability, in the last section of Chapter 4. These results hold when
alternative samples and measures of connectedness are employed.
Moreover, findings remain intact when controlling for a variety of
country-level characteristics, such as macroeconomic environment,
economic freedom, quality of institutions, government ownership
of banks, banking sector characteristics and income level. Finally,
the positive relationship persists when implementing econometric
techniques to address endogeneity concerns. From a policy making
perspective as in the previous chapters, the findings of the analy-
sis performed enhances the better understanding of the potential
impacts that connections have on bank outcomes, thus, aiding the
design of appropriate rules. The limitations outlined earlier regard-
ing other less direct or unobserved types of connections also apply
here. Another potential drawback of the analysis carried out in this
chapter is the timeframe considered. The political connectedness
measure is drawn from the study of Braun and Raddatz (2010),
who construct their measure for a single year, that of 2005. Future
research in this field could therefore, benefit by making use of more
recent data for more than one year.
• Chapter 6
Conclusion
This final section of the thesis is devoted to providing an overall
summary of the key objectives and findings. Moreover, the limita-
tions and points of improvement are outlined. Finally, this section
o ers some suggestions for further research within the broader field
of political connections in finance and banking.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The underlying subject matter of this thesis evolves around the further
understanding of the role of political connections in the banking industry,
with particular focus on the following three key areas: (i) Value-relevance
of political connections, (ii) Determinants of political connections and
(iii) Regulation and political influence. The general topic of political
connections has received increased academic interest dating back to least
1974, with the seminal work of Krueger (1974) exploring the interrelation
between rent-seeking activities and restrictions regarding trade policies.
Evidence from the political economy perspective dates back to the early
90s, with the work of Roberts (1990) assessing the value of political
connections by examining how the unexpected death of a particular US
Senator influenced the share price reaction of companies who had ties
with this individual. Moreover, Roberts (1990) also examined the share
price reaction of companies who had ties with his successor. Although
not providing evidence on the exact magnitude of the importance of such
connections, Roberts (1990) does provide preliminary evidence on the
value of connections.
Despite the aforementioned seminal work and heightened interest of
scholars to further examine the context of political influence, the empiri-
cal literature in the area of finance and banking has only recently emerged
-and, in fact, still is. The main reason for this can be attributed to the
limited availability of data. For instance, in the US, only after the imple-
mentation of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, it has been compulsory
for firms to disclose their lobbying expenses since 1998. Nonetheless,
as it will be discussed in following sections there is academic research
demonstrating the benefits of political connections across various areas
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of a firm’s operations.
It is worth pointing out that empirical precedent has employed vari-
ous proxies in order to assess the impact of political connections on firm
outcomes. For instance, some consider the formation of Political Action
Committees (PACs) (Cooper et al., 2010), others rely on lobbying, (Chen
et al., 2015), whereas others focus on the influence stemming from politi-
cians (Gropper et al., 2013, 2015). In addition, certain studies consider
other types of relationships such as board memberships (e.g. Goldman
et al., 2008). It is worthwhile to mention that earlier work (Sapienza,
2004; Dinç, 2005) exploring political influence particularly in the banking
industry, considers government ownership as a proxy of influence.
This chapter provides an overview of the literature related to the
analysis to be performed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. It is important to
highlight at this point that the strands of literature discussed are those
which specifically relate to each of these chapters. In particular, the
papers discussed in Subsection 2.2 relate to the literature examining
political connections and performance outcomes (Chapter 5). Subsection
2.3 discusses the literature on the motives behind political connections
and in particular, those of lobbying, which is relevant to the analysis
carried out in Chapter 4. Finally, Subsection 2.4 presents the literature
on political connections and their e ects on regulation, which is relevant
to both Chapters 3 and 4.
2.2 The value relevance of political connec-
tions
Empirical and theoretical studies overall agree that political connections
are a "valuable" investment (Mathur et al., 2013), in the sense that firms
with identified connections are more likely to enjoy certain benefits. In
particular, the literature has indicated preferential regulatory treatment
(Lambert, 2019), easier access to finance (Infante and Piazza, 2014; Chen
et al., 2014), better performance (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Gropper
et al., 2013, 2015), higher probability of bailout (Faccio et al., 2006) ,
lower cost of capital (Boubakri et al., 2012) and milder depositor reaction
(Disli et al., 2013; Nys et al., 2015). Nonetheless, a few existing studies
provide evidence supporting the "negative" side of political connections.
More precisely, empirical work has reported that political connections
can be associated with deteriorating quality of earnings (Chaney et al.,
2011), higher cost of debt (Bliss and Gul, 2012), lower performance of non-
financial (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006) and financial firms (Lambert,
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2019).
The present section pays attention to the studies that focus on un-
derstanding whether political connections enhance or impede the prof-
itability of firms. As it will be discussed in detail below, researchers have
explored the impact of the aforementioned routes either on the financial
market and/or accounting-related performance. One of the key objectives
of this thesis is to explore the interrelation of political connections and
banking sector performance. It is worth mentioning at this point that the
majority of existing studies focus on non-financial firms. Regardless of
the measure considered to capture political connections and the approach
followed to capture firm performance, the general finding (with some
exceptions) of this strand of literature is that political connections are
associated with greater firm performance. Most studies focus on the US
context, which is not surprising given the abundance of data available.
To begin with, focusing on campaign contributions of US firms between
1979-2004, Cooper et al. (2010) report evidence of a positive association
with stock returns. Their findings appear to be more pronounced for
firms that support a higher number of candidates, who are based in
the same state the firms are located in. Moreover, when distinguishing
among party and chamber; they find that the observed e ect is stronger
for Democrats and candidates who are members of the House of Repre-
sentatives. Focusing on lobbying as a proxy for political connectedness,
Alexander et al. (2009) examine the rate of return of lobbying expendi-
tures of US firms. By considering the lobbying activity regarding the
American Job Creations Act of 2004; their findings suggest that the
companies lobbied for this particular Act, encountered a $220 return
of excess for each $1 spent, a figure translated to a return on excess of
22,000%. Also, considering lobbying as a connection proxy, Hill et al.
(2013) examine the determinants and e ects of corporate lobbying of US
firms during the time frame of 1999-2011. Their findings suggest that,
after controlling for PAC contributions, lobbying can be considered as a
useful way for increasing shareholder value. In particular, they provide
evidence of the value of corporate lobbying activities for shareholders
especially in the case where firms do not engage in PACs.
In a more recent study, Chen et al. (2015) explore the impact of lobby-
ing on firm performance, using both operating and market-based mea-
sures. Focusing on US firms during the period 1998-2005, their findings
confirm that lobbying is positively associated with firm performance. As
an extension of their analysis, they explore the value of lobbying by consid-
ering a portfolio approach. Their findings suggest that portfolios of firms
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who heavily engage in lobbying activities outperform the benchmark in a
time frame of three years after the portfolio was formed. Turning to an-
other measure of connectedness, Goldman et al. (2008) consider the 2000
presidential elections in the US, and find that firms who have a board
member associated with the winning party experience positive abnor-
mal returns around the election window. Finally, exploring ties between
corporate boards and powerful politicians, Fisman et al. (2012) examine
the interplay between such connections and market-based performance.
In particular, they examine the stock price reaction of firms for which
personal ties with Vice-president Richard Cheney are identified. Their
baseline results indicate a "zero-e ect", which they interpret as evidence
of the e ectiveness of US institutions in controlling such rent-seeking
behavior.
There are several studies focusing on non-financial firms in countries
outside the US, too. These studies also provide supporting evidence of
benefits of political connections on firm performance and profitability,
even though the countries in their sample vary significantly in terms of
institutional quality and transparency. The early work of Fisman (2001)
and the study of Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) focus on Indonesian
firms, while Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2008) on firms
located in Thailand. Niessen and Ruenzi (2010) and Ferguson and Voth
(2008) focus on German firms, Amore and Bennedsen (2013) and Cingano
and Pinotti (2013) explore Danish and Italian firms respectively, whereas
Claessens et al. (2008) focus on Brazilian firms.
A limited number of studies explore this topic under a cross-country
set-up.The work of Faccio et al. (2006) is one of the few academic stud-
ies exploring the impact of political connections on firm value using an
international data-set. Using a sample of over 20,000 firms operating
in 47 countries, they find that when firm executives (such as the CEO)
and other large shareholders announce a political position, this leads
to increased market performance (approximately 2% ) around the an-
nouncement. Another cross-country study by Faccio and Parsley (2009)
explores the impact of sudden incidents (such as politician deaths) on the
stock-market performance of firms located in the home region/town the
politician was serving. Their findings indicate a decline in the share price
of these firms following the incident. In addition to the market- based
measures, they also suggest that declines appear also in sales growth,
as well as accessibility to credit by these firms. What is more, given the
cross-country nature of their study, Faccio and Parsley (2009) are able to
point out several country-related characteristics. In particular, they find
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that the aforementioned pattern is more pronounced in countries where
corruption is higher.
Evidence on bank and other financial institutions, is rather limited.
First, the study of Gropper et al. (2013) explores the extent to which
political connections, captured by whether elected politicians at the state
level hold powerful positions in the US Congress, have a direct impact on
bank performance. Their findings confirm that having a politician with
power in Congress improves the performance of the banks headquartered
at the state these politicians are elected. Taking their study a step
further, Gropper et al. (2015) explore whether the findings of their initial
paper are subject to the degree of economic freedom at the state level.
Their findings indicate that, in states where economic freedom is greater,
the e ect of political influence has a less prominent e ect as opposed to
states with lower economic freedom.
Acemoglu et al. (2016) focus on the e ect that bank ties with powerful
individuals in congress has on stock market reaction. In particular, they
find that banks with identified ties with Timothy Geithner encountered
positive abnormal returns in the time period following the announcement
that Geithner had been nominated as Treasury Secretary. On a more
general note, they conclude that personal ties with powerful individuals
pay o  during periods of turbulence, even in countries with strong insti-
tutions, such as the US. Hung et al. (2017) assess bank CEO professional
history to identify a liations with political parties, in order to explore
whether and how such ties influence the performance and risk-taking
behavior of Chinese banks. Focusing on a sample of Chinese Commercial
Banks from 2007 to 2014, their findings provide evidence on the value-
adding aspect of political connections. Thus far, the aforementioned
studies indicate a positive association between political influence and
bank performance. However, a more recent study by Lambert (2019) finds
that, among others, lobbying banks are associated with higher levels of
risk-taking behavior and tend to under-perform their non-lobbying peers.
The only cross-country study exploring political connections in the
banking industry is that of Braun and Raddatz (2010). Their core pur-
pose is to explore how political connections on the aggregate level vary
across counties. They explore country-level characteristics in regard to
economic development, institutional structure, regulation and financial
development. Moreover, they attempt to assess the direct impact of their
connectedness measure on bank performance and confirm a positive
association among these. Nonetheless, they do so by exploring this by
considering the performance measures and financial characteristic prox-
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ies at the firm level, and by saturating their model in order to reduce any
noise from traits at the country level.
Finally, it is important to recall that political connections are consid-
ered as a valuable investment, forming it to be a potential endogenous
choice for banks and firms in more general. That indeed highlights the
fact that banks that choose to engage in lobbying activities not need
to be the same. This aspect therefore, should be incorporated in the
econometric analysis of the research undertaken in this area. Empirical
precedent has implemented a variety of approaches, depending on set-up
of their research. For instance, Gropper et al. (2013) explore change of
chairmen as an exogenous "shock" in order to assess how such events
influence changes in performance. Acemoglu et al. (2016) employ match-
ing techniques in order to alleviate endogeneity concerns stemming from
the fact that connected and non-connected banks do not necessarily have
the same characteristics. In addition, Hung et al. (2017) and Lambert
(2019) employ Instrumental Variable approaches in order to establish
the validity of their results.
2.3 The motives behind political connections
The drivers behind firms engaging in political strategies has triggered the
attention of researchers. It is worth mentioning at this point that most
of the available studies focus on the determinants of lobbying activities.
Therefore, the discussion followed below lies around the determinants
of this particular strategy. As in the previous section, a great portion
of the available studies focuses on the non-financial sector. The key
determinants behind firms motives to engage in political strategies are
outlined below:
1. Size. The general consensus is that larger firms are more heavily
involved in corporate political activities, such as lobbying or PACs.
Schuler and Rehbein (1997) argue that firm size signals the capacity,
in the sense that it can a ord, to become engaged in such activities
in the first place. Indeed, larger firms are more likely to have the
financial strength to become involved, but at the same time such
firms have greater incentives to do so. Cooper et al. (2010) provide
evidence that larger firms contribute more to PACs, as opposed to
smaller firms. Focusing on lobbying activities, Hansen and Mitchell
(2000) and Brasher and Lowery (2006) suggest that firm size is an
important factor determining a firm’s decision to lobby. Hill et al.
(2013) find that firms are more likely to engage in lobbying when
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they are larger, have more investment opportunities and greater
cash-flows. A similar pattern is observed in financial institutions,
as Gibson et al. (2018) find that larger Bank Holding Companies are
more likely to engage in lobbying. Apart from size, the literature
has also reported firm growth as a potential determinant of polit-
ical activity undertaken. In particular, studies have shown that
increased capital (Myers, 2007) and R&D expenditure (Singh et al.,
2009) are positively associated with corporate political activity.
2. Risk. This element is considered "key" when it comes to assessing
the factors driving a firm’s decision to engage in political strate-
gies or not. Regarding non-financial firms, Myers (2007) use return
volatility to capture risk and find that lower levels of return volatility
are associated with greater political activity. Moreover, Boubakri
et al. (2012) find that connected firms are associated with lower cost
of capital requirements by investors, suggesting that such firms are
considered to entail lower risk. Turning at the distinctive nature of
financial firms, Gibson et al. (2018) use credit ratings and informa-
tion on whether an institution has implemented hedging strategies
or not as proxies for risk. In contrast to non-financial firms, Gibson
et al. (2018), find that lobbying banks are less creditworthy and
riskier.
3. Leverage. Another aspect discussed in the literature relates to
the extent of debt undertaken by a firm. In the corporate finance
literature, leverage is an aspect that can crucially influence various
decisions and firm outcomes, such as financial performance, cost
of debt or even financial distress. Empirical evidence suggests a
positive relationship between leverage and probability to engage in
political strategies of non-financial (e.g. Cooper et al., 2010; Faccio
et al., 2006), and financial firms (e.g. Gibson et al., 2018).
4. Firm performance. Empirical evidence has shown that perfor-
mance plays a prominant role in determining a firm’s decision to
engage in corporate political strategies. The majority of empirical
studies report an inverse relationship, suggesting that poor perform-
ing firms engage in lobbying or other strategies in order to overcome
shortcomings that lead to such poor performance. In fact, Myers
(2007) reports an inverse relationship between performance and
PAC contributions and in particular, explains that such firms may
engage in PACs contributions with the anticipation of enhancing
future performance.In line with this, Cooper et al. (2010)’s findings
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also suggest that lower performing firms are more likely to engage
in PACs contributions. In regard to lobbying, Chen et al. (2015)
report that firms increase their lobbying activity after periods of
poor performance.
5. Corporate governance. Although this aspect has not yet been
investigated in depth, some empirical evidence exists suggesting
that corporate governance could play a role when it comes to corpo-
rate political activity.In particular, Mathur et al. (2013) examine
the relationship between corporate governance and lobbying of non-
financial firms and find that higher managerial entrenchment is
associated with higher lobbying activity.
Apart from the above main determinants, empirical precedent has
pointed out the role of industry characteristics in regard to the inten-
sity of firm participation in corporate political strategies (e.g. Andres,
1985; Masters and Keim, 1985). This is not surprising, given that each
industry functions under di erent rules and structure, and as pointed
out by Hansen and Mitchell (2000) heavily regulated industries are in
"heightened" need of political influence. It is noteworthy to mention that,
a great portion of the aforementioned studies focus on firms outside the
financial sector. Although these studies indicate the factors that influ-
ence political strategies, there is an apparent need for further evidence
specifically regarding the financial sector. Moreover, there is also a need
in exploring determinants of political strategy engagement, above and
beyond the standard proxies of connectedness.
2.4 The nexus between political connections
and regulation
A strand of literature developing over the past years examines the inter-
play between political economy and regulations. This literature dates
back to Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), and Peltzman (1976), the pioneers
of the theoretical models of regulatory influence. Besley and Coate (2001)
and Grossman and Helpman (2001) provide theoretical models on how
firms can influence policy outcomes. Other studies (e.g. Mailath and
Mester, 1994; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007) have explored why and
to what extent regulators use their discretion. Moreover, Holburn and
Bergh (2008) develop a theoretical argument suggesting that firms oper-
ating in heavily regulated industries have a higher probability to engage
in corporate political strategies in order to influence changes in legisla-
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tion towards their own interest. It is worth highlighting at this point,
that the common ground of the aforementioned studies evolves around
explaining how firms can influence the design of regulatory rules. As
extensively discussed below, a great portion of the empirical literature
emphasizes on how firms are able to influence regulatory enforcement
through their political connections. Therefore, regarding the theoretical
strand of studies, there appears to be a gap when it comes to explaining
how firms influence the enforcement of regulatory authorities. This in
turn consists a core point of interest in the development of the theoretical
model presented in Chapter 4.
Despite the availability of theoretical literature, empirical studies
on this aspect have been on the rise relatively recently. As part of this
strand of literature, a number of empirical studies provide evidence con-
firming that regulatory decisions and certain firm outcomes are subject
to political influence exerted by organizations that engage in political
strategies (such as lobbying, PACs, etc.) or other type of connections (e.g.,
board - based, professional networks, etc.). The areas explored in regard
to regulation and legislation vary. For instance, some of these studies
focus on SEC enforcement actions (Correia, 2014; Fulmer et al., 2018),
whereas others examine fraud detection and enforcement against fraud
(Yu and Yu, 2011; Wu et al., 2016). In the banking industry context,
Lambert (2019) explores regulatory enforcement actions initiated by
US financial regulators. Other areas explored in the literature include
tax enforcement e ectiveness (Lin et al., 2018), public reports of major
violations for safety compliance (Fisman and Wang, 2015), government
procurement contracts (Goldman et al., 2013), corporate bailouts (Faccio
et al., 2006), and preferential access to finance (Claessens et al., 2008).
Focusing on the non-financial sector, Faccio et al. (2006) in their cross-
country study explore among other things, the relationship between
political connections and corporate bailouts during the years 1997-2002.
Their key findings confirm that politically connected firms are more likely
to be bailed-out. Results are even more pronounced for cases where firms
are located in countries that the IMF or World Bank provide financial
aid. Exploring the e ect of lobbying activity, Yu and Yu (2011) assess
the relationship between lobbying activity and corporate fraud detection
across ten di erent industries of US firms between 1998-2004. Their
key findings suggest that lobbying firms involved in fraudulent activities
appear to have lower probability of being detected, as opposed to their
non-lobbying peers. What is more is that fraudulent firms spend more
money on lobbying activities in comparison to non-fraudulent firms.
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Using a sample of publicly traded firms, Goldman et al. (2013) examine
whether and how political connections identified for key members of
the board could influence the allocation of government procurement
contracts. Their main findings suggest that members of the board who
were connected to the elected party, enjoyed higher chances of being
allocated a government procurement contract. Making use of data on
lobbying and PACs contributions, Correia (2014) investigates whether
politically connected firms have lower SEC enforcement costs. Her key
findings confirm that politically connected firms are less likely to receive
enforcement actions and tend to face lower penalties. Moreover, whilst
both PACs contributions and lobbying reduce the probability of receiving
an enforcement action at the first place, PACs can also reduce the penalty
once an enforcement action has been filed, whereas lobbying cannot
(unless lobbyists involved have prior connection to the SEC, e.g., through
past employers). Adelino and Dinc (2014) explore the e ect of lobbying on
government decisions, in the form of fund allocation under the Stimulus
Act. Using data on US firms for the time frame between 2008-2009,
they provide evidence suggesting that lobbying activity enhanced the
probability of firms to be allocated stimulus fund.
Outside the US context, Wu et al. (2016) explore the relationship
between political connections and institutional investors on corporate
fraud detection. Their findings show that firms owned by larger pro-
portions of institutional investors are less likely to receive regulatory
enforcement actions for fraudulent activities. Regarding political influ-
ence, they provide evidence confirming that political connections reduce
regulatory enforcement likelihood. This relationship is more prominent
in cases of non-state-owned firms operating in a weaker legal environ-
ment. Another study on Chinese companies (Lin et al., 2018) examines
whether political connections of board members influences the extent of
tax-avoidance. Using information on tax-related enforcement activity for
the years between 2003-2013, their findings suggest that fines imposed
for tax income understatement are lower than for cases where connec-
tions are identified. Another recent study by Fulmer et al. (2018) focuses
on favorable treatment of individuals. In particular, they use political
contributions as a measure of influence to assess their impact of personal
contributions on government enforcement. Their findings overall show
that political contributions by individuals reduce government enforce-
ment by the SEC and Department of Justice (DoJ) against individuals
involved in fraudulent activities.
Turning to the empirical studies exploring the financial services in-
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dustry, one group of studies focuses on potential (favourable) changes in
regulation and allocation of government support in cases where political
activity is identified for certain institutions. An early study by Kroszner
and Strahan (1999) examines bank branching deregulation in the 1970s
and the 1980s in the US, finding that pressure exerted by special in-
terest groups had an impact on the elimination of restrictions on bank
branching. Focusing on the financial crisis, Mian et al. (2010) examine
whether and how the voting behavior of members of Congress is driven
by constituent and special interests, as well as political ideology. Their
findings confirm the power of the aforementioned interests and ideology
in congressional voting. Moreover, they suggest that higher financial
sector contributions increased the probability of Congressional members
supporting the bailout legislation of 2008.
Igan et al. (2012) examine the relationship between lending patterns
and lobbying expenditures for regulation in regard to mortgage lending
and securitization of US banks during the 2000-2008 time period. They
find that institutions that engage in lobbying were involved in riskier
lending practices ex ante and had worse performance ex post. Moreover,
lobbying banks appear to have higher chances of being part of a bailout
program. In a somehow related study, Duchin and Sosyura (2012) ex-
amine the relationship between political connections between banks and
regulators and/or members of Congress, and government investment
(in the form of Troubled Asset Relief Program - TARP). Their findings
confirm, among other things, that politically connected financial firms are
more likely to be funded through the Capital Purchase Program (CPP).
Adams (2013) finds that o cers of larger banks are more likely to obtain
Federal Reserve directorship, adding value in terms of positive average
market reaction. Moreover, her findings reveal some evidence that banks
with Federal Reserve directorships have lower probability to cease their
operations in comparison to other banks within the industry.
Focusing on de-regulation, Igan and Mishra (2014) employ a sample
of US banks including information on the lobbying activity, campaign
contributions and other network connections among lobbyists and leg-
islators for the years from 1999 to 2006. Their findings suggest that
higher lobbying from financial sector encouraged deregulation during
the pre-crisis period. Their baseline findings were more pronounced for
banks that hired lobbyists with prior employment in legislative bodies.
Finally, Agarwal et al. (2018) provide an alternative route of influencing
legislative outcomes. Using a sample of US banks, they provide evi-
dence suggesting that foreclosure delays are able to function as a way of
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pressurising politicians and achieving favourable legislative outcomes.
Another group of studies focuses on exploring the extent to which polit-
ical connections influence regulatory decision-making, captured through
the avoidance of fine or enforcement action issuance. Focusing on the
revolving door, Braun and Raddatz (2010) find that banks that are po-
litically connected are larger and more profitable than non-connected
banks, despite being less leveraged and having less risk. They suggest
that banks may hire former politicians in order to ensure favourable reg-
ulatory treatment. Using cross-state enforcement actions of regulators,
Lucca et al. (2014) find that gross worker inflows into regulation from the
private sector and gross outflows from regulation are both higher during
periods of intense enforcement, although the outflows are significantly
smaller in magnitude. They conclude that their results are in favour of
the regulatory schooling hypothesis rather than the quid-pro-quo expla-
nation of the revolving door. Shive and Forster (2016) reach a similar
conclusion. They find that financial firms hire former employees of their
regulators with the aim to reduce risk, and there is limited direct evi-
dence of quid-pro-quo behavior in regulatory event frequency and fines.
Finally, the most recent study in this steam is that of Lambert (2019),
who examines the relationship between lobbying activity and regulatory
enforcement in the U.S banking industry. His findings suggest that lob-
bying banks are less likely to receive regulatory enforcement actions.
Moreover, his baseline results are more pronounced during the financial
crisis period.
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Chapter 3
Does political influence
distort banking regulation?
Evidence from the US
For a working paper version of this chapter please see:
Papadimitri, P. Pasiouras, F., Pescetto, G., Wohlschlegel, A. (2018).
Does political influence distort banking supervision? Evidence from
the US Banking sector. Available at: http://repec.port.ac.uk/
EconFinance/PBSEconFin_2018_09.pdf.
3.1 Introduction
The regulatory and supervisory architecture of the banking sector has
received extensive attention, with interest therein being renewed during
the crisis and the post-crisis period. While policy makers and academics
have traditionally focused on prudential - and most recently macropru-
dential - regulations, attention has, since the financial crisis, increasingly
been shifted to the role of political influence, which runs high on the
agenda of the banking industry.
The interest in this latter issue is not surprising for at least two rea-
sons. First, regulatory capture and political influence has been cited as
one of the reasons that led to the crisis. For instance, the 2011 report
of the national commission on the causes of the financial and economic
crisis in the US concludes that "widespread failures in financial regu-
lation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s
financial markets. More than 30 years of deregulation and reliance on
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self-regulation by financial institutions, championed by former Federal
Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and others, supported by successive
administrations and Congress, and actively pushed by the powerful fi-
nancial industry at every turn, had stripped away key safeguards, which
could have helped avoid catastrophe" (p. xviii). Second, the high level
of regulatory oversight and policy complexities in the banking industry
imply that political connections, lobbying, and influence, may be par-
ticularly valuable (Gropper et al., 2015; Igan and Lambert, 2018). In
fact, as highlighted in earlier sections of the thesis the financial sector
ranks amongst the top spenders in lobbying and campaign contributions
according to data provided by the Center for Responsive Politics. Igan
and Lambert (2018) also point out that, between 1998 and 2016, the
US financial sector spent $7.4 billion on lobbying. Most importantly,
during the 2016 US election cycle, the dollar amount of lobbying and
campaign contributions by large banks, hedge funds and other financial
institutions hit a record high approximately 25% higher than the amount
spent during the 2007-2008 elections (McLannahan and Jopson, 2017).
Focusing on the US banking sector, the main objective of the present
chapter is to examine whether and how political influence impacts the
decision making of financial regulators. To fulfill this objective a hand-
collected data-set is constructed including information on US Commercial
Banks and biographical information of Congressional Committee chair-
men from the period 2000-2015. Overall, the results confirm that banks
with political connections are less likely to receive a severe type regula-
tory enforcement action. These results hold when a set of estimations are
performed to examine the robustness of the initial results obtained. First,
endogeneity concerns are addressed by implementing two methodological
approaches: (i) Instrumental variable analysis is implemented using the
chair’s home state’s political environment as an instrument for the chair
dummy and (ii) Propensity-score matching is also performed. Both meth-
ods yield results that are in line with the baseline findings, which rules
out concerns that these might be driven by correlations of unobserved
bank quality with the political influence variable, or by powerful banks
using their influence to get favourable candidates from their home state
appointed as committee chairs. Second, alternative control variables are
included and several sub-samples (e.g., crisis vs non-crisis years, large
banks, poor vs top capitalized banks) are examined in order to confirm
whether the results hold. In all these cases, the results remain the same.
Third, alternative factors that could enhance the understanding of po-
litical channels are also examined. Briefly, the findings suggest that in
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cases where the Chair’s seniority is higher, the financial sector’s con-
tributions are higher, and the level of vote concentration is greater, the
impact of local political influence on regulatory enforcement likelihood
is enhanced. Furthermore, the results suggest that, although commit-
tee membership exerts a significant impact on regulatory enforcement
likelihood, the impact of subcommittee chairmanship is insignificant.
In terms of bank-related traits, the results indicate that the committee
chair dummy is negative and statistically significant for both listed and
non-listed parent companies. When parent-related traits are examined,
such as company age, the core variable of interest is highly significant in
the case of older than average parent companies, whereas the chair e ect
is much weaker and only significant at the 10% level for younger parent
companies. Moreover, reported results suggest that political influence is
statistically significant only in the case of banks that operate in a single
state. Last but not least, the overall state environment appears to play
a role, too. In particular, political influence appears to matter in states
with lower economic freedom, higher corruption, lower levels of religiosity,
and higher polarization.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2
provides an overview of the institutional background of U.S Politics
and U.S Banking supervision. Section 3.3 discusses the key related
studies to this chapter and presents the key hypotheses. Section 3.4
provides a description of the sample, data and variables, while section
3.5 provides an overview of the methodology employed and presents the
results. Section 3.6 adds the findings of the further analysis carried out
and, finally, Section 3.7 o ers concluding remarks.
3.2 Institutional background
3.2.1 US Senate, House of Representatives and Con-
gressional Committees
The US Congress is the legislative branch of the US Federal government
and is composed of two chambers: the Senate (upper chamber) and the
House of Representatives (lower chamber). Senators and Congressmen
(members of House of Representatives) are primarily chosen by direct
election.1
The US Senate is made up of 100 Senators (two for each state), who
serve a six-year term. The Senate’s powers and functions, as outlined
1 In some cases, Senators may be chosen by gubernatorial appointment.
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by Article One of the United States Constitution,2 vary from "advice and
consent" and approval of legislation suggested by the House of Represen-
tatives, to electing one of the top two recipients for the Vice President’s
o ce in the case where no candidate receives a majority of electors. The
House of Representatives consists of 435 voting members, each represent-
ing a congressional district, and 6 non-voting members. Each member
serves a two-year term, and there is no limit as to the number of terms an
individual can serve. Each state is allocated a minimum of one member.
The primary function of the House of Representatives is to initiate bills,
which are then sent to Senate.
The US Congress deals with a range of policy issues. The Committees
of the US Congress are legislative sub-organizations that are in charge
of dealing with specific issues. This enables the e cient handling of such
policy issues and it allows members to develop specialized knowledge on
specific policy matters within their area of jurisdiction. A Committee’s
main tasks include monitoring government operations, identifying issues
suitable for legislation, examining information on specialized issues
and suggesting lines of action in their respective controlling body. The
House has 23 Committees, whereas the Senate has 20. In regard to
the Committee assignments (including the Chair position), members
are appointed by majority vote. For the Chair position, seniority had
traditionally been an important factor considered during the appointment
procedure. Although all members exert influence on policy issues related
to the committee’s area of jurisdiction, the chair has considerable power
to influence the policy-making procedure.3 The powers of the Chairman
include setting the legislative agenda, organizing meetings with the
members of the committee, shaping debates related to particular issues,
as well influencing the legislation brought to a vote.
As discussed earlier, the primary aim is to examine the level of influ-
ence of elected o cials (members of House or Senate) in shaping bank
regulatory decisions. There are two Committees closely related to the
financial services industry which are taken into consideration in this
study, namely the Committee of Banking, Housing and Urban A airs
(Senate’s Committee) and the Financial Services Committee (House of
2For further information visit https://constitution center.org/interactive-
constitution/articles/article-i.
3There is a growing body of literature that examines the role of Congressional
Committees in policy making. For example, Berry and Fowler (2017) find that the
majority of a committee’s power is concentrated among chairs. Gropper et al. (2013)
find that banks head-quartered in states where an elected o cial serves as a chair
in their respective committee, tend to outperform banks in other states. Cohen et al.
(2011) reveal that there is increased federal spending in the states where an elected
o cial is a chair of an important committee.
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Representatives’ Committee).4 For example, the Banking, Housing, and
Urban A airs Committee engages in writing and passing legislation
related, among other things, to banking, insurance, financial markets,
securities and housing. The Committee also oversees the work of the
Federal Reserve System, US Department of Treasury, US Securities
and Exchange Commission and other financial regulators. Although all
members of the Committee can exert, up to some extent, political power
and influence, the Chair has considerable power to influence and shape
regulatory issues related to the Committee’s area of jurisdiction. Since
Chairmen are also elected o cials, one could expect the existence of a
channel of influence flowing from the political environment within a state
to the regulatory treatment of banks.
3.2.2 Enforcement Actions & US Banking supervision
The US banking sector operates under a dual banking system. This
relates to the co-existence of federal and state banking systems. Three
main regulatory agencies are responsible for the regulation and super-
vision of US banks: (i) the O ce of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) which is in charge of federally chartered banks (national banks),
(ii) Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), which supervises state-chartered in-
stitutions that are members of the Federal Reserve System and (iii) the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which is responsible for
federally insured depository institutions, which includes FED chartered
banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System, as well as
state-chartered thrift institutions. For banks that are chartered on both
a federal and state level, supervisory responsibilities are allocated amid
the three regulatory agencies. According to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, safety and soundness, deposit
insurance, capital adequacy and systemic risk are considered to be the
traditional components of US banking regulation. Regulatory agencies,
therefore, monitor the safety and soundness conditions of the banks they
supervise by conducting examinations on an on-site and o -site basis.
"Full-scope" on-site examinations are carried out by the regulatory
agency in charge at least once a year.5 Depending on the information
obtained through the above process, the agency assigns a rating, which
reveals the financial condition and performance of the bank. The afore-
mentioned procedure concerns the evaluation of the components of the
Uniform Financial Institutions Rating Systems (UFIRS). This system
4The name of the House of Representatives Committee has changed, but "Financial
Services Committee" is the most up to date name.
5Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, 1991.
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is commonly referred to as the CAMELS rating system, which includes:
Capital Adequacy (C), Asset quality (A), Management (M), Earnings (E),
Liquidity (L) and Sensitivity to market risk (S). 6 After the assessment
procedure, a composite rating is assigned on each regulated institution
and ranges from 1 to 5. Institutions that have been assigned a rating
of 1 or 2 appear to have a small weakness that may be controlled by its
management or Board of Directors. A rating of 3 or 4 suggests that there
may be moderate to severe weaknesses encountered by the examined
institution. In such cases, the managerial department may not be able
or willing to promptly address the deficiencies that led to the weaknesses
observed during the examination process. Finally, a rating of 5 reflects
risky practices adopted by the institution and may lead to poor perfor-
mance, as well as other severe problems. CAMELS ratings are strictly
confidential, are not revealed to the public, and are only available to each
institution’s senior management.
O -site audits complement the CAMELS ratings from the on-site
examinations and are implemented in order to monitor supervised insti-
tutions. In this case, information obtained by prior examinations and
financial information provided in the Quarterly Reports of Condition and
Income (Call Reports) is assessed. The above mechanisms are helpful in
developing "early warning" models, which aid to identify institutions with
riskier behaviour and, thus, require supervisory attention. An important
element to be highlighted at this point is that information derived by
on-site and o -site programs, in combination with the CAMELS com-
posite ratings assigned to each depository institution, play a key role in
determining the type of enforcement action imposed on a bank.
There are two types of regulatory enforcement actions. First, infor-
mal enforcement actions are mainly voluntary commitments formed by
the bank’s management, board of directors or trustees when the level
of misconduct is less severe. These actions are not publicly disclosed or
legally enforceable and their main objective is to correct weaknesses iden-
tified during the supervisory process and reassure conformity with laws
and regulations. Informal actions are imposed in cases where CAMELS
6Capital adequacy refers to the amount and quality of the institution’s capital. Asset
quality assesses the levels of existing and potential credit risk related to the institution’s
loan and investment portfolio. In addition, the management component, which is
primarily a qualitative measure, refers to the e ectiveness of internal control and audit
systems; as well as the overall capability of board of directors and management to meet
their roles. The earnings component rates the bank’s earnings (current and expected).
Liquidity refers to the assessment of the bank’s ability to honour its cash payments as
they fall due. Finally, sensitivity to market risk considers the management’s capability
to determine and control risks derived from the institution’s exposure to its trade
operations in the financial markets, as well as interest rate risk from non-trading
positions.
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ratings are 3 or above. Common types of informal enforcement actions
are commitments, Board resolutions, or Memorandum of Understand-
ing.7 Second, formal enforcement actions are imposed in cases where
misconduct is severe or where previously imposed informal actions have
not been adequate or e ective. These types of actions are publicly dis-
closed and legally enforceable and are issued against institutions with
CAMELS composite ratings of 4 or 5 or, in some cases, 3. The most
common types of formal actions are termination of insurance, cease and
desist orders, removal and prohibition orders, suspension orders and civil
money penalties.8
One particular aspect in the context of the present chapter is that
enforcement actions must be "tailored" around an institution’s individual
characteristics and requirements. In general, enforcement actions target
at correcting imperfections identified during the examination procedure
and restoring an institutions financial health. The level of severity of an
action depends on a variety of factors. For instance, the overall finan-
cial performance, weaknesses, and the attitude of an institution’s bank
management play an important role in the decision of the type of formal
enforcement action to be imposed. Moreover, composite CAMELS ratings
play a crucial role in this decision. Finally, prior non-addressed problems
or shortcomings can lead to the implementation of formal enforcement
actions or, in some cases, of additional formal actions.
3.3 Background and hypotheses development
3.3.1 Key related studies and contribution to litera-
ture
The present chapter is related to and contributes to several strands of
literature. First, it relates to studies examining the interplay between po-
litical economy and general regulation. Second, it is related to a growing
number of empirical studies providing evidence that regulatory decisions
and firm outcomes are subject to political influence exerted by organi-
zations. It is important to highlight at this point that this section is
dedicated to the discussion of the points of relevance and di erentiation
between the analysis performed in the current chapter and some of the
key studies of the literature. For a full overview of the related literature
please see Chapter 2.
The first closely related paper is that of Lambert (2019). In his study,
7OCC PPM, 5310,-3 at 8-9, 2011; FDIC, 2014, II - 8.1.
8FDIC, 2014, II - 8.1; OCC PPM, 5310,-3 at 8-9, 2011.
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he finds that lobbying banks are less likely to receive regulatory enforce-
ment actions. However, the analysis of the present chapter di erentiates
from the work of Lambert in some crucial respects. The most important
one is that, while he focuses on bank lobbying activities, the present anal-
ysis investigates the impact of the political influence of elected o cials
on regulatory decisions. This is particularly important for at least two
reasons. First, Igan and Lambert (2018) highlight that, while the size of
the bank lobbying market appears to be big, the expenditures are actually
rather small when compared to the size of the banking industry, the value
of policies, and the benefits at stake. One potential explanation that they
provide is that special interest groups do not need to spend much once
they have reached out to the legislator or regulator and provided some
key information. As an example, they mention that for a congressman,
the relevant piece of information could be the impact of his vote for or
against a particular bill on his re-election prospects. Another explanation
that they o er is that lobbying expenditures are supplemented by other
mechanisms of influence like quid pro quo agreements, career concerns,
relationships, and persuasion. In the present study, to account for such
factors, political influence is captured by whether or not a bank’s head-
quarters are located in a state represented by a Senator or Congressman
who is a Chairman in a Committee relevant to banking and financial
services. The second reason for which the impact of the political influence
of elected o cials on regulatory decisions is important is that it has re-
ceived considerably less attention compared to firms’ corporate political
strategies, such as lobbying (e.g. Lambert, 2019), campaign contributions
(e.g. Correia, 2014) or employment connections (e.g. Shive and Forster,
2016).
Therefore, the main attempt in the case of the present chapter is
to shed more light on one of the mechanisms through which political
influence may work. This approach makes this analysis related to recent
studies by Gropper et al. (2013, 2015) who use the same proxy for polit-
ical influence to conclude that it "pays" to have friends in high places.
However, these two studies focus on bank profitability and stock market
performance and not on regulatory decisions. In contrast, by focusing
on regulatory enforcement actions against banks headquartered in an
elected o cial’s home state, the present study provides direct evidence on
a channel via which this elected o cial may exert the political influence
associated with holding a chair position in a congressional committee
(House or Senate) relevant to the financial industry. Shielding banks
from regulatory enforcement actions is a plausible channel for a commit-
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tee chair to exert his influence for two reasons: First, enforcement actions
must be appropriately "tailored" around the unique features and needs
of each institution. Essentially, this means that the regulators have
some flexibility on the severity and type of action that will be imposed.
Second, the regulators had, in many instances, worked with members of
the Senate before, or they had been nominated and supported by them.9
3.3.2 Hypotheses development
The research objective of the present chapter is to examine whether banks
headquartered in a "politically important state" are more likely to receive
more favourable regulatory treatment. Within this context, a "politically
important state" refers to any state where an elected o cial (Senator or
Congressman) holds a chair position within a congressional committee
related to the banking and financial services industry. It is important to
note that Senators and Congressmen very often visit their home states
in order to meet with citizens and/or other systematically important
parties, like banking institutions. During such interactions, banks can
collectively or individually exert influence towards congressional o cials
and can gauge their attention more conveniently to regulatory and super-
visory matters. In the meantime, banks adopt various corporate political
strategies, such as spending money on campaign contributions, in order
to further influence and support the congress and bureaucrats. In turn,
members of Congress listen to the issues raised during these meetings
and have the power to raise these on a higher level. This is even more
pronounced if the elected o cial holds a chair position in a congressional
committee, which is in fact one of the principal reasons for which this
analysis focuses on the political influence of the chair.
9Take for example, Martin J. Gruenberg, the 20th Chairman of the FDIC, who re-
ceived Senate confirmation on November 15, 2012. Previously he held other important
positions in the FDIC board, and before that he had broad congressional experience in
the financial services and regulatory areas. He served as Senior Counsel to Senator
Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD) on the sta  of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban A airs from 1993 to 2005. Mr. Gruenberg advised the Senator on issues of
domestic and international financial regulation, monetary policy and trade. He also
served as Sta  Director of the Banking Committee’s Subcommittee on International
Finance and Monetary Policy from 1987 to 1992. As another example, on July 27 2017,
US Senator Mike Crapo (R-Idaho), Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban A airs, delivered the following remarks during a full com-
mittee hearing on the nominations of Mr. Joseph Otting, of Nevada, to be Comptroller
of the Currency; and The Honorable Randal Quarles, of Colorado, to be a Member of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System."Mr. Otting brings a particular
expertise and understanding of our banking system from a long career in financial
services.I am confident that Mr. Otting will bring strong leadership to the OCC" and
"Mr. Quarles has a wealth of government and private sector experience dealing with
both domestic and international financial markets. He is no stranger to public service,
having previously served in multiple top posts in the Treasury Department".
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Reasonably, the above can be beneficial for a bank, depending on
the intentions of the elected o cial. For instance, the politician may
be a "social planner", thus, aiming to maximize social welfare. Under
this view, the politician will act in such ways as to promote the proper
implementation of regulations, reforms and enforcement mechanisms.
Alternatively, the politician may be "selfish" in terms of catering for
his/her own interests, aiming to pursue his/her own personal agenda
(such as the possibility of re-election). Under this view, the politician
will provide accommodating treatment for the banks in his/her home
state. This accommodating treatment could include delaying or avoiding
the closure or punishment of financially troubled institutions or the
implementation of less stringent regulation for a particular group of
banks. In exchange, banks provide their support through campaign
contributions, lobbying or even future employment.
Moreover, a prior study by Correia (2014) attributes the political
control of regulatory agencies to two distinct theories, the Iron Triangles
and the Congressional Dominance theories. The former states that a
mutually beneficial, three-way relationship exists between agencies (such
as regulators), special interest groups and congressional committees.
Under this view, congressional committees o er political support and
funding to agencies that provide a lax regulatory environment or specific
favours to special interest groups. Special interest groups support (e.g.,
through votes or monetary contributions) congressional committees, who
in turn have the power to pressurize agencies to implement favourable
treatment or policies towards the special interest groups. The latter
theory suggests that a principal-agent problem arises between congress
and agencies. In particular, it suggests that Congress assigns various
tasks and formulates alternative monitoring systems in order to motivate
agencies to act on their behalf, i.e., to maximize political support.
In addition, there is some evidence of a geographic component of firms’
political influence and, more specifically, that firms located in a politi-
cian’s home state enjoy preferential treatment. Faccio and Parsley (2009)
measure the value of this political influence to companies by showing that
the unexpected termination of this influence (e.g., because the politician
resigns) is associated with a 1.7% reduction in the company’s market
value. Preferential treatment may be manifest in the form of higher fed-
eral investment in that state generally (Cohen et al., 2011) , or banks from
this state being less likely to fail despite higher leverage (Kostovetsky,
2015) or more likely to receive government funding (Duchin and Sosyura,
2012). In that last context, Chavaz and Rose (2016) suggest that the pref-
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erential treatment might have been motivated by the expectation that
banks that benefit from such treatment will adopt investment policies
that are more in line with the politician’s preferences, but other motives
such as the expectation that this behaviour be rewarded by voters, or
politicians being more likely to have personal or financial ties with local
banks, also seem plausible.
Given the above discussion, the main hypothesis to be tested is the
following:
H1. Banks that are headquartered in a politically important state are
more likely to receive favourable treatment by their supervisors, in the
form of a lower probability of receiving an enforcement action.
3.4 Sample, data and variable selection
3.4.1 Sample description
The working sample of the present analysis consists of a fully hand-
collected dataset including information for US Commercial Banks for the
years 2000q1 - 2015q4. Financial characteristics of banks are obtained
by the 031/341 Call-report files available from the Federal Financial
Institutions Council (FFIEC) and Chicago Fed website. The sections
below provide an overview of the construction procedure of the final work-
ing sample, the variables included in the analysis, and their descriptive
statistics. Table 3.1 provides a list of the variables.
3.4.2 Enforcement action variables
Data on enforcement actions are retrieved from the three federal regula-
tory agencies’ websites, i.e., those of the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB),
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the O ce of
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The types of actions taken (in order
of severity) are: Deposit Insurance Termination, Cease and Desist orders,
Formal Written Agreement/ Supervisory Agreement, Prompt Correc-
tive Action/ Capital Directive, Civil Money Penalty, Call Report Penalty,
Penalties on violations of specific laws. A detailed description of each type
along with their classification, can be found in Table A in Appendix 3A.
Enforcement actions are split into two categories: severe and less severe.
While initially all types of actions are considered, subsequently the focus
is put on the severe ones only, i.e., Deposit insurance termination, Cease
and Desist orders, Formal Written Agreements and Prompt Corrective
Actions. There are various reasons for this. First, severe actions are
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more closely related to safety and soundness issues of banks.
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In contrast, less severe actions are usually issued against institutional
a liated parties and are, therefore, not related to deficiencies observed
over the financial condition of an institution. Moreover, Delis et al. (2016)
show that such actions do not have an impact on a bank’s financial
condition. Finally, it is worth noting that the preliminary results of the
present study show that these types of actions are not associated with
political influence.
In order to match the enforcement action data to the Call Report
Data, two steps are followed. First, in cases where the unique identifier
number of the punished institution (cert or rssd9001) is available, this is
directly matched with the one provided by the Call Report data. Second,
if this information is not provided, then the name, city and state of each
institution is matched. Since Call Report data are provided on a quarterly
basis, enforcement actions are also matched by quarter. For example, if
Bank XX received an enforcement action during January 1st- March 31st,
then this information is assigned to the 1st quarter. In the case where a
bank received multiple types of enforcement actions during a given period,
the most severe type is retained. A dummy variable ("Action all types")
is constructed, which takes the value of 1 if a bank received a formal
enforcement action of any type (severe or less severe) in a particular
quarter and the value of 0 otherwise. Two additional variations of this
dummy variable are also constructed. The first ("Severe actions") takes
the value of 1 in the case of severe actions , and the value of 0 otherwise.
Similarly, the second ("Less severe actions") takes the value of 1 in the
case of less severe actions, and the value of 0 otherwise.
3.4.3 Political influence variable
Information related to Committee Chairmanships is obtained by the rel-
evant committee’s website: US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban A airs10 and US House of Representatives Financial Services
Committee.11 Biographical information of Committee Chairmen is ob-
tained by the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress.12
The timeframe of the analysis addresses the period between 2000q1 -
2015q4, thus, covering 9 Congresses (106th -114th).
The present study focuses on two particular Committees that special-
ize on policy issues related to banking and financial services. These are
the Committee of Banking, Housing and Urban A airs (Senate) and the
10https://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/home.
11https://financialservices.house.gov.
12http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp.
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Financial Services Committee (House of Representatives). The reason
being is because their area of jurisdiction is closely related to the banking
sector and, thus, it is expected that it is more likely that they would
be approached by banks in order to discuss or settle any issues. The
core analysis focuses on elected o cials that hold a chair position on
these Committees. The rationale behind this decision is that the chair
of a committee exerts superior influence than that of any other mem-
ber. However, in a robustness check the scope of the political variable
is extended by including all members of both committees. To capture
political connections, a binary variable ("Committee chair") is employed,
which takes 1 if a bank’s parent company operates in a state where an
elected o cial (Senator or Congressman) holds a chair position in their
respective committee in a given year, and 0 otherwise.
3.4.4 Financial variables
As mentioned earlier, the CAMELS ratings play a crucial role, for regula-
tory purposes, in assessing the financial condition and performance of
banking institutions. However, these ratings are confidential and there-
fore the use of individual financial ratios proposed in the literature are
considered as proxies. Cole and White (2012) show that such traditional
proxies for CAMELS components do an excellent job in explaining the
bank failures during 2009 as they did in the 1985-1992 crisis. The ap-
proach followed for the analysis of the current chapter is consistent with
the one adopted in past studies (Lambert, 2019; Delis et al., 2016). First,
bank size ("Size") is also controlled for in order to account for di erences
in terms of organizational complexity, too-big-to fail issues, and the fact
that large firms may excert higher levels of political influence (Schi er
and Weder, 2001). Moreover, capital adequacy is captured by the "Risk-
based capital ratio". To control for asset quality, and in particular credit
risk, the Risk-weighted assets ratio is used. Also, the "Return on assets"
ratio is utilised as a measure of earnings and managerial ability. To
proxy for the liquidity component, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets
is considered ("Liquidity ratio"). A detailed description of these variables
is available in Table 3.1. Financial variables have been trimmed in the
(-3,+3) standard deviations window around their mean.
3.4.5 Descriptive statistics
This section is dedicated in presenting the key descriptive statistics of the
variables considered in the analysis. Table 3.2 provides the descriptive
statistics of the enforcement actions of the sample. The bank-quarter
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number of all types of enforcement actions in the sample is 3,925, from
which 1,955 are of severe type and 1,970 of non-severe type. Given that
the focus of the analysis is on severe types of actions, a break-down
of these types is presented in the same table. The majority of cases
refers to Cease and Desist orders (N=969), followed by Formal Written
Agreements (N=844) and Prompt Corrective Actions (N=157). The rarest
type of action is that of Deposit Insurance Termination, where only 3
cases are recorded. In regard to the actions issued per agency, FDIC
appears to have issued the most severe actions (N=1,223) in comparison
to the actions issued by the FED (N=56) and the OCC (N=676). Overall,
there is a general increase in the total number of enforcement actions
issued around the crisis years, with the peak being reached in the year
2010.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics of enforcement actions
Year All Severe Less sev. Breakdown of severe actions Severe Act. per agency
C& D D.I. P.C.A. FWA FDIC FED OCC
2000 76 51 25 29 2 1 21 20 2 29
2001 111 60 51 31 0 3 26 25 2 33
2002 126 79 47 42 0 1 37 29 1 49
2003 143 70 73 51 0 0 22 37 0 33
2004 159 75 84 49 0 0 26 36 3 36
2005 171 65 106 48 0 0 22 30 0 35
2006 156 45 111 27 0 0 19 18 2 25
2007 185 63 122 48 0 0 16 39 1 23
2008 300 150 150 95 0 0 56 75 1 74
2009 593 364 229 232 0 27 106 243 11 110
2010 710 420 290 84 0 55 281 301 16 103
2011 450 228 222 163 1 37 27 169 5 54
2012 314 153 161 35 0 16 103 111 5 37
2013 186 72 114 21 0 8 45 47 0 25
2014 135 38 97 9 0 7 22 25 5 8
2015 109 22 87 5 0 2 15 18 2 2
Total 3,925 1955 1970 969 3 157 844 1223 56 676
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of the enforcement actions sample of the analysis. The sample period is
2000q1 - 2015q. All action types is a dummy variable that takes "1" if a bank received an enforcement action of
any type in quarter t, "0" otherwise. Severe actions is a dummy variable that takes "1" if a bank received a severe
type of enforcement action in quarter t, "0" otherwise. Less severe actions is a dummy variable that takes "1" if a
bank received a less severe type of enforcement action in quarter t, "0" otherwise. Data on enforcement actions is
retrieved from the OCC, FED and FDIC’s websites.
Turning to the political connection variables, the number of connec-
tions identified in the working sample is 18,603 (4.94%) bank-quarter
observations over the total 376,358 bank-quarters for the period 2000-
2015. From the summary information reported in Table 3.3, it appears
that for the Senate committee, there are five di erent chairmen present
in the sample, representing Texas, Maryland, Alabama, Connecticut
and South Dakota. As for the House Committee, there are four di erent
chairmen, who represent the states of Ohio, Massachusetts, Alabama and
Texas. In terms of party a liation, there are six Chairmen representing
the Republican party and four representing the Democratic party.
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The Chairmen’s experience while in service ranges from 11 to 33.5
years (on average), whereas their age ranges from 57 to 82 years (on
average). Finally, Table 3.4 provides the descriptive statistics of the
financial related variables, for the full sample (part i), political connected
banks only (part ii) and punished banks (part iii). Table 3.5 reports the
mean di erence of all variables for two groups, non-punished banks and
those punished with a severe enforcement action. There is divergence in
the mean values of the variables across samples in Table 3.5. Table 3.6
reports the correlation coe cients. According to the figures reported for
the full working sample, the average bank has a 0.16 risk-based capital
ratio and a risk-weighted assets ratio equal to 0.68. Return on assets
for the average bank equals to 0.006 and has a mean liquidity ratio
equal to 0.059. Finally, the natural logarithm of size equals 11.94 for the
mean bank of the full working sample. An observation of interest is that
punished banks are of lower quality in terms of capitalization (risk-based
capital ratio=0.12), asset quality (risk-weighted assets ratio=0.72) and
earnings (ROA=-0.007). However, it appears that punished banks are
more liquid (liquidity ratio=0.076) than non-punished banks. Moreover,
punished banks appear to be larger in size (natural logarithm of total
assets=12.32). Focusing on the political influence variable, it appears
to be higher for non-punished banks and this di erence is statistically
significant at the 1% level, as confirmed by the univariate test of means
in Table 3.5. At this point there is therefore, preliminary evidence for the
fact that politically connected banks are less often enforcement targets.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of core and financial variables
Observations Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
(i) Full sample
Severe Actions 374528 0.0052333 0 0.0721518 0 1
Committee chair 374528 0.0494703 0 0.2168481 0 1
Risk-based capital ratio 372851 0.1627947 0.1445853 0.0666491 -0.1676752 0.8203545
Risk-weighted assets ratio 372124 0.6855651 0.6924991 0.1273082 0.2852844 1.081971
Return on assets 374368 0.0069594 0.0065758 0.0096871 -0.1567464 0.1713443
Liquidity ratio 369494 0.0594606 0.0413084 0.0514141 -0.0024057 0.3194084
Size 374528 11.94797 11.80427 1.333464 3.332205 21.46335
(ii) Connected sample
Risk-based capital ratio 18454 0.1753796 0.1228466 0.0707974 -0.001486 0.8168582
Risk-weighted assets ratio 18381 0.6438928 0.7274467 0.1287669 0.285319 1.077301
Return on assets 18516 0.0076363 -0.0009424 0.0073914 -0.1132164 0.1699827
Liquidity ratio 18120 0.0667662 0.0568675 0.058359 0.0026748 0.3192939
Size 18528 12.09121 12.07847 1.411821 6.900731 19.43696
(iii) Punished sample
Risk-based capital ratio 1952 0.1242376 0.1551909 0.0578782 -0.1469169 0.5605881
Risk-weighted assets ratio 1945 0.7210423 0.6513182 0.1076446 0.2898475 1.075673
Return on assets 1950 -0.0073306 0.006783 0.022274 -0.1473495 0.115203
Liquidity ratio 1926 0.0769846 0.0445919 0.0597405 0.0005808 0.3169498
Size 1955 12.32602 11.90347 1.670912 8.840435 21.402
Table 3.4 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis. Section (i) provides the descriptive statistics
of the full sample. Sections (ii) and (iii), provide the descriptive statistics for politically connected and punished with severe
type enforcement actions banks, respectively. The sample period is 2000q1 - 2015q. Severe actions is a dummy variable that
takes "1" if a bank received a severe type of enforcement action in quarter t, "0" otherwise. Committee chair is dummy variable
that takes "1" if a bank’s parent company operates in a state where an elected o cial (Senator or Congressman) holds a chair
position in a Congressional Committee that oversees the banking and financial services in industry in a given year, "0" otherwise.
The Risk-based capital ratio is equal to the total qualifying capital divided by risk-weighted assets net of allowances and other
reductions. Risk- weighted assets ratio refers to the risk-weighted assets net of allowances and other reductions divided by total
assets. Return on assets are equal to the income (loss) before applicable income taxes and discontinued operations divided by total
assets. The liquidity ratio is calculated by dividing cash and cash equivalents plus US treasury securities with total assets. Bank
size equals the natural logarithm of total assets. Data on enforcement actions is retrieved from the OCC, FED and FDIC’s websites.
Committee chair data is retrieved from the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban A airs and the US House of
Representatives Financial Services Committee websites.Financial data is retrieved from the FFIEC 031/041 Call Reports.
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3.5 Empirical framework and results
3.5.1 Empirical model and baseline results
To examine the relationship between political influence and the likelihood
of an enforcement action, a non-linear probability model is estimated,
as done in empirical precedent. Therefore, as in Lambert (2019), the
baseline equation is estimated with a Probit model of the following form:
SevereActioni,k,t = ↵ +  1CommitteeChairi,k,t +  2Controlsi,k,t +  statek +  quartert + "i,k,t
(3.5.1)
where i refers to bank i, k refers to state k and t refers to quarter t. Sev-
ereActioni,k,t is a dummy variable that takes "1" if a bank i received an
enforcement action in quarter t and "0" otherwise. CommitteeChairi,k,t is
a dummy variable that takes "1" if bank i’s parent company operates in a
state where an elected o cial holds a chair position in a Congressional
Committee related to banking and financial services in quarter t, and
"0" otherwise. Therefore,  1 is the coe cient of the variable of interest
and reveals the e ect that politically important states have on the proba-
bility of receiving a severe type of enforcement action. Controlsi,k,t is a
vector of covariates accounting for bank-level characteristics for bank i at
quarter t. Given the nature of the setting, it is important to account for
the observable and unobservable characteristics across states. For this
purpose, a full set of state dummies is included. In order to account for
variation across time, a set of time dummies is also included in the model.
Equation 3.5.1 is estimated using robust standard errors clustered by
bank.
Table 3.7 provides the estimation results of the baseline model. Col-
umn (1) reports the results for all types of actions, and Column (2) reports
the results when severe types of actions taken into account, when Equa-
tion 3.5.1 is estimated using a Probit model specification. Both coe cient
estimates as well as marginal e ects at means are reported in order to
facilitate interpretation.
The coe cient of the core variable of interest, is negative and signif-
icant at the 1% level for severe types of actions, confirming our earlier
observations from Table 3.5. This suggests that banks whose parent
company operates in a politically important state are less likely to be
subject to severe types of enforcement actions. The significance of the
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core variable of interest deteriorates when all types of actions are taken
into account. Thus, the e ectiveness of the political influence measure
appears to be important for cases where banks are subject to enforcement
actions that are more closely related to more severe types of misconduct.13
The results also convey economic significance. Focusing on the severe type
of actions, political influence reduces by 0.1 percentage points the proba-
bility of a bank being punished with a severe type of action. Moreover,
given that the unconditional probability of a bank receiving a severe type
of action being equal to 0.5%; it can be inferred that political influence
reduces by almost 20% the probability of a bank receiving a severe type
of action. Although this figure is somewhat lower than the one reported
by Lambert (2019) (52.1%), it does still indicate a pronounced impact
of political influence on regulatory enforcement likelihood. A potential
reasoning behind this di erence could be that a lobbying bank imposes
pressure on the regulator or politician more directly than the kind of
political influence that is analysed in the present context.
The baseline model is estimated also by making use of a Linear Prob-
ability Model using fixed e ects. Columns (3) and (4) present the results
when all sanctions and severe type of actions only are taken to account,
respectively. The findings suggest that when controlling for fixed e ects
at the bank level, the coe cient of the core variable of interest remains
negative and statistically significant.
To examine further the sensitivity of the results to the use of addi-
tional models, Equation 3.5.1 is re-estimated under five assumptions:
(i) estimate a Binary Logit model, (ii) use of a suitably modified logit
model that accounts for the fact that enforcement actions can be seen
as "rare events",14 (iii) use of a multinomial logit model that accounts
simultaneously for all three possible outcomes (i.e., severe, less severe,
and no enforcement action), (iv) use of ordered logit and probit models
that take into account the ordering of the severity of the action, and (v)
estimate a binary model where the dependent variable takes the value of
"1" only if the bank received a "severe" enforcement action in that period.
As discussed earlier, in the results shown in specification 2 in Table 3.7,
13Indeed, when re-estimating Equation 3.5.1 using a dummy for less severe actions
only and dropping cases of severe actions from the analysis, the coe cient of interest is
statistically insignificant.
14King and Zeng (1999) highlight that models with binary dependent variables, like
logit and probit, can underestimate the probability of rare events. Descriptive statistics
in Tables 3.2 and 3.4 reveal that enforcement actions can be seen as rare events. Taking
together both types of enforcement actions, such actions represent about 1% of the total
of bank observations, whereas when the focus is on severe actions only, this percentage
drops to 0.50%. Therefore, as in Lambert (2019) , a robustness test is performed by
using a rare events logistic regression approach (King and Zeng, 1999, 2001; Tomz and
Zeng, 1999).
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the dependent variable takes the value of "1" in the case of severe actions
and "0" otherwise. Thus, the value of zero has been assigned in cases of
both less severe actions and no enforcement actions of any type. At this
stage, the cases of less severe actions are dropped from the analysis and
the model is re-estimated with the dependent variable taking the value
of "1" for severe actions and the value of "0" for no enforcement action of
any type.
In all the five cases discussed above, the baseline findings remain the
same and are consistent with the ones presented in Table 3.7. Therefore,
in the analysis that follows severe-type actions only are considered; an
approach that is consistent with Lambert (2019). Lambert (2019) pro-
vides two further justifications that could possibly also explain why less
severe actions appear to be insignificant. First, less severe actions are
usually issued against individuals a liated with an institution and not
because of the financial condition of the institution. Second, less severe
actions do not have a direct impact on bank activities.
As a further test, alternative variations of the control variables are
considered; by either using four quarter lags or their 1st di erences.
Finally, Equation 3.5.1 is re-estimated with the use of alternative bank-
specific control variables. For example, instead of the risk-based capital
ratio, the base model is estimated using the equity to assets ratio as a
measure of capitalization. Another example is the use of the natural
logarithm of deposits, which indicates the size of the bank’s sources of
stable funding. These controls are included one by one as well as jointly
in these set of regressions. The findings are robust to these variations.
In all the cases, the coe cient of the Committee chair variable remains
negative and statistically significant.
In terms of the remaining control variables, the findings are in line
with the ones of prior studies. Briefly, it appears that on average, pun-
ished banks are larger, less capitalized, and have lower risk weighted
assets, return on assets, and higher liquidity.
The following section is dedicated in examining the sensitivity of
the results obtained thus far by: (i) restricting the sample, (ii) using
additional control variables, and (iii) addressing endogeneity concerns.
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3.5.2 Robustness Analysis
3.5.2.1 The impact of the Financial Crisis
To begin with, the potential influence of the Financial crisis on the find-
ings of the present study are explored. As depicted in the descriptive
statistics in Table 3.2, the number of formal enforcement actions imposed
during the crisis years reached record high. The question that arises is
whether the impact of political influence during the years of the crisis
remains the same. To explore this, the baseline model is re-estimated by
restricting the analysis to the years 2007-2011. The reason for which the
focus is put on this time frame is that the pattern observed in Table 3.2
suggests that the increase in the number of sanctions is more pronounced
during these years. Column (1) in Table 3.8 reports the results obtained.
The overall findings suggest that the coe cient of the political influence
measure remains negative and statistically significant at the 1%.
3.5.2.2 Controlling for systematically important and Highly cap-
italised banks
Findings so far could be driven by a specific group of banks due to their
financial characteristics. The sensitivity tests implemented in this section
aim to address two main concerns. The first relates to the fact that top
performing or especially poorly performing banks could potentially be
influencing the estimation results. Thus, Equation 3.5.1 is re-estimated
by excluding the strongly capitalised banks of the sample (top 25%) and
then by excluding the poorly capitalised banks of the sample (bottom
25%).
The second concern relates to the fact that some banks may be re-
ceiving preferential treatment because they are considered systemically
important. In order to control for this, large banks from of the sample -in
particular the top 1%- are excluded. The baseline model is re-estimated
by (i) excluding the largest 1% of banks per state and (ii) the largest 1%
of banks per year. As reported in Table 3.8, the core variable of interest
retains its sign and significance.
3.5.2.3 Alternative channels of influence
The purpose of this section is to control for alternative channels of influ-
ence. Prior literature (Lambert, 2019) has shown a significant relation-
ship between lobbying and the probability of enforcement.
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Information regarding bank lobbying activity provided by the Center
of Responsive Politics (CRP) is collected in order to create a dummy
variable, Lobbying that takes "1" if a bank is engaged in lobbying activities
in a particular year, and "0" otherwise. The majority of lobbying reports
are filed by parent companies. Following prior literature, parent lobbying
activity is therefore assigned to each subsidiary. Column (1) in Table
3.9 reports the results obtained when re-estimating the baseline model
by additionally controlling for bank lobbying, in order to account for
alternative pressures of influence. The main findings suggest that even
when controlling for lobbying, the political influence variable remains
statistically significant at the 1% level.
3.5.2.4 Di erences among regulatory agencies and distance to
regulator
The analysis begins by including two dummy variables to account for
potential di erences between the three regulatory agencies.15 The first
dummy takes the value of "1" in the case of banks regulated by the FDIC
and the value of "0" otherwise; whereas the second takes the value of "1"
in the case of banks regulated by the OCC and the value of "0" otherwise.
Banks regulated by the FED form the reference category.
The results in Table 3.9, Column (2) reveal that both variables enter
the regressions with a positive and statistically significant coe cient.
Thus, banks regulated by the FDIC or the OCC are more likely to be
subject to an enforcement action than banks regulated by the FED. The
inclusion of these variables in the analysis does not alter the key findings.
In addition to the above, the distance between a bank’s headquarters
from its regulator are considered. The variable "Distance to regulator" is
included, which refers to the distance in km between a bank’s headquar-
ters and nearest Federal Reserve Bank (Main o ce or Branch). Prior
research (e.g. Lim et al., 2016) provides evidence suggesting that indeed a
bank’s distance from a regulator’s field o ce has an impact on regulatory
monitoring; since distance can reflect the level of information asymmetry
between the regulator and the bank. Taking that into consideration, the
baseline model is re-estimated by controlling for this type of information
15Ioannidou (2005) finds that the Fed’s monetary policy responsibilities alter its
bank supervisory behaviour, as captured by formal actions. More detailed, she finds
that a tightening of the Fed’s monetary policy is associated with a lower probability
of intervention. However, the monetary policy actions do not a ect the behaviour of
the other two agencies (i.e., FDIC, OCC). Agarwal et al. (2014) also conclude that
regulators can implement identical rules inconsistency due to their institutional design
and incentives. Their comparison of federal and state supervisory ratings within the
same bank reveals that federal regulators are systematically tougher; however, they do
not find evidence that this is due to regulator self-interest and revolving doors.
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asymmetry. The findings reveal that the key variable of interest remains
intact in both sign and significance.
3.5.2.5 State-related analysis
In this section the baseline model is re-estimated by clustering standard
errors at the state level, instead of the bank level. The output does
not alter the baseline results. The second exercise is related to the
concern that banks headquartered in states that are considered to be
"important banking states" may be driving the results of the study. The
analysis is therefore, extended by excluding banks headquartered in New
York, California and North Carolina. The results reported in Column (4)
,Table 3.9 suggest that, even when controlling for the "important banking
states",16 the core variable of interest retains its sign and significance.
Finally, another issue relates to the over-representation of particular
states via the core variable of interest. For instance, Alabama and Texas
appear more than once, either through Senate or House chairmanship.
In order to rule out the potential that the results are driven by this over-
representation of particular states, the baseline model is re-estimated by
dropping one state at a time.
Table 3.10 reports the results obtained after dropping each of the nine
states where there is a representative who is a chairman of a committee.
The findings suggest in all seven cases, the core variable of interest
remains negative and statistically significant. However, it is worth noting
that when Texas is dropped, the political connection variable is significant
at the 10% level.
16For instance, according to the Global Financial Centers Index Report (2018), which
examines statistics on the leading financial centers on a global scale, New York (NY)
and San Francisco (CA) are ranked amongst the top 25 cities. Full report can be
found here: https://www.longfinance.net/programmes/financial-centre-futures/global-
financial-centres-index/.
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3.5.3 Addressing endogeneity
3.5.3.1 Background discussion on endogeneity
This section intends to address potential endogeneity issues and outline
approaches commonly used in related literature to alleviate them. To
begin with, it is essential to define what endogeneity is in the first place.
According to Wooldridge (2010, pp. 49), endogeneity arises "in the situa-
tion where an explanatory variable is correlated with the disturbance
term", violating the key Ordinary Least Square (OLS) condition that the
error must not be correlated with any of the regressions. If this condi-
tion is violated, the output obtained may lead to inconsistent estimators.
There are three key reasons that lead to endogeneity:
1. Omitted variables, which occurs when not all variables that should
be included in a model are actually included. Reasons for not incor-
porating such variables could be due to inability to collect data, or,
in some cases, due to the fact that some factors are not observed in
the first place.
2. Measurement error, which appears due to inconsistency between
the measured value of a variable and its true value.
3. Simultaneity or reverse causality, which refers to the cases where
a particular explanatory variable is determined at the same time
with the dependent variable.
It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned forms through which
endogeneity may appear in a model set-up could hold either on an in-
dividual or simultaneous basis. Therefore, it is possible for a model to
su er from endogeneity due to measurement error and omitted variable
bias at the same time.
Endogeneity concerns can be alleviated through the implementation
of certain techniques. Depending on the structure of the initial model,
there are di erent types of approaches one could follow. As outlined by
Lewbel et al. (2012), there are three types of estimators used commonly:
(i) linear probability, (ii) maximum likelihood and (iii) control functions.
A common ground of these techniques is that in all cases the endoge-
nous variable is determined by an exogenous variable, referred to as
an instrument. It is worth noting that the selection of the instrument
is a crucial part in the analysis. This is because the instrument to be
selected needs to satisfy two conditions. First, it must not be correlated
with the disturbance term of the model initially estimated. That is, it
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must be exogenous. This condition is known as the "exclusion restric-
tion" criterion. Second, it must be correlated to the endogenous variable.
This is known as the "relevance" criterion. In order for a measure to be
considered a candidate instrument, it must fulfil both criteria. Another
similarity of the aforementioned approaches refers to the fact that in all
three cases the endogenous variable is considered to be a function of the
candidate instrument and therefore it is part of a reduced form equation,
or put simply the estimations are carried out by estimating a two stage
equation system analysis, where the first stage refers to the estimation of
the endogenous regressor and the second to the estimation of the original
model. The core element that di erentiates the approaches mainly lies
under the core assumptions considered to carry out the estimation of the
first stage model. For instance, in some cases the endogenous variable is
substituted by predicted values of the first stage equation, whereas in
other cases the endogenous variable is not replaced, but, rather the resid-
uals from the first stage regression are included as additional regressors
in the main model.
More precisely, a generally accepted and commonly used technique
within this area of research is that of the Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS)
approach, which falls under the linear probability model estimation group.
In this case, both stages are estimated with a linear model, independent
on whether the endogenous variable is continuous, discrete or limited.
Within this group of models, the first stage predicted values are used
to replace the endogenous variable in the second stage. It is worth
noting that although the 2SLS approach disregards the non-linearity
of a binary outcome model, it still remains one of the most applicable
techniques when it comes to addressing endogeneity even when the
dependent variable of a model is binary. An alternative Instrumental
Variable approach is the Two-stage residual Inclusion model (2SRI). As
pointed out by Terza et al. (2008) the first stage of the 2SLS and 2SRI
models yield identical estimates. What di ers is that in the 2SRI model
the second stage model includes the residuals of the first stage model as
an additional estimate.
Although the 2SLS approach is commonly followed in the literature,
there are other methods one could implement in order to alleviate en-
dogeneity concerns. In particular, given the binary structure of the
dependent variable used in the present analysis it is worth discussing
the methods that lie under the Binary Choice models with Endogenous
regressors. This group of methodologies are suitable for cases where a
binary choice model includes one or more endogenous explanatory vari-
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ables. As in the linear probability case, both maximum likelihood and
control function estimators require the use of a suitable instrument in
order to determine the endogenous regressor. Regarding the maximum
likelihood estimator models, the Bivariate probit model (BIPROBIT) falls
under this type of models. This model considers the non-linear nature of
the dependent and/ or endogenous variable, in the sense that it allows for
a non-linear function in the first stage regression. That is, it allows for a
Probit or Logit model specification to be estimated at the first stage when
the endogenous variable is binary. Moreover, unlike control function
models that will be discussed below, a core assumption of the BIPROBIT
is that parameters are simultaneously identified.
In turn, control function estimators consist a more general approach
in comparison to the maximum likelihood estimators models. IVPROBIT
falls into this category. The core di erence among the two is that in con-
trol function estimator models, the first stage -i.e., the model determining
the endogenous variable as a function of the instrument(s)- is estimated
in the beginning. The errors from this regression are then used in the
main model as an explanatory variable. This therefore, removes the
correlation of the main model’s error and the endogenous variable, thus,
removing endogeneity. It is worth mentioning that the initial regression
(i.e., the 1st stage) follows a linear function at all times.
Another issue that researchers are increasingly concerned about is
sample selection bias, i.e., the case where the sample’s population is not
randomly chosen. A common remedy considered within this strand of
literature (e.g. Lambert, 2019; Papadimitri et al., 2019) is the use of
Propensity Score Analysis (PSA). The core element of this approach is
the calculation of a propensity score or else, the predicted probability,
which is defined as "the probability of treatment assignment conditional
on observed baseline characteristics" (Austin, 2011). The core focus of this
approach is to obtain a probability for which a particular group within
the sample will be treated or in other words, participate in an event,
given a set of common characteristics for that group. Therefore, the
analysis in practical terms involves the categotization of individuals of
the sample’s population in accordance with certain characteristics which
are observable. Then based on those characteristics, a probability is
calculated in order to establish whether the pattern originally observed
in the main model holds or not. In such context there are two main
types of groups: (i) treated group - i.e., the group that participates in
a particular event and (ii) non-treated group - i.e., the group that does
not participate in a particular event. Once the categorisation is done
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then several metrics can be calculated. It is possible to calculate the
di erence in the means between the treated and non treated group of
the overall population (Potential outcome means). Alternatively, it is
also possible to calculate the di erence in means among the treated
group (Average Treatment E ect for the treated). It is worth noting that
there are alternative ways of performing the PSA. For instance, some
approaches involve matching, weighting, sub-classification techniques.
Austin (2011) provides a detailed overview of thees di erent approaches.
In the context of the present analysis endogeneity concerns are related
to the fact that it is di cult to observe a bank’s actual financial condition.
More specifically, one cannot observe the actual CAMELs ratings, which
play a major role during the enforcement process. This could lead to an
omitted variables bias, which could in turn lead to misleading results.
Another important issue that should be accounted for is the fact that
perhaps it is banks and the power of their organizations that drive the
appointment of an elected o cial with ties in Washington. Therefore,
endogeneity in the current set-up may also be linked to reverse causal-
ity. Following empirical precedent (Lambert, 2019), these issues are
addressed by implementing two approaches: (i) Instrumental Variable
techniques (2SLS and IVPROBIT) and (ii) Propensity score matching.
3.5.3.2 Instrumental Variable analysis
The first approach followed to correct for endogeneity is to estimate a
two-stage Instrumental Variable analysis, treating the political influence
dummy as the endogenous component. A two-stage least-squares method
(2SLS) and an Instrumental Variable Probit (IVPROBIT) method are
followed. An integral part of performing an IV analysis is the choice of
the instruments used, both on a methodological and conceptual level. In
this case, the state’s overall political environment is used as an instru-
ment. This is measured by the voter turnout rate, which is an indicator
provided by the PEW Charitable trusts, an independent non-profit re-
search and policy organization.17 The voter turnout rate constitutes a
summary measure which demonstrates the level to which citizens that
are eligible to vote participate in democratic politics. This measure is
determined by a series of factors, such as voter’s interest, demographics,
or political culture of a state’s citizens. Therefore, voter turnout is an
excellent proxy to reflect the political environment of a state. Moreover,
prior studies (e.g. Gropper et al., 2013), using a variation of the voting
turnout rate, provide evidence suggesting that there is indeed a link be-
17The data set can be found at the following link: http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/20572.
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tween the dynamic nature of a state’s political setting and chairmanship
e ectiveness. Indeed, the voter turnout rate is also highly correlated (⇢ =
0.6954) with the political influence variable of this study, lending support
to the assumption that the selected instrument is relevant. An important
property that needs to be fulfilled is that of the exclusion restriction. The
selected instrument captures the overall political environment of a state
and does not reflect, or is linked to, the amount of votes a particular
party or individual has received. Thus far, there is no prior evidence or
theoretical argument suggesting a relationship between the level of the
public’s participation in voting to a ect regulatory enforcement action is-
suance. Moreover, on a more technical level, a low correlation (⇢ = 0.0083)
is observed between the instrument voter turnout and the dependent
variable severe enforcement action, which is in line with the validity of
the selected instrument.
Two Instrumental Variable approaches which are commonly used in
the literature are adopted for the purpose of this analysis. First, a Two-
Stage Least Square (2SLS) linear model is estimated, which is outlined
below:
CommitteeChairi,k,t = ⇣ + ⌘1V oter_turnoutk,t + ⌘2Controlsi,k,t + ✓statek + quartert + ri,k,t
(3.5.2)
SevereActioni,k,t = ↵ +  1CommitteeChairi,k,t +  2Controlsi,k,t +  statek +  quartert + "i,k,t
(3.5.3)
where i refers to bank i, k refers to state k and t refers to quarter t.
Equation 3.5.2 is the first stage equation, where the dependent variable is
the Committee chair dummy, which is treated as the endogenous variable
in the model. Voter turnout is the instrument and reflects the percentage
of a state’s population that participated in the electoral procedure, over
the total number of the eligible to vote population. Equation 3.5.3 is
the response equation and is of similar specification of the base model
outlined in Equation 3.5.1. State and quarter dummies in both equations
are included. Due to data availability on the voter turnout variable, the
analysis is estimated for the time period 2008-2015.
In addition to the above, an Instrumental Variable Probit (IVPROBIT)
model is also estimated. This model takes into consideration the binary
nature of the dependent variable. In essence, the specification of the
models in both stages are similar to those outlined in Equations 3.5.2 and
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3.5.3. The core di erence lies on the fact that in the IV Probit model, the
second stage model is estimated with a Probit rather than a linear model
as in the 2SLS approach. The results of the IV regression analysis are
reported in Table 3.11. Column (1) reports the results obtained from the
2SLS model, whereas Column (2) reports the results from the IV Probit
model. The main findings suggest that even when isolating the exogenous
component of the core variable of interest, there is a significantly inverse
relationship between political influence and enforcement likelihood.18
Moreover, in both models, the instrument is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. It is worth mentioning that the validity of
the instrument is supported by the relevant diagnostic tests for under
and weak identification; as well as the overall F-test reported in the first
stage.
3.5.3.3 Propensity score matching
In order to further confirm the results obtained and rule out endogeneity
concerns linked to sample selection bias, a Propensity Score Matching
analysis is performed. The motive behind following this approach stems
from the fact that there is a relatively small amount of the treated group
(i.e., politically connected banks), as opposed to the non-treated group
(i.e., non-connected banks). To carry out the analysis, a Probit model
is estimated where the dependent variable is the treated variable (i.e.,
the political connections variable) and the independent variables include
a set of bank-level characteristics which determine the matching of the
two groups. In particular, the following measures are considered: the
risk-based capital ratio, risk weighted assets, liquidity ratio, return on
assets ratio and size. The propensity score is then calculated.
Table 3.12 reports the results obtained. Column (1) reports the Aver-
age Treatment E ects for the Treated (ATT), whereas Column (2) reports
he number of matches obtained. The matching technique implemented
is "Near neighbor" for n=1,10,50,100 and caliper value equal to 0.01. The
overall results suggest that politically connected banks are less likely to
be punished and, most importantly, highlight that there is a significant
di erence among connected and non-connected banks.
18As mentioned previously due to data availability of the instrument the sample is
restricted for the years 2008-2015. This could raise potential questioning in regard to
the results obtained by the IV analysis. To eliminate this concern, the baseline model is
re-estimates by restricting the time-frame to 2008-2015. When estimated with a Probit
model specification, the coe cient of the political influence variable is negative and
significant at the 1% coe cient. When a linear model with fixed e ects is estimated,
the sign and significance remain.
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Table 3.11: Addressing endogeneity (1)
(1) (2)
Second stage results
Dep var: Severe action
Committee chair -0.0034*** -0.3128 ***
(0.0006094) (0.1031885)
Observations 364064 362645
R-squared 0.0206 -
Bank-controls YES YES
State dummies YES YES
Year dummies YES YES
Method of estimation 2SLS IVPROBIT
First stage results
Dep var: Political influence
Voter turnout 0.0513496 *** 0.0513235 ***
(0.0006056) (0.0006045)
State dummies YES YES
Time dummies YES YES
Wald test of chi2 (p-value) - 0.000
F-test 7189.99
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 741.677 -
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics 7189.988 -
Table 3.11 reports the results from the IV analysis. Column (1) reports the results obtained
when estimating a 2SLS model, whereas Column (2) reports the results when estimating an
IV PROBIT model. In both cases, models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered
by bank. Sample period is 2008q1-2015q4. Severe actions is a dummy variable that takes "1"
if a bank received a severe type of enforcement action in quarter t, "0" otherwise. Committee
chair is dummy variable that takes "1" if a bank’s parent company operates in a state where an
elected o cial (Senator or Congressman) holds a chair position in a Congressional Committee
that oversees the banking and financial services in industry in a given year, "0" otherwise. Voter
turnout is the percentage of a state’s population that participated in the electoral procedure,
over the total number of the eligible to vote population. Data on enforcement actions is retrieved
from the OCC, FED and FDIC’s websites. Committee chair data is retrieved from the US Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban A airs and the US House of Representatives
Financial Services Committee websites.Financial data is retrieved from the FFIEC 031/041
Call Reports. Voter turnout is retrieved from PEW Charitable trusts.The *, ** and *** signs
denote statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10% level.
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3.6 Further Analysis
Thus far, the main findings of this analysis suggest that elected o cials
holding a powerful position within a congressional committee that over-
sees the financial services industry can influence the probability of a bank
receiving a severe type enforcement action. In this section, the analysis
is complemented by exploring alternative explanations and potential
channels that could provide further insights.
3.6.1 Committee and politician related factors
3.6.1.1 Politician’s power and influence
First, the analysis is extended by exploring personal traits of main com-
mittee chairmen in order to assess whether individual characteristics,
such as a politician’s level of seniority, play a role in the empirical inves-
tigation of this chapter. Prior studies (e.g. Gropper et al., 2013, 2015;
Vidal et al., 2012) have highlighted the importance of politician seniority.
In fact, Gropper et al. (2013), find that a chairman’s age has a significant
e ect on bank performance. The baseline model is therefore re-estimated
by examining whether long/short seniority leads to higher/lower probabil-
ity of enforcement action likelihood. An elected o cial’s level of seniority
is captured through the combined average age of two chairmen (House
and Senate Committee) in a particular year. This measure reflects ad-
ditional dimensions of power and knowledge of the industry from prior
employment. A person’s age can also reveal and drive other aspects, such
as their decision making, level of risk or even career concerns.
Following Gropper et al. (2013), "high seniority" in the sample is de-
fined for quarters in which the average age of both committees’ chairmen
is above the overall average in the sample.19 The next step is to run the
baseline regression separately for the sub-samples of periods with high
and low seniority.
Table 3.13 reports the results. The findings confirm the main results
for years where committee chairs were more senior than the average,
at the 1% level of statistical significance. For periods with junior com-
19To provide an illustrative example, consider the state of Florida, which, during
the years examined in the present study, has not had an elected o cial holding a
chair position within a powerful committee overseeing the Financial Services industry.
However, with the use of the independent sampling banks from Florida can be considered
in this sample in terms of high/low seniority, depending on the bank’s chair age from
another state, for di erent time periods. Thus, in this case, there is no variation across
states during a particular point in time; however there is variation across time and,
therefore, this approach provides a ground to test the level of impact of individual
characteristics.
79
mittee chairs, the coe cients of the political influence variable remains
negative, but it is now insignificant. Therefore, the power, knowledge
and potentially the relationships acquired over the years of age and in
service appear to enhance the influence of politicians 20. In the attempt to
further explore the potential motives of elected o cials holding powerful
positions in Congressional committees in promoting laxer treatment of
banks headquartered in their home state, two additional pathways are
examined. First, the total number of votes received by a chairman as a
fraction of the total number of votes within the district or state (depend-
ing on chamber) is considered. By considering the percentage of votes
they receive for each election cycle enables to explore an elected o cial’s
"popularity" within their state or district. This could be a conditional
factor for whether the politician was easily elected or whether the amount
of votes received could potentially translate in favors owed and in more
general terms, motivate elected o cials.
Prior studies have shown that there exists a connection between firms’
political connections and job and plant creation rates, which is more
pronounced in areas where elections are highly contested (Bertrand
et al., 2018). Voting information is gathered from the Federal Elections
Commission data on Elections and Voting21 and manually matched to
each elected o cial of the sample. Second, information regarding the
total dollar amount of contributions received by each elected o cial
in the sample is also collected. The decision to employ this measure
is driven by the fact that campaign contributions are considered to be
an indirect measure of a politician’s power (Berry and Fowler, 2017).
To tailor the investigation around the research question of the present
chapter, the focus is put on contributions particularly from the Financial
Services industry. More precisely, the ratio of the sum of contributions
received from the financial sector as a fraction of the total contributions
received by a candidate is considered. This measure is chosen in order to
specifically observe the level of "aggressiveness" of financial institutions
in approaching politicians.22 The aforementioned information is obtained
from the Center of Responsive Politics (Open Secrets) website.
20The impact of experience specifically in the role of chairmen was also examined
in the context of the present analysis, but did not find a di erence in the chair e ect
between high and low levels of experience
21Further information on the data can be found here:
https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/electionresults.shtml.
22Figures reported by the "Donation Concentration Metric" study, which examines the
concentration of donations during an elected o cial’s career, show that for the banking
industry, four (Spencer Bachus, Jeb Hanserling, Richard Shelby, and Tim Johnson) out
of ten have been Chairmen of an important Committee in Finance and are also part of
the sample of the present analysis.
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Once the above information is collected, two main measures are con-
structed: (i) %Votes and (ii) %Contributions(fin). Just like in the previous
subsection, quarters are defined according to whether the average ratio
of contributions received by both committees’ chairmen from the financial
sector to total contributions is above the overall average as "high contri-
bution", and quarters in which the average votes ratio of both committees’
chairmen in a given year is below average as "high votes". The results
for the sub-samples of high versus low contributions and high versus low
votes are reported in Table 3.13.
The overall findings reveal that for the sub-samples where chairmen
received higher votes or high contributions, the political influence vari-
able is negative and statistically significant. In contrast, in the case
of the "low" sub-samples, the coe cient of the core variable of interest
is insignificant. Therefore, from a general perspective, it appears that
higher popularity (in terms of votes received), as well as higher amounts
of money received by the financial sector, enhance politician’s e ective-
ness and potentially motivation, on reducing the likelihood of a bank
being punished.
3.6.1.2 Political influence, committee membership and sub-committee
chairmanship
The analysis presented so far has focused on the role of the Chairmen.
In this sub-section the analysis is extended in order to examine the role
of other Committee members. Information in regard to members of the
Senate’s Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban A airs and the
House of Representative’s Financial Services Committee from 103rd
to the 114th Congress is obtained from the Charles Stewart III and
Jonathan Woon data set.23 Due to the fact that it is very likely for
more than one committee member to be elected from a particular state,
information from the Charles Stewart III and Jonathan Woon data set is
aggregated in order to construct a dummy variable ("Committee member"),
which takes the value of "1" if a bank is headquartered in a state where
there is at least one elected o cial that serves as member in one of the
two Committees of interest, and the value of "0" otherwise.
Additionally, the potential influence of o cials serving as Chairs in
sub-committees is also explored. As mentioned earlier, congressional
committees are in charge of working on specific tasks and issues related
to a particular area of jurisdiction. Thus, the main committees consist
23Please find further information on the data and related studies at the Charles
Stewart Congressional data page http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/datapage.html.
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of a number of sub-committees, each of which is in charge of dealing
with even more specific tasks within the jurisdiction of their "parent"
committee. For example, the House "Financial Services" Committee
currently consists of five sub-committees (Capital Markets, securities
and Investment; Financial Institutions and Consumer credit; Housing
and Insurance; Monetary Policy and Trade; Oversight and Investigation;
Terrorism and Illicit Finance), which engage in and deal with a set of
very specific issues. Similar to the main committees’ organization and
structure, the subcommittees are also assigned a chairman and a group
of members who are elected o cials across di erent states.24
For the purposes of this study, the focus is on the following two sub-
committees, which are considered to be the most relevant: (i) The House
of Representative’s subcommittee "Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit" and (ii) The Senate’s subcommittee on "Financial Institutions
and Consumer protection"25.Historical information on sub-committee
chairmanship is obtained from the Center of Responsive politics website
from the 106th -114th Congress. This information is used to construct a
binary variable ("Subcommittee chair"), which takes the value of "1" if a
bank is headquartered in a state where an elected o cial holds a Chair
position on one of the two aforementioned sub-committees and the value
of "0" otherwise.
The baseline model is re-estimated with the inclusion of the "Com-
mittee member" and "Subcommittee chair" variables. The results are
reported in Table 3.14. The findings reveal a statistically significant
and inverse relationship between the probability of a bank receiving a
regulatory enforcement action and the presence of at least one member
of a finance-related committee, who represents the state where the bank
is headquartered. Moreover, the findings show that subcommittee chair-
men do not appear to have any influence over regulatory enforcement
likelihood. In unreported regressions, subcommittee chairmanship and
committee membership are explored around the enforcement likelihood
of less severe type of actions.
24Further information on subcommittees could be found in the following: (i) Sen-
ate’s Banking, House and Urban A airs Committee can be found: https://www.
banking.senate.gov/about/subcommittees ; (ii) House of Representative’s Finan-
cial Services Committee can be found https://financialservices.house.gov/about/
subcommittee-membership.htm.
25For example, the jurisdiction of the "Financial Institutions and Consumer protec-
tion" subcommittee lies -among others- around banking institutions, deposit insurance,
regulatory activities of the Fed, as well as those of the OCC and FDIC.
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3.6.2 Variation across bank-related traits
In this section the aim is to identify whether banks with particular pro-
files may be more prone to preferential treatment. For this purpose,
certain traits of the bank’s parent company are explored. First, the own-
ership status is considered, by taking into account whether or not the
parent company is listed in a stock exchange. Second, the parent’s age
is also taken into account. Third, the diversity of geographic operation
is considered by distinguishing between parent banks that are repre-
sented in multiple states through o ces or subsidiaries, and banks that
operate in a single state.26 The aforementioned information is obtained
from the SNL Financial database. Using the parent’s unique regulatory
identifier, this information is matched with the main working sample.
Due to coverage, institutions in the working sample for which there is
no information are dropped. The baseline regression is re-estimated by
splitting the sample along the three dimensions discussed above. The
results are presented in Table 3.15.
First, the Committee chair dummy is statistically significant at the
1% level and inversely related to enforcement action likelihood in the
cases of both listed and unlisted banks. Turning to the parent banks’
age, the results show that the influence of the Committee chair dummy
is statistically significant at the 1% in the case where parent companies
are above average age and only 10% in the case of parent companies with
below average age. There are at least two potential explanations for this
finding. First, older banks may be more e cient and less likely to fail,
influencing the decisions of regulators and politicians.27
26For this measure the sample is not split based on above/below average as in the
case of age and ownership, because this would result in having a considerably low
number of enforcement actions in the above average sub-sample. To address this, a
dummy variable that brings together all the banks operating in more than one State is
considered.
27For example, DeYoung and Hasan (1998) report that profit e ciency improves
rapidly at the typical de novo US bank during the first three years of operation; however,
on average it takes about nine years to reach the levels of established banks. DeYoung
(2003) examines banks chartered between 1980 and 1985 and concludes that initially,
new banks were no more likely to fail than established banks; however, they become
substantially more likely to fail as fast growth and negative earnings depleted their
capital. In a more recent study, Lee and Yom (2016) also find that, compared to small
established US banks, recent de novos were financially fragile and failed at higher rates
during the recent crisis.
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Table 3.14: Committee membership and subcommittee chairmanship
(1) (2)
Dep. Var: Severe type enforcement actions
  / SE Mfx   / SE Mfx
Committee member -0.056** -0.001**
(0.024)
Subcommittee
chair -0.113 -0.001
(0.071)
Risk-based
capital ratio -3.766*** -0.034*** -3.772*** -0.034***
(0.334) (0.334)
Risk-weighted
assets ratio -0.160 -0.001 -0.163 -0.001
(0.103) (0.103)
Return on assets -20.095*** -0.180*** -20.077*** -0.180***
(0.624) (0.625)
Liquidity ratio 1.520*** 0.014*** 1.528*** 0.014***
(0.161) (0.160)
Size 0.039*** 0.000*** 0.040*** 0.000***
(0.010) (0.010)
Constant -2.310*** -2.385***
(0.215) (0.213)
Observations 362645 362645
Time dummies YES YES
State dummies YES YES
Cluster 8536.000 8536.000
Pseudo R2 0.124 0.124
Table 3.14 reports the estimation results when committee membership (Column 1) and sub-
committee chairmanship (Column 2) are explored. A Probit model with robust standard errors
clustered by bank is estimated. For all model specifications estimated coe cients and marginal
e ects at means are reported. Sample period is 2000q1-2015q4. Severe actions is a dummy
variable that takes "1" if a bank received a severe type of enforcement action in quarter t, "0"
otherwise. Committee member is dummy variable that takes "1" if a bank’s parent company
operates in a state where an elected o cial (Senator or Congressman) is a member in a Congres-
sional Committee that oversees the banking and financial services in industry in a given year,
"0" otherwise. Subcommittee chair is dummy variable that takes "1" if a bank’s parent company
operates in a state where an elected o cial (Senator or Congressman) holds a chair position
in the "Financial institutions and consumer credit subcommittee" or "Financial institutions
and consumer protection subcommittee", and "0" otherwise. The Risk-based capital ratio is
equal to the total qualifying capital divided by risk-weighted assets net of allowances and other
reductions. Risk- weighted assets ratio refers to the risk-weighted assets net of allowances and
other reductions divided by total assets. Return on assets are equal to the income (loss) before
applicable income taxes and discontinued operations divided by total assets. The liquidity
ratio is calculated by dividing cash and cash equivalents plus US treasury securities with
total assets. Bank size equals the natural logarithm of total assets. Data on enforcement
actions is retrieved from the OCC, FED and FDIC’s websites. Committee chair data is retrieved
from the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban A airs and the US House
of Representatives Financial Services Committee websites.Financial data is retrieved from
the FFIEC 031/041 Call Reports. Committee membership information is retrieved from the
Charles Stewart III and Jonathan Woon data set. Subcommittee membership is retrieved from
each subcommittee’s website. The *, ** and *** signs denote statistical significance at the 1,5
and 10% level.
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Second, older firms may be more experienced with the machinery of
the state and political influence, or they can be more valuable to gov-
ernmental bodies (Desbordes and Vauday, 2007; Macher et al., 2011).28
Finally, the coe cient of the Committee chair dummy retains its negative
sign in both the samples of multiple state and single state banks; how-
ever, it is statistically significant only for the latter. Therefore, it seems
that only banks that operate locally benefit from preferential treatment.
Nonetheless, this finding should be treated with some caution due to the
very low number of enforcement actions in the case of the sample with
banks operating in multiple states.
3.6.3 Social and political environment
Previous sections focused on factors related to committee and politician
characteristics, as well as bank-related traits that could be useful in
explaining the enforcement action likelihood. However, institutional,
political, and social attributes at the state level have not been yet taken
into account. These are important environmental characteristics that
could shape both the level of pressure towards politicians. In the sub-
sections below, the following traits are considered: (i) Economic freedom
and corruption, (ii) Political orientation and (iii) Social norms.
3.6.3.1 State economic freedom and corruption
This section explores whether a state’s level of economic freedom and
corruption are conditional factors driving the relationship between en-
forcement action likelihood and political influence. These elements are
of interest as they are key attributes to how well a democratic govern-
ment functions. One would expect that in states with higher levels of
economic freedom and lower levels of corruption, rent-seeking behavior
would be less pronounced and elected o cials would act in the interest
28For example, Desbordes and Vauday (2007) find that age has a positive impact
on the political influence of foreign firms over government regulations. In another
cross-country study, Macher et al. (2011) provide evidence that older firms are more
e ective in influencing governmental decision-making entities than younger firms in
the cases of executive, legislative, and ministerial branches, albeit not in the case of
regulatory agencies. Macher et al. (2011) provide three potential reasons for which age
could matter, in general, in governmental outcomes. First, firms become more adept
via "learning curve" e ects in influencing governmental decision-makers. Second, firms
that are unsuccessful in influencing governments may fail. Third, because older firms
are more likely to survive, governmental decision-makers consider favourable decisions
to older firms as more beneficial due to repeated and ongoing interactions.
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of the citizens.29
In measuring economic freedom, prior studies (e.g. Gropper et al.,
2015) are followed and obtain information on state Economic Freedom
from 2000-2015 provided on an annual basis by the Fraser Institute.30
The state-level overall index of economic freedom for North America is
considered. This index consists of five main components/sub-groups for its
calculation: Size of government, taxation, regulation, legal systems and
property rights, sound money and freedom to trade internationally. The
value of the index ranges from 1-10, where higher values reflect higher
levels of economic freedom. Based on this information, the working
sample is split into high economic freedom and low economic freedom
states; depending on whether the economic freedom of a given state is
above or below average in a particular year.
Following prior studies, corruption on a state level is measured through
information collected on convictions of public o cials. Such information
is provided by the U.S Department of Justice (e.g. Smith, 2016).31 Infor-
mation is available on district level, which is why figures are aggregates
on state level in order to match information with the working sample of
the present analysis. These figures are then expressed on per capital
basis. Using this information the states are classified into ones with high
corruption and low corruption, similarly to the case of economic freedom.
The baseline model is re-estimated for these sub-samples. The results
are reported in Table 3.16. The findings show that, while the e ect of
the Committee’s Chair remains negative in all cases, it is statistically
significant only in states with low levels of economic freedom or high
corruption.
3.6.3.2 Social norms
The focus is now turned towards state-level social norms and their in-
fluence on the relationship between political influence and regulatory
enforcement. In order to capture community morals and culture on a
local level, a state’s level of religiosity is taken into account. Prior studies
have considered such proxies in both national (e.g. Dyreng et al., 2012;
Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016) and international samples (e.g La Porta
et al., 1999) .
29For example, in the study of Braun and Raddatz (2010) it is highlighted that
countries where banks are more politically connected are shown to rank higher on
corruption. Similarly, Faccio et al. (2006) finds that corporate political connections
are less common in the presence of more stringent regulations for political conflicts of
interest and more common in countries that are highly corrupt.
30Further details on the data can be found here:https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/electionresults.shtml.
31Full reports with relevant data https://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin.
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Religion has been shown to have an e ect on various aspects ranging
from firm risk-taking (e.g. Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016; Hilary and Hui,
2009) to misconduct (e.g. Grullon et al., 2009), as well as financial re-
porting (e.g. Dyreng et al., 2012). Moreover, in the context of politics and
voting, empirical precedent shows that a community’s level of religious-
ness can influence the voting behavior of individuals (e.g. Layman, 1997),
as well as members of the US Congress (e.g. Fastnow et al., 1999). In
the context of the present analysis, religiosity could potentially influence
the behavior of a politician in order to "serve" the beliefs of his or her
potential voters. However, what is important to highlight is that this
would not necessarily reflect the beliefs or ideas of the politician.
In order to test the above, information from the "Churches and church
membership files of American religion data archive (ARDA)" is collected.32
In particular, the data on religion is retrieved from surveys conducted
in 2000 and 2010. Following Adhikari and Agrawal (2016), in order to
obtain estimates for intermediate years, the decennial data are linearly
interpolated. The state-level version of data are taken into account, in
order to retain consistency with the set-up of the working sample. The
measure of religiosity is defined as the total number of congregations
divided by a state’s population. Based on this variable, the working
sample is split to above ("Religiosity high") and below average religious
("Religiosity low") state in order to estimate the baseline model. Results
are shown in Table 3.17.
The key findings show that the political influence variable is nega-
tive and statistically significant for states with low levels of religiosity;
whereas for states with high level of religiosity the e ect is no longer
significant. A potential explanation could be that in areas with higher
religious adherence, the local community would follow religious beliefs
and norms; while "punishing" misconduct and unethical decisions and be-
haviors. Thus, in such communities, politicians aiming to maximize the
probability of re-election and social acceptance, would be more likely to
conform to such situations. In contrast, when religion is less pronounced
or is not as popular within a local community, then the above "unwritten
rules" would deteriorate. Consequently, in such cases there is further
room for less ethical behavior, the cultivation of beneficial relationships
between politicians and firms and other rent-seeking behavior.
32More information on the ARDA surveys can be found here http://www.thearda.
com/Archive/ChState.asp.
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3.6.3.3 State political polarization
The final exercise is to examine the state level political polarization. In a
two-party political system, as in the US, it is very likely to observe diver-
gence of ideologies and political attitudes towards various socio-economic
issues within Congress among Republican and Democratic parties. Aca-
demic studies state that increased polarization impedes policy making
and outcomes, and could also be tied to lower quality of legislation (e.g.
Epstein and Graham, 2007) . Moreover, it potentially drives Congress to
"gridlock" and policy inaction (e.g. Binder, 2004; Jones, 2001) . The goal
in the context of the present study, is to explore whether ideological dis-
tance between political elites enhances the observed relationship between
political influence and favourable treatment of banks. In essence, it could
be that, in states with higher divergence of political attitudes by members
of congress, politicians are more prone to establish relationships with
banks in order to secure their support, in exchange for benefits such as
more favourable treatment.
In order to explore this, information on Congressional Roll-Call Votes
is collected from Voteview 33. This information provides scores of mea-
sures (DW-NOMINATE scores) that indicate the ideological positions of
elected o cials over time and range from -1 (liberal) to 1 (conservative).
Once the above are collected, the next step is to construct an "overall state
polarization index", following the procedure in McCarty et al. (1997), by
calculating the average distance between Democrats and Republicans
within a state, based on these scores. Once the index is constructed, an
indicator is then created for states with high levels of elite polarization
("Polarisation high") and another for states with low levels of elite polar-
ization ("Polarisation low"). Using these variables, the baseline model is
estimated for the two samples. The results are reported in Table 3.17.
The results suggest that the e ect of the political influence dummy
on enforcement action likelihood is significantly negative for states with
higher levels of polarization, whereas the coe cient of this variable is not
statistically significant for states with lower levels of polarization. These
findings could, therefore, indeed suggest that, as members of congress
become more diverge to each other, political influence is enhanced. Thus,
it is consistent with prior literature suggesting that as polarization in-
creases, policy outcomes are a ected.
33Further information can be found in: https://voteview.com/data.
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3.7 Conclusion
The core objective of the present chapter is to provide evidence on whether
powerful politicians can exert influence on regulatory decision making.
So far, the literature provides evidence that political connections are
beneficial to firms, through a variety of channels. The majority of studies
examining the relationship between political connections and regulatory
outcomes focus on the political strategies that firms adopt (e.g., lobbying,
campaign contributions) to influence policy makers. Nonetheless, there is
scarce evidence on whether and how political connections to Washington
can result in beneficial regulatory treatment of banking institutions. The
present chapter addresses this gap.
Focusing on the US banking sector and by making use of a sample
of Commercial Banks for the period 2000-2015; political power is mea-
sured by a binary variable that indicates whether or not a bank’s parent
company operates in a state where a Senator or Congressman serves as
Chairman in a finance-related Congressional Committee. The analysis
focuses on severe types of enforcement actions.
The core findings suggest an inverse relationship between political
influence and enforcement action likelihood. The results hold when alter-
native model specification and econometric methods are implemented. In
a series of robustness tests, the output shows that the political influence
variable exerts significant impact on enforcement action likelihood when
controlling for the crisis years, for di erent regulatory agencies supervis-
ing the banks, as well as for several sub-samples (e.g., large banks, poor
vs top capitalized banks). The results remain robust when addressing
endogeneity as well. The findings suggest that politicians with power in
Congress are likely to have the ability to influence regulatory decision-
making. Thus, these findings complement previous studies (e.g., Gropper
et al., 2013, 2015) that suggest that such connections have an impact on
bank performance.
Furthermore, alternative patterns of influence on a politician, bank
and state level are explored, in order to explain the baseline results. In
particular, the additional findings suggest that Chairing a committee
matters when Chairs are more senior, receive greater amounts of cam-
paign contributions from the financial services industry or when they
have higher levels of vote concentration. On a bank level, political influ-
ence is important in the case of both listed and unlisted parent banks;
however, the Chair is more influential in the case of older banks and
banks operating in a single state. Finally, a state’s overall socioeconomic
93
and political environment also plays an important role in the treatment
of banks with headquarters in politically important states. More pre-
cisely, in states with lower economic freedom, higher corruption, lower
levels of religiosity and higher polarization, there appears to be room
for political influence to be e ective. Overall, the findings are useful in
shedding light on the impact of political influence on shaping regulatory
decisions. Moreover, from a policy-making perspective, the output of
this analysis provides evidence that enables the further understanding
of whether political influence enhances or impedes the e ectiveness of
banking supervision.
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Appendix 3A
Table A. Enforcement actions classification
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ISSUED AGAINST BANKS
A.1. SEVERE ( ordered from most severe to less severe):
Deposit Insurance Termination /Threat
Decision to threat to suspend or terminate a bank’s deposit insurance
scheme by the FDIC, when unsound and unsafe banking practices are
detected or when violations of laws and regulations have taken place.
Deposit Insurance Termination can be imposed if a bank has
neglected previous enforcement actions issued against the bank.
Cease and Desist Order
Banks that receive Cease and Desist orders are required to follow
specific actions outlined by their primary supervisor. C&D orders
can be enforced by law, in the federal banking system. Typical reasons
or the issuance of C&D orders are the engagement in unsafe and unsound
activities, violations of laws and regulations. A C&D may impose
specific orders to stop the bank engaging in specific banking practices
or may outline a particular strategy in order to improve asset quality,
promote growth, decrease risk, etc.
Formal written agreement
The institutions subject to this type of action, enter into an agreement
with their primary regulator to take particular actions or to follow particular
proscriptions in written agreement. Unlike the C&D orders, although FAs
are also legally enforceable, they are however, not enforceable through the
federal court. FAs can nonetheless lead to the issuance of Civil Money
Penalties, when they are ignored. Reasons that FAs are imposed are unsound
practises, mismanagement policies, or "insider" abuse. FAs can lead to more
severe types of enforcement actions if not taken into consideration.
Prompt Corrective Action
Prompt Corrective Actions are issued usually when undercapitalization
issues are detected. These actions order banks on taking remedial actions
in order to overcome the deficiencies in their level of capital. Among
the corrective measures outlined, in some cases there may be dismissal
of management, restrictions on executive payments, asset growth,
rates paid on deposits or even prohibition on certain activities,
such as approval for acquisition deals from the regulatory authorities.
A.2. LESS SEVERE TYPE
Civil Money Penalty (CMP)
Monetary penalties against banking institutions that engage in unsafe
or unsound banking practices, violations of laws or failure to comply
with an order issued previously.
Call report penalty (CR-P)
Monetary penalties against banking institutions that fail to file
Call Reports on time or in accordance to the general outline or
even for misreporting information on Call Report files.
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Chapter 4
Lobbying, regulatory
enforcement and corporate
governance: Theory and
evidence from regulatory
enforcement actions against
US banks
For a working paper version of this chapter please see:
Papadimitri, Wohlschlegel, A. (2018). Lobbying, regulatory enforce-
ment and corporate governance: Theory and Evidence from regu-
latory enforcement actions against US Banks. Available at: http:
//repec.port.ac.uk/EconFinance/PBSEconFin_2019_08.pdf.
4.1 Introduction
Lobbying is an ubiquitous way for firms and interest groups to gain
political influence. It is a means to communicate information that these
interest groups want political decision makers to consider, and any other
information that they think will make congress or regulatory agencies
decide in their favour. Following theoretical work such as Potters and
Van Winden (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (2001), it is now well
understood that, as long as the interest group’s and society’s interests
are at least partially aligned, lobbying is informative to some extent in
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equilibrium. Therefore, it is rational for a regulator to make use of the
information transmitted in this process, even though the interest group
has some incentive to misrepresent its private information.
Some recent empirical work has also presented evidence for lobbying
to be an e ective way to influence enforcement decisions (Correia, 2014;
Lambert, 2019). This is surprising from a theoretical point of view: If
the purpose of lobbying is to reduce one’s enforcement probability, one
should expect a wrongdoer to have higher incentives to lobby than a
law-abiding individual. In other words, a firm that lobbies in order to
convince an enforcer to turn a blind eye on it will inadvertently let on that
it has probably done wrong. Hence, if investigations of wrongdoing are
costly, an enforcement agent could save some of these costs by focusing
investigations on lobbying individuals, thus making them more likely
to be punished and removing the incentives to lobby in the first place.
Indeed, the existing theoretical explanations of potential wrongdoers’
influence on enforcement decisions are confined to the exchange of favours
(e.g. Polinsky and Shavell, 2001) rather than lobbying.
This analysis o ers a novel explanation of why potential wrongdoers
lobby enforcement agents based on the transmission of relevant informa-
tion: If the wrongdoer can credibly communicate that the social conse-
quences of his wrongdoing are less severe, committing to not punishing a
lobbying, less harmful wrongdoer allows the enforcement agent to provide
incentives for this type of wrongdoer to identify themselves and focus her
costly investigation e ort on more severe cases. After developing this idea
within a simple theoretical model, a data-set on lobbying and regulatory
enforcement actions against US banks is used to test the predictions of
the model.
As the theoretical explanation of lobbying is based on the communi-
cation of information to the enforcement agent that would otherwise be
unobservable to her, testing hypotheses regarding this information is not
straightforward. Based on previous evidence that, in the context of bank-
ing, better governance has been found to be associated with better risk
management (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013) and less misconduct against
bank regulation (Nguyen et al., 2015), the quality of a bank’s corporate
governance may be used as a proxy for this unobservable quality of a
bank. The feature of the model that this higher ability to manage risks
may induce banks with better corporate governance to take higher risks
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finds also some support in the existing empirical literature.1
In the panel dataset of 173 large US Bank Holding Companies and
their subsidiaries, the findings show that Bank Holding Companies with
stronger corporate governance and a poorly performing portfolio of sub-
sidiaries are more likely to lobby. This is in line with the idea that Bank
Holding Companies whose subsidiaries are at risk of being penalized
lobby in an attempt to convince the regulator of their quality. Further-
more, banks whose parent companies have lobbied and have a high
corporate governance indicator are less likely to receive an enforcement
action than subsidiaries of their non-lobbying, high-quality counterparts.
For Bank Holding Companies with low corporate governance indicator,
this result is reversed. This supports the idea that regulators’ reaction to
lobbying depends on the lobbying firm’s quality. Last, there is a positive
relationship between lobbying and future performance, which is entirely
driven by high-quality Bank Holding Companies.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2
discusses the key studies related to the work of this chapter. Section 4.3
presents a theoretical model of lobbying in order to avoid enforcement
in the context of a bank in order to derive a set of predictions. Section
4.4 the dataset employed in the empirical analysis is discussed. Sections
4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 discuss the empirical results of the analysis testing the
aforementioned predictions. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes and discusses
some policy implications.
4.2 Key related studies and contribution to
literature
The present chapter seeks to explain Bank Holding Companies’ lobby-
ing decisions by their aim to avoid regulatory enforcement actions, and
regulatory authorities’ aim to target their enforcement e ort most e -
ciently. Therefore, it is related to two strands of literature, explaining
the motives for lobbying and the relationship between bank lobbying and
bank regulation. As in the previous chapter this section discusses the
similarities and di erences of the analysis carried out in this chapter
with that of the key studies of the literature. For a full overview of the
related literature strand please see Chapter 2.
The first closely related strand of studies examine the determinants
1Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Erkens et al. (2012) and Minton et al. (2014) have
linked certain indicators of good coporate governance to weaker performance during the
financial crisis, which, in some cases, is attributed to di erent risk taking incentives
for these banks.
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of corporate lobbying. As pointed out in Chapter 2 the evidence on the
motives behind lobbying in the banking industry is rather limited. The
only study from this branch of literature that is closely related to the
analysis of this chapter is that of Gibson et al. (2018), who examine the
determinants of bank lobbying activities. Focusing on the time period
prior and during the financial crisis, they provide evidence that larger,
less creditworthy banks with more vulnerable balance sheets and more
diversified business profiles are more likely to lobby. They also suggest
that it is not only lobbying expenses that matter, but also the number
of lobbyists hired by banks, as well as the interaction of these two. This
study builds on their work and takes the analysis a step further by inves-
tigating both the motives behind bank lobbying and its potential success,
and by providing a theoretical explanation of the findings. Although
outside the banking context, the study of Mathur et al. (2013) is also
somewhat related, given its focus on examining the role of corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms on determining lobbying behaviour of firms. Using
a sample of US non-financial firms they assess the relationship between
corporate governance and lobbying of non-financial firms and find that
higher managerial entrenchment, in terms of weak shareholder rights,
is associated with higher lobbying activity. They also find that, among
others, lobbying can be a value creating strategy.
The analysis of the present chapter also contributes to the literature
examining the relationship between bank regulation and political connec-
tions. From this perspective, the most closely related study to the present
paper is that of Lambert (2019), who examines the relationship between
bank lobbying and regulatory enforcement actions. Focusing on the uni-
verse of US Commercial and Savings Banks, he finds that lobbying banks
are less likely to receive enforcement actions. Moreover, his findings
suggest that banks engaging in lobbying activities have higher levels
of risk-taking behaviour and tend to under-perform their non-lobbying
peers. Although Lambert’s and the present study both aim to examine
the impact of lobbying on regulatory enforcement on banks, with the
ultimate purpose of disentangling the motives behind lobbying, the anal-
ysis carried out in this chapter distinguishes in the following important
ways: First, a theoretical rationale is provided for the regulator to spare
lobbying banks potential enforcement actions. Second, in line with the
model’s predictions, it is shown that the negative relationship between
lobbying and enforcement only holds for banks with high quality of cor-
porate governance. Last, it is revealed that the main beneficiaries from
this enforcement strategy, lobbying banks with high governance quality,
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do perform better in the long run than their non-lobbying counterparts.
Finally, the work carried out in this chapter relates to and adds to
the literature examining the interplay between regulatory enforcement
and other types of political connections in banking. For instance, Shive
and Forster (2016) provide evidence that financial firms that hire former
regulators are associated with reduced risk. They also provide limited
evidence of "quid pro quo" behaviour in regulatory actions. The analysis
of this chapter also complements the analysis carried out in Chapter 3,
where the key objective is to examine political influence through elected
o cials with power in Congress and its impact on regulatory enforcement.
4.3 A Simple Theory of Lobbying of an En-
forcement Agency
4.3.1 The Model
In this section, a model of lobbying as a means for banks to communi-
cate otherwise private information to an enforcement agent is developed.
Based on the analysis of this model, a set of predictions is derived. The
model is formulated in the context of a bank, but the main idea is appli-
cable to a wide range of settings of costly enforcement.
An enforcement agent is tasked with investigating and potentially
punishing a bank’s violation of a regulation. At time 0 of the model, the
bank chooses an investment I, and the enforcement agent announces
an enforcement strategy, which will later be specified in more detail.2
Depending on the bank’s investment i 2 {0, I}, the bank draws a quality
type ✓ from a distribution with cdf Hi(✓), where HI(·) first-order stochas-
tically dominates H0(·), and privately observes this ✓. We will denote the
enforcement agent’s beliefs by the cdf G(✓).
At time 1, the bank decides whether or not to comply with the regula-
tion. Furthermore, the bank may spend L to make the value of ✓ perfectly
observable to the enforcement agent.3 We will refer to this latter process
2For most of the time, it is assumed that the enforcement agent can credibly commit
to this enforcement strategy, but it will be briefly discussed in the conclusion how the
results change in the absence of commitment.
3For simplicity, it is assumed that this communication of ✓ is perfectly accurate, but
the model’s qualitative results would not change if it was assumed that it comes in the
form of a noisy signal.
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as lobbying.4
Although the enforcement agent cannot directly observe whether the
bank has complied with the regulation, she may, at time 2, spend C in
order to obtain hard evidence on whether the bank did so. We will refer
to this act as an investigation. If the bank has complied at time 1, or the
enforcement agent does not investigate, no evidence is produced and noth-
ing further happens. If, however, the bank has violated the regulation at
time 1 and the enforcement agent has started an investigation, evidence
of this violation is produced with certainty. If evidence has been obtained,
the enforcement agent imposes a regulatory enforcement action on the
bank, which forces the bank to comply with the regulation. It is assumed
that compliance that has been forced via a regulatory enforcement action
comes at an exogenous cost f for the bank. To fix ideas, it is assumed
that f comes in the form of a welfare neutral payment of a fine. However,
the results of the model would be qualitatively the same if some of this
extra cost was due to indirect adverse e ects of a regulatory enforcement
action such as reputational damage.5
Due to the assumption that evidence is produced if and only if the
enforcement agent spends C to investigate, the probability p that the
agent investigates is also a non-compliant bank’s probability of receiv-
ing an enforcement action. Therefore, we refer to the mapping of the
enforcement agent’s information, which may include whether a bank has
lobbied and, if so, the bank’s type ✓, into an enforcement probability p as
the enforcement strategy. Implementing an enforcement probability p
costs the enforcement agent Cp.6
At time 3, payo s are realized. If the bank has complied with the
regulation, its payo  will be S with certainty. If the bank has not complied,
payo  is risky. With probability ✓, a high payo  R > S is realized. With
probability 1 ✓, the bank defaults and gets a payo  of zero, which imposes
4In reality, the lobbying and compliance decisions are made by di erent entities –
the former by Bank Holding Companies, and the latter by its subsidiaries, which are
in charge of the operative business. Modelling both decision makers as a single player
is equivalent to assuming that the bank holding’s and its subsidiaries’ interests are
aligned. As the focus of the analysis is on the conflict of interest between the banking
sector and the regulator, such an assumption seems an appropriate simplification.
5One might also consider making f an endogenous policy choice. Two are the main
reasons for treating f as exogenous: First, some of the bank’s costs of receiving an
enforcement action are beyond a policy maker’s control, so that extreme choices such
as f = 0 are not feasible in practice. Second, the model focuses on an independent en-
forcement agent’s decision making, who can, in reality, decide how to use her resources,
whereas the magnitude of fines is usually decided on a di erent level.
6Instead of this deterministic investigation process, it could, for instance, be as-
sumed that an investigation against a non-compliant bank only produces evidence with
probability  . This would restrict the range of implementable enforcement probabilities
to p 2 [0, ] and increase the cost of implementing an enforcement probability p to Cp 
but leave all results of the model qualitatively unchanged.
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a negative externality B on society.7 Last, if the bank has initially not
complied but was forced to comply because of an enforcement action, its
payo  will be S   f with certainty. Expected social welfare is S with
and ✓R   (1   ✓)B without compliance, less the enforcement agent’s
cost of investigation if applicable. If the regulator was able to directly
implement the compliance decision, she would make banks comply with
the regulation if and only if their type is
✓  ✓FB := S +B
R +B
, (4.3.1)
which we will refer to as the "first-best" threshold type or compliance
decision.
The information revealed via the lobbying process is valuable for the
enforcement agent as it allows her to assess the expected social costs of
a violation of the regulation. On the other hand, a bank that is already
complying with the regulation will never have an incentive to lobby.
Hence, the enforcement agent can infer with certainty that a lobbying
bank has violated the regulation. As a result, investigating a lobbying
bank will be more likely to result in evidence than investigating a non-
lobbying bank. It is this trade-o  that our model is mainly concerned
with.
4.3.2 Optimal Enforcement with Symmetric Informa-
tion
Suppose that the enforcement agent was able to observe the bank’s type
✓ and whether it has complied with the regulation, so that there is no
need for the bank to lobby, although the enforcement agent would still
have to spend C in order to potentially find valid evidence. Obviously, the
enforcement agent will not spend C for evidence if she observes the bank
to have complied with the regulation. If the enforcement agent observes
a violation, an enforcement action imposes a welfare neutral payment of
the fine f on the bank and forces it to comply with the regulation. If, after
observing a violation, the enforcement agent invests C with probability
p, and imposes an enforcement action on the bank whenever she finds
evidence, social welfare is
w
SI(✓, p) = pS + (1  p)(✓R  (1  ✓)B)  pC. (4.3.2)
7For instance, such a payo  structure emerges when a bank may or may not comply
with capital adequacy rules in Feess and Hege (2011) and Feess and Wohlschlegel
(2018).
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The enforcement agent will choose this enforcement probability p so
as to maximize wSI(✓, p). As this function is linear in p, the optimal choice
of enforcement probability conditional on observing that a type ✓ bank
has violated the regulation is
p
SI⇤(✓) =
(
1, if ✓ < ✓̂ := S+B CR+B ;
0, otherwise.
(4.3.3)
Anticipating this enforcement probability, a type ✓ bank will comply with
the regulation if and only if ✓ < ✓̂ and violate it otherwise. In equilibrium,
no evidence will be generated and no enforcement actions imposed.
4.3.3 Asymmetric Information and No Lobbying
In reality, enforcement agents do not know for sure yet whether a bank
has complied with the regulation when they initiate an investigation, and
they are not completely informed about all relevant characteristics of this
bank. Therefore, we will now analyze the case where, absent lobbying,
the enforcement agent needs to choose the enforcement probability p
unconditionally. We restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria where
the bank’s investment choice i is concerned, so that the consistent beliefs
G(·) are identical either to HI(·) or to H0(·). A non-compliant type ✓ bank’s
expected payo  is p(S   f) + (1  p)✓R. When complying, payo  is S with
certainty. Hence, the bank complies if and only if
✓ < ✓̃(p) :=
S + p1 pf
R
. (4.3.4)
The threshold ✓̃(p) is increasing in p, and types below ✓̃(0) = SR , are so
bad at managing risks that they would comply even without any threat of
enforcement action. The enforcer can achieve full compliance by setting
p so high that ✓̃(p)   1, which is the case if p   p̃ := R SR (S f) .
For partial compliance, p < p̃, expected welfare is
W
NL(p) = S   (1  p)
Z 1
✓̃(p)
(S   ✓R + (1  ✓)B)g(✓)d✓   Cp, (4.3.5)
which is the social benefit of a complying bank less the social loss due
to a non-complying bank not receiving an enforcement action, less the
enforcer’s cost of achieving the enforcement probability p. The enforce-
ment agent will choose the enforcement probability p so as to maximise
W
NL(p). Implementing full compliance cannot be optimal, as even with-
out costly enforcement it would be in society’s best interest if the very
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highest types violate the regulation. Indeed, increasing p beyond the
level where ✓̃(p) = ✓FB reduces the integrand in the second summand of
(4.3.5) and increases the enforcement cost Cp. Hence, under the optimal
enforcement probability, even some types of bank violate the regulation
for which this violation is welfare reducing.
4.3.4 Asymmetric Information and Lobbying
If lobbying is available to banks as a way to reliably communicate their
type ✓ to the enforcement agent, the latter can make the enforcement
probability contingent on some features that are now observable: She can
implement di erent enforcement probabilities for non-lobbying (pN ) and
lobbying (pL) banks and, if the bank has used lobbying to reveal its type
✓, di erent probabilities pL(✓) for di erent types. We will analyze this
scenario in two steps: First, we will determine the optimal enforcement
strategy towards lobbying banks for a given enforcement probability pN
for non-lobbying firms. Based on this result, we will then analyze the
optimal enforcement strategy over all and derive a set of predictions for
the empirical exercise.
Recall that a non-lobbying bank will comply if and only if ✓  e✓
 
p
N
 
.
Therefore, a type-✓ bank’s payo  when not lobbying is
⇧N(✓; pN) =
(
S, if ✓  e✓
 
p
N
 
;
p
N(S   f) +
 
1  pN
 
✓R, otherwise.
(4.3.6)
The contribution of this non-lobbying type ✓ bank to social welfare is
w
N(✓; pN) =
(
S   CpN , if ✓  e✓
 
p
N
 
;
p
N(S   C) +
 
1  pN
 
(✓R  (1  ✓)B), otherwise.
(4.3.7)
A bank that complies with the regulation has no benefit from lobbying
in our model. Hence, only non-complying banks would ever lobby. If a
bank does not comply but lobbies, it anticipates an enforcement proba-
bility pL(✓) according to the scheme that the regulator is committed to.
Hence, a lobbying bank’s payo  is
⇧L(✓; pL(✓)) = pL(✓)(S   f) + (1  pL(✓))✓R  L, (4.3.8)
and its contribution to social welfare
w
L(✓; pL(✓)) = pL(✓)(S   C) + (1  pL(✓))(✓R  (1  ✓)B)  L. (4.3.9)
Suppose a type-✓ bank violates the regulation and lobbies. As the
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bank’s type is now observable to the enforcement agent as a result of lob-
bying, the ex-post optimal enforcement strategy against lobbying banks
carries over from the symmetric information case: For given type ✓, wL(✓)
is increasing in pL(✓) if and only if ✓ < ✓̂ given by (4.3.3). However, the
enforcement agency will also anticipate ex ante the e ect of her choice of
p
L(·) on whether a type-✓ bank will lobby (henceforth denoted by `(✓) = 1)
or not (`(✓) = 0) in the first place. For a given enforcement probability pN
for non-lobbying banks, the enforcement agency chooses a schedule pL(✓)
so as to
max
pL(✓)
`(✓)wL(✓; pL(✓)) + (1  `(✓))wN(✓; pN)
s.t. `(✓) =
(
1, if ⇧L(✓; pL(✓))   ⇧N(✓); pN ;
0, otherwise.
(4.3.10)
Of course, it can never be optimal for the enforcement agent to induce
a bank with type ✓ < ✓̂ to lobby: Doing so saves investigation cost but
makes this type less likely to comply with the regulation, which is welfare
reducing due to ✓ < ✓̂, and imposes lobbying cost on that type.
For types of banks above that threshold, the enforcement agent needs
to compare social welfare with lobbying wL(✓; 0) under the ex-post optimal
enforcement probability pL(✓) = 0 with social welfare without lobbying
w
N(✓; pN). The enforcement agent would like to induce that type to lobby
if and only if the former exceeds the latter. Furthermore, the bank
might prefer not to lobby even if lobbying would permit it to violate the
regulation without having to fear an enforcement action, either because
it would, absent lobbying, prefer complying with the regulation anyway,
or because the enforcement probability without lobbying pN is too low to
warrant spending the lobbying cost L. Therefore, denote ✓c(pN) [✓v(pN)]
the type of bank above which, for given pN , both the regulator and the bank
prefer that the bank violates the regulation and lobbies with enforcement
probability pL(✓) = 0 rather than complying with the regulation [rather
than violating the regulation without lobbying], i.e., wL(✓; 0)   S   CpN
and ⇧L(✓; 0)   S if and only if ✓   ✓c(pN), and wL(✓; 0)   pN(S   C) +
 
1  pN
 
(✓R  (1 ✓)B) and ⇧L(✓; 0)   pN(S f)+
 
1  pN
 
✓R if and only
if ✓   ✓v(pN).
The following Lemma characterizes the equilibrium under lobbying:
Lemma 1. Consider a given enforcement probability pN for non-lobbying
banks. The enforcement agent’s optimal enforcement strategy of lobbying
banks is pL(✓) = 0 if ✓ 2 T (pN) := (✓c(pN), ✓̃(pN)) [ (max{✓v(pN), ✓̃(pN)}, 1],
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and the bank will, in equilibrium, lobby if and only if ✓ 2 T (pN).
Proof. Directly implied by the definitions and the explanation in the text.
Banks that would, absent lobbying, comply with the regulation (✓ <
✓̃(pN)) will, in equilibrium, lobby if and only if it is socially and individually
optimal for them to do so (✓ > ✓c(pN)), whereas banks that would violate
the regulation anyway (✓   ✓̃(pN)) will lobby if and only if ✓ > ✓v(pN). In
other words, the enforcement agency promises to leave lobbying banks
alone, but only if the information that emerges in the lobbying process
confirms that they are of high quality.8 This allows the enforcement agent
to focus her costly investigation e ort on the non-lobbying banks, which
are, in equilibrium, of low quality. Of course, the specific discussion above
rests on the assumption that lobbying reveals the bank’s type perfectly,
but the result would be qualitatively the same if lobbying only revealed a
noisy signal of the bank’s type to the enforcement agent.
However, if lobbying made no information on the bank’s type ob-
servable at all, such an enforcement strategy would not be incentive
compatible: Without the threat of investigating lobbying banks below the
quality threshold with even higher probability, low-quality banks would
have an incentive to imitate high-quality banks by lobbying. This would
be exactly the scenario discussed in the introduction, in which the only
information content of lobbying is that of non-compliance as compliant
banks can never benefit from lobbying. In such a case, however, it would
be optimal to investigate lobbying banks with probability 1 rather than 0,
which in turn would wipe out any incentive to lobby. In other words, the
equilibrium characterized by Lemma 1 only exists in a model in which
lobbying makes the bank’s type observable at least to some extent.9
With the result of Lemma 1 in mind, the enforcement agent can
optimize her enforcement probability pN for non-lobbying banks. The
8Note that, if some types of banks lobby at all, there is always a threshold type
above which all types do, and another threshold type below which all types do not lobby.
However, lobbying in equilibrium is not monotonic in the type for general enforcement
probabilities pN , i.e., these threshold types do not necessarily coincide. Proposition 1
(a) will establish that they do coincide, and lobbying is monotonic in the bank’s type,
under the optimal enforcement probability.
9That is to say, lobbying cannot serve as a "signal" in the game theoretic sense.
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objective function is
W
L(pN) =
Z
✓/2T (pN )
w
N(✓, pN)dG(✓) +
Z
✓2T (pN )
w
L(✓, pL(✓))
=
Z min{✓c(pN ),✓̃(pN )}
0
(S   CpN)dG(✓)
+
Z ✓v(pN )
✓̃(pN )
⇥
p
N(S   C) + (1  pN)(✓R  (1  ✓)B)
⇤
dG(✓)
+
Z
✓2T (pN )
(✓R  (1  ✓)B   L)dG(✓)
(4.3.11)
The following Lemma establishes that it can never be optimal for the
regulator to implement enforcement probabilities under which some
types of banks lobby although they would have preferred to comply with
the regulation absent lobbying.
Lemma 2. If lobbying is available, then under the optimal enforcement
strategy pNL , ✓̃(pNL ) < ✓c(pNL ).
Lemma 2 implies that, under the optimal enforcement strategy, the
lobbying decision uniquely separates types in higher types that lobby and
lower types that don’t. This allows the enforcement agent to focus the
enforcement e ort on non-lobbying, low-quality banks, which increases
the marginal returns to this e ort. As a consequence, part (b) of the
following proposition will show that lobbying is welfare enhancing unless
lobbying costs are too high. This is true although part (c) shows that,
under certain parameter constellations, the optimal enforcement strategy
may induce some types ✓ < ✓FB of banks to lobby whose violation of the
regulation is welfare reducing.
Proposition 1. (a) If the optimal enforcement strategy entails lobbying
by some types of bank at all, equilibrium lobbying is monotonic in
the bank’s type, i.e., there exists a threshold type ✓̄ such that type ✓
lobbies if and only if ✓ > ✓̄.
(b) If, absent lobbying, it is optimal for the enforcement agent to inves-
tigate with some positive probability pNNL > 0, then for su ciently
small lobbying costs L < pNNL(R max{S f,B C}) the availability
of lobbying is strictly welfare enhancing.
(c) For even smaller lobbying costs (L < pNNLC) and if C f is su ciently
small, the optimal enforcement strategy will induce some types ✓ <
✓
FB to lobby.
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(d) If lobbying costs are between the thresholds specified in parts (c)
and (d), the optimal enforcement probability pNL for non-lobbying
firms if lobbying is available is larger than the optimal enforcement
probability pNNL if lobbying is unavailable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Part (d) of Proposition 1 illustrates why responding to lobbying with
a reduced investigation probability is attractive for the enforcement
agent: The information shared by a lobbying bank allows the enforcement
agent to focus enforcement e ort on the most harmful banks, which
increases the social benefit from enforcement. As a consequence, the
socially optimal level of enforcement is higher than without lobbying.
4.3.5 Predictions of model
There are a number of testable predictions that can be derived from the
equilibrium derived in the theoretical analysis above. However, while
some of the model parameters translate into observable variables quite
straightforwardly, a central feature of our model is the bank’s private in-
formation on its type ✓, which would mean that we inherently expect this
variable to be unobservable in reality. We argue that this unobservable
quality can be proxied by information that we have about the quality of
corporate governance in a bank’s parent company.
In our model, the reason for lobbying is to communicate otherwise
unobservable information about the bank’s quality to the regulator. As
a consequence, Proposition 1 (a) has shown that it is banks with high ✓
that lobby in equilibrium.
Prediction 1. Banks with better corporate governance are more likely
to lobby.
Furthermore, banks that have violated the regulation should, ceteris
paribus, be more likely to be penalized than banks that have complied
with it. Therefore, the bank’s expected benefit from using lobbying to
convince the regulator of the bank’s quality is higher for violating banks.
Prediction 2. Banks that have violated the regulation are more likely
to lobby.
Banks will only have an incentive to lobby if they are less likely to be
punished than in the case where they do not lobby. Therefore, under the
optimal enforcement strategy characterized in Lemma 1, pL(✓) < pN for
all types ✓ that lobby in equilibrium.
Prediction 3. Lobbying high-quality banks are less likely to be punished
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than non-lobbying high-quality banks.
Finally, the equilibrium derived exhibits high-quality banks to be more
likely to violate the regulation and lobby. If they did not lobby, they would
be more likely to be penalized and, as a consequence, forced to comply
with the regulation. Therefore, lobbying banks can be expected to be
more successful for two reasons: a selection e ect, because the decision
to lobby is correlated with quality, and a punishment e ect, because
lobbying banks are more likely to be allowed to go ahead with their risky
strategy, which they are good at because of their high type.
Prediction 4. In equilibrium, lobbying high-quality banks perform
better than non-lobbying high-quality banks.
4.3.6 Discussion: Incentives to Invest in Quality
An obvious next question is whether the availability of lobbying increases
or reduces the bank’s incentives to invest in quality. Of course, the
enforcement agency’s beliefs on the bank’s type depends on whether
the bank invests in quality in equilibrium: If the bank does invest in
equilibrium, the enforcement agency will believe that high types are more
and low types less likely than if it does not. Given the optimal enforcement
strategy based on these beliefs, there is an equilibrium in which the bank
invests in quality if and only if it cannot gain by unilaterally deviating to
not investing, given that the enforcement agency’s beliefs are based on
the distribution HI(·) with investment.
As the costs of that investment are independent of the lobbying regime
and the enforcement strategy, comparing investment incentives with and
without lobbying available boils down to comparing the benefit from
that investment under both regimes, which is basically to increase the
probability of being a high and reduce that of being a low type. In order
to compare this benefit with and without lobbying available, we need
to compare the bank’s equilibrium profit under each regime for every
type. For instance, types ✓̃(pNNL) < ✓ < ✓̃(pNL ) comply with the regulation
when lobbying is available but don’t when it is not, so that they are worse
o  if lobbying is available. On the other hand, the main beneficiaries
from lobbying are those types who do not comply under either regime,
as they go unpunished under lobbying. In other words, there are lower
types that are worse and higher types that are better o  when lobbying
is available than when it is not. However, a full analysis of the e ect
of the availability of lobbying on investment incentives would require
more specific assumptions on the distributions of types with and without
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investments.
In summary, Proposition 1 established that lobbying is welfare en-
hancing for a given distribution of banks’ types unless the process of
lobbying is too costly. The present Subsection has identified a further
potential benefit, that the availability of lobbying may improve banks’
incentives to invest in (corporate governance) quality.
4.4 Sample, data and variable selection
The main objective of the empirical analysis will be to examine how
the lobbying and the enforcement decisions and corporate governance
quality are interrelated. Regulatory enforcement actions are imposed
on Commercial and Savings Banks and, as such, will largely depend on
their financial characteristics. However, these banks do not usually lobby
by themselves. Instead, their parent Bank Holding Companies lobby on
their behalf.
As a consequence, there is need to work with two di erent samples
to analyze the research question of this chapter: (i) the Bank Holding
Company Sample which consists of 173 large listed US Bank Holding
Companies, and (ii) the Subsidiary sample, which consists of 684 Com-
mercial and Savings Banks and are subsidiaries of the Bank Holding
Companies included in (i). The data in both samples refer to the years
from 2002 until 2017. The choice of the Bank Holding Companies in-
cluded in the sample, as well as the time-frame, are mainly driven by
the availability of the Corporate Governance indicator, which is one of
the core variables of interest of this analysis. Data is collected from the
following sources: (i) Financial characteristics and Enforcement Actions
are obtained by SNL Financial, (ii) Lobbying information is hand col-
lected by the Center of Responsive Politics website and (iii) Corporate
Governance information is retrieved by Datastream.
The sections below provide an overview of the construction of the
working sample, as well as a detailed description of the variables included
in the analysis. Tables with their descriptive statistics and correlation
coe cients are also included. A full list of the variables can be found in
Table 4.1.
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4.4.1 Bank Holding Company sample
To begin with, the analysis examines on the motives behind the lobbying
decision of a Bank Holding Company. In order to do so, the focus is put on
the quality of a Bank Holding Company’s Corporate Governance, while
controlling for financial and other characteristics.
All information in regard to lobbying activity is hand collected from
the lobbying database and filing archives of the United States Senate and
the "Open Secrets" website of the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP).
Information is available from 1998 to date. The Lobbying Disclosure Act
of 1995 requires lobbyists to register and report information on their
activities to the Senate O ce of Public Records (SOPR). The SOPR
keeps an archive of these files, which is available to the public. Data on
lobbying is therefore collected and compiled as provided by the CRP. This
information includes various files which provide details on the lobbying
reports that each Bank Holding Company files. Such reports are provided
on firm-level. In regard to financial institutions, the majority of reports
are filed by a bank’s parent company (i.e., the Bank Holding or Financial
Holding Company). For the purpose of the present analysis, information
on lobbying is retrieved from the report files from 2002 to 2017. Once
lobbying information is gathered and matched with each Bank Holding
Company of the sample, a dummy variable is created, "Lobbying", which
takes "1" if a Bank Holding Company has filled a lobbying report in a
given year, and "0" otherwise.
In order to capture the overall quality of a Bank Holding Company’s
Corporate Governance systems and processes, a relevant indicator ("Gov-
ernance") is taken into account. This indicator is provided by Datastream
and is intended to measure a company’s commitment and e ectiveness to-
wards following best practice corporate governance principles. In essence,
this indicator reflects a company’s key areas of corporate governance such
as board structure, compensation policy, board functions, shareholder
rights and its vision and strategy. This indicator is used in the present
analysis as a proxy for a Bank Holding Company’s corporate governance
quality. Higher values indicate better governance, and vice versa.
Finally, following empirical precedent (Gibson et al., 2018) several
financial characteristics and controlled for: (i) capitalisation through the
equity to assets ratio ("Risk-based capital ratio"), (ii) performance by the
return on assets ("Return on assets"), (iii) the Bank Holding Company’s
age (Age) and (iv) the Bank Holding Company’s number of depository
subsidiaries (Depositories), in order to account for the magnitude and
significance of the institution. In addition, a set of characteristics, which
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capture the financial condition of the Bank Holding Company’s sub-
sidiary banks are considered. In particular, the average profitability
(ROA (mean)) and non-performing loans ( NPL (mean)) of each Bank
Holding Company’s subsidiaries is controlled for. More precisely, these
measures are constructed as follows: (i) For the average value of perfor-
mance (ROA (mean)), a variable that takes the mean return on assets
ratio of the subsidiary banks of each Bank Holding company at year t
is created, and (ii) for the average value of non-performing loans (NPL
(mean)), a variable that takes the mean non-performing loans ratio of the
subsidiary banks of each Bank Holding company at year t is constructed.
Last but not least, the geographical distance of the Bank Holding Com-
pany’s headquarter location to DC (Distance to DC) and the extent of
state-level financial sector employment (Fin. sector employment) are
considered.
4.4.2 Subsidiary level sample
The analysis is continued by examining whether a Bank Holding Com-
pany’s lobbying activity is successful in terms of lower probability of
enforcement by the regulator against its subsidiary. In order to assess
this, information on regulatory enforcement actions issued against Com-
mercial and Savings Banks for the time frame between 2002-2017 is
gathered. In order to identify whether a Commercial Bank or Saving
Bank engages in lobbying activities, lobbying information for each sub-
sidiary is inserted reflecting the lobbying activity of its Bank Holding
Company, as done in prior literature (Lambert, 2019).
Data on enforcement actions issued by the three federal regulatory
agencies: Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC) and the O ce of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
are retrieved from SNL Financial. These enforcement actions 10 refer
to actions taken against Commercial or Savings Banks, which are sub-
sidiaries of the Bank Holding Companies in Sample (i). The types of
actions taken (in order of severity) are: Deposit Insurance Termination,
Cease and Desist orders, Formal Written and Prompt Corrective Action.
A detailed description of each type along with their classification can be
found in Table A in Appendix 3.A. For the purpose of this analysis, the
severe types of enforcement actions outlined above are considered, as
severe actions are more closely related to safety and soundness issues
of banks. Following the analysis and findings of Chapter 3 the current
10For a detailed discussion on the architecture of US banking supervision please see
Section 3.2.2.2 of the previous chapter.
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analysis focuses on severe type of enforcement actions only. A dummy
variable, Severe actions, is therefore, constructed that takes the value of
"1" if a bank received a severe type of regulatory enforcement action in a
particular year, and the value of "0" otherwise.
A set of variables capturing the CAMELS ratings components, which
form an integral part of the examination process are also considered
in the empirical set-up. These ratings are confidential, and therefore
following prior studies (Lambert, 2019; Cole and White, 2012) certain
proxies are considered. In particular, the risk-based capital ratio ("Risk-
based capital ratio") is considered as a measure of capital adequacy and
the risk weighted assets ("Risk-weighted assets ratio") as a measure of
asset quality.
4.4.3 Descriptive statistics for Bank Holding Company
and Subsidiary level sample
The present section discusses the main descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables considered in the analysis of this chapter. To begin with, Table 4.2
reports the descriptive statistics of the variables presented in Section
4.4.1 explaining the Bank Holding Company level sample and variables.
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample, whereas
Panel B for the lobbying only sample. In regard to the core variable of
interest, (Governance) ranges from 0.12 to 99.65. In the sample of Bank
Holding Companies, the average score is equal to 48.37, which is lower
than the score of lobbying - only banks (53.15). In regard to the remaining
control variables, it appears that the average Bank Holding Company
in the full working sample has an average ("Risk-based capital ratio")
ratio equal to 11.97 and an average ("Return on assets") of 0.008. These
figures are not outstandingly di erent (11.43 and 0.0081 respectively)
to those reported for connected only banks in Panel B. However, it is
noteworthy that for the lobbying sample, the average age and number of
subsidiary banks is higher. In particular, the mean value of the number
of depository institutions is equal to 1.55, whereas for the lobbying banks
it is equal to 1.94. In regard to age, full sample mean age is 105.26,
whereas for lobbying banks it is equal to 133.29. Moreover, the mean
("Distance to DC") for the lobbying banks appears to be lower (6.9391)
in comparison to the reported values of the full sample (7.005). Turning
to the subsidiary related characteristics, Bank Holding Companies that
lobby have subsidiaries with lower average ("Return on Assets") (1.11)
and higher average("Non performing loans") (2.81), in comparison to the
average bank in the full sample (1.49 and 1.84 respectively).
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for BHC characteristics
Panel A. Full sample
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Governance 715 48.37365 48.7 28.38413 0.12 99.65
Risk-based capital ratio 689 11.97855 11.73 2.596312 6.79 33.6
Return on assets 695 0.0088751 0.0095153 0.0067993 -0.0600171 0.0364328
Depositories 715 1.551049 1 1.464274 0 16
Age 710 105.2662 116 55.8259 1 218
Fin. sector employment 703 15.08818 15.09814 0.860954 12.72089 16.4873
Distance to DC 715 7.005628 6.968432 1.1123 2.547414 9.092468
ROA (mean) 715 1.490437 1.016667 2.823402 -7.043333 24.10333
NPL (mean) 715 1.846481 1.05 2.208688 0 14.91
Panel B. Lobbying sample
Governance 218 53.15284 54.62 28.29258 1.05 99.65
Risk-based capital ratio 216 11.4331 11.415 2.36886 6.79 19.15
Return on assets 216 0.0081356 0.0098061 0.0093224 -0.0600171 0.025473
Depositories 218 1.949541 1 1.453496 1 6
Age 218 133.2936 144.5 48.85194 14 218
Fin. sector employment 209 15.29248 15.32365 0.6620064 12.91844 16.4873
Distance to DC 218 6.939166 6.945255 1.130203 5.725819 9.092468
ROA (mean) 218 1.114252 0.9933333 1.530599 -5.325 8.21125
NPL (mean) 218 2.813809 1.6685 2.998015 0.1293333 14.91
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the first section of this analysis, which focuses on the
lobbying decision of Bank Holding Companies. The sample period is 2002-2017. Panel A provides the descriptive statistics
of the full sample. Panel B, provides the descriptive statistics for Bank Holding Companies engaged in lobbying activities.
The Governance indicator is an index measuring a company’s commitment and e ectiveness towards following best practice
corporate governance policies. The Risk-based capital ratio is equal to the total qualifying capital divided by risk-weighted
assets net of allowances and other reductions. Return on assets are equal to the income (loss) before applicable income taxes
and discontinued operations divided by total assets. Depositories is the sum of depository institutions owned by the BHC. Age
is the natural logarithm of the number of years that the BHC is operating. Fin. sector employment is the natural logarithm
of the total number of individuals employed in the financial services and insurance industry at the state level. Distance to
DC is they flying distance (in km) from BHC’s headquarter location to DC. ROA (mean) is the average value of ROA of the
BHC’s subsidiaries in year t. NPL (mean) is the average value of non performing loans of the BHC’s subsidiaries in year t.
Governance index is obtained by Datastream. Financial data is retrieved from SNL Financial. Financial sector employment is
retrieved from the US Census Bureau.
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Moreover, as a measure of earnings/ performance the "Return on as-
sets" is used, and as a measure of liquidity, the ("Liquidity ratio"). Finally,
size (Size) and age (Age) of the bank are included. Table 4.4 presents the
descriptive statistics of the severe enforcement actions enacted against
the BHC’s subsidiary banks of the sample. The bank-year number of
actions in the sample is 105. In regard to the actions issued per agency,
the OCC appears to have issued slightly more severe actions (N=44) in
comparison to the actions issued by the FDIC (N=42), while the FED has
issued the least. As observed in Chapter 3, enforcement action activity
was increased during the years of the crisis, with 2010 recording the
highest number.
Last but not least, Table 4.5 reports the descriptive statistics for the
financial related variables employed in the subsidiary level sample and
discussed in section 4.4.2. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the
full working sample, whereas Panel B for the punished sample only -i.e.,
for banks that received a severe type enforcement action. The average
bank in the full sample has a mean risk-based capital ratio of 40.08 and
risk-weighted assets ratio of 74.06. In terms of performance and liquidity,
the respective ratios are equal to 1.39 and 26.06. Moreover, the average
non-performing loans ratio equals to 1.89. In regard to size and age, the
average bank in the working sample has a mean natural logarithm of total
assets equal to 14.29 and 66.50 of age. When comparing these figures to
those reported in Panel B, certain di erences exist, which are almost in
line with the profile identified in the analysis in Chapter 3. In particular,
punished banks have lower average risk-based capital ratios (12.41) and
risk-weighted asset ratios (76.19), as well as poorer performance (-0.78)
as opposed to those recorded in the full sample. Moreover, punished
banks are less liquid (19.17) and have higher non-performing loans (7.55).
Finally, they are greater in size (15.49) and age (75.59).
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Table 4.4: Summary statistics of enforcement actions
Year Severe Actions FDIC FED OCC
2002 2 0 1 1
2003 4 1 2 1
2004 2 1 1 0
2005 3 0 0 3
2006 1 0 0 1
2007 0 0 0 0
2008 8 3 2 3
2009 14 8 4 2
2010 16 10 3 3
2011 12 3 1 8
2012 9 5 0 4
2013 6 2 1 3
2014 12 3 1 8
2015 8 2 1 5
2016 6 4 1 1
2017 2 0 1 1
Total 105 42 19 44
Table 4.4 reports the summary statistics of the enforcement
actions sample of the analysis.The sample period is 2002-
2017.Severe actions is a dummy variable that takes "1" if a
bank received a severe type of enforcement action in quarter t,
"0" otherwise. Data on enforcement actions is retrieved from
the OCC, FED and FDIC’s websites.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics for Subsidiary banks
Panel A. Full sample
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Risk-based capital ratio 2874 40.08364 12.945 97.0501 -1.49 570.92
Risk-weighted assets ratio 2839 74.06471 77.5 20.28402 9.64 250.05
Return on assets 2858 1.398523 1.06 4.104111 -28.2 69.7
Liquidity ratio 2736 26.06557 14.5 53.32765 0.02 497.64
Non-performing loans ratio 2682 1.898576 0.9 3.49462 2.062365 39.72
Size 2876 14.29704 14.11253 2.402639 7.6 21.48
Age 2875 66.50157 44 54.47093 1 217
Panel B. Punished sample
Risk-based capital ratio 105 12.41914 12.3 7.674172 -1.49 43.53
Risk-weighted assets ratio 104 76.19663 77.145 11.8039 35.68 111.22
Return on assets 104 -0.7854808 0.395 2.88302 -11.68 4.54
Liquidity ratio 105 19.17676 14.86 14.77127 1.42 79.23
Non-performing loans ratio 105 7.554952 4.11 7.499041 0.01 27.95
Size 105 15.49523 14.82366 3.022346 10.12 21.45
Age 105 75.59048 45 64.73447 2 20
Table 4.5 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the second section of this analysis, which examines
the probability of a Commercial and Savings Banks being punished. The sample period is 2002-2017. Panel A provides
the descriptive statistics of the full sample. Panel B, provides the descriptive statistics for punished with severe actions
only subsidiaries. The Risk-based capital ratio is equal to the total qualifying capital divided by risk-weighted assets
net of allowances and other reductions. Risk-weighted assets ratio refers to the risk-weighted assets net of allowances
and other reductions divided by total assets. Return on assets are equal to the income (loss) before applicable income
taxes and discontinued operations divided by total assets. The liquidity ratio is calculated by dividing cash and cash
equivalents plus US treasury securities with total assets. Non-performing loans ratio is the non-accrual and restructures
loans as a percent of total loans and leases. Bank size equals the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural
logarithm of number of years that the bank’s parent company is operating. Financial data is retrieved from SNL
Financial.
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4.5 Empirical analysis on BHCs’ Lobbying
Decision
4.5.1 Baseline model and results
The starting point of the analysis is to examine the motives behind
a BHC’s decision to engage in lobbying activities. Due to the binary
nature of the dependent variable "lobbying" the following Probit model
is estimated:
Lobbyingi,t =   (↵ +  1Governancei,t +  2Controlsi,t +  statek +  yeart + "i,t) ,
(4.5.1)
where i refers to the Bank Holding Company, k to the state and t to year
t. The variable Lobbying takes the value "1" if a Bank Holding Company
filed a lobbying report in year t, and "0" otherwise. In order to test Pre-
diction 1, the main variable of interest in explaining a BHC’s lobbying
decision is the quality of the BHC’s corporate governance Governance,
which serves as a proxy for the unobservable quality of the BHC and
its subsidiaries. Furthermore, a number of the BHCs’ characteristics
are controlled for including financial characteristics and company demo-
graphics, such as age or number of depository institutions held. In order
to account for observable and unobservable characteristics across states,
a set of state dummies is incorporated. Moreover, in order to address
variation across time, a set of year dummies is included. Equation 4.5.1
is estimated using robust standard errors.
Results are reported in Table 4.7, Column (1). In line with Prediction
1, BHCs with higher corporate governance quality are more likely to
lobby, as indicated by a positive and significant coe cient of the Gover-
nance variable. With regards to the control variables, the findings show
that companies that are older and have a greater number of depository
institutions are more likely to lobby. Furthermore, two additional vari-
ables that could be potential drivers of lobbying activity are controlled
for. First, prior studies (Lambert, 2019; Gibson et al., 2018) have shown
that proximity to Washington, DC influences the costs associated with
lobbying. In particular, firms that are located near to Washington, DC
are closer to regulatory authorities and politicians. Thus, this enables
lobbyists to interact easier with the aforementioned parties. The result
of a negative and significant coe cient confirms these previous studies.
Second, the importance of the financial services and insurance indus-
try for the BHC’s home state’s economy is controlled for. This aspect is
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measured by the number of individuals employed in that industry in the
respective state. Cunha (2017) considers financial services and insurance
industry employment at the state/ district level as a determinant of vot-
ing patterns of policy-makers regarding the introduction of bills, as this
helps to capture the influence of potential interest groups. In the case of
this study, the magnitude of financial services and insurance industry
employment could be a driver of lobbying activity, in the sense that as
the number of people employed in this industry increases, banks are
encouraged to engage in corporate political strategies (such as lobbying)
in order to serve the needs/ demands of these interest groups. Indeed,
the results indicate that higher financial sector employment is associated
with higher lobbying activity.
In a next step, the aim is to test in a more direct manner the theoretical
model’s main theme that lobbying is undertaken so as to shield banks
that are in violation of regulation from regulatory enforcement. The idea
is that large Bank Holding Companies could potentially be lobbying on
behalf of their ailing subsidiaries in order to secure them more favourable
supervisory treatment. In order to test this, financial characteristics of
the BHC’s portfolio of subsidiaries are added to the control variables. In
particular, two variables that play an important role in the supervisory
process are used: (i) average ROA and (ii) average non-performing loans
ratio over all of this BHC’s subsidiaries, respectively. Controlling for the
financial position of a BHC’s subsidiaries allows to test how relevant the
possibility of an enforcement action is for a BHC’s subsidiaries.
As these variables belong to the financial characteristics that the
CAMELS rating is based on, which regulators use to assess whether
banks have complied with the regulation, Prediction 2 predicts a positive
coe cient for average non-performing loans and a negative coe cient
for average ROA. The signs of both of these coe cients in Column (2) of
Table 4.7 are in line with these predictions (significant on the 1% and
the 5% level, respectively). All coe cients of variables that were already
included in Column (1) remain qualitatively the same.
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Table 4.7: Probability to lobby (BHC level)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES dep. varr: Lobbying dep. varr: Lobbying
Governance 0.0132*** 0.0164***
(0.00307) (0.00337)
Risk-based capital ratio -0.0491 -0.0973*
(0.0547) (0.0591)
Return on assets -10.44 -7.487
(10.07) (10.56)
Depositories 0.225*** 0.235***
(0.0804) (0.0811)
Age 0.00517* 0.00734***
(0.00288) (0.00266)
Fin. sector employment 9.011** 9.662**
(3.71) (3.849)
Distance to DC -0.244** -0.285***
(0.099) (0.102)
ROA (mean) -0.114***
(0.0328)
NPL (mean) 0.0963**
(0.0486)
Constant -125.1** -133.8**
(52.37) (54.27)
Observations 437 437
State Dummies YES YES
Time dummies YES YES
R-sq 0.358 0.379
Table 4.7 reports the baseline results of a Probit model with robust standard errors. Sample
period is 2002-2017. The dependent variable in both (1) and (2) is the lobbying indicator variable.
The Governance indicator is an index measuring a company’s commitment and e ectiveness
towards following best practice corporate governance policies. The Risk-based capital ratio
is equal to the total qualifying capital divided by risk-weighted assets net of allowances and
other reductions. Return on assets are equal to the income (loss) before applicable income
taxes and discontinued operations divided by total assets. Depository is the sum of depository
institutions owned by the BHC. Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years that
the BHC is operating. Fin. sector employment is the natural logarithm of the total number
of individuals employed in the financial services and insurance industry at the state level.
Distance to DC is they flying distance (in km) from BHC’s headquarter location to DC. ROA
(mean) is the average value of ROA of the BHC’s subsidiaries in year t. NPL (mean) is the
average value of non performing loans of the BHC’s subsidiaries in year t. Governance index is
obtained by Datastream. Financial data is retrieved from SNL Financial. Financial sector
employment is retrieved from the US Census Bureau. The ***, ** and * signs denote statistical
significance at the 1,5 and 10% level.
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4.6 Empirical analysis on Lobbying Success
4.6.1 Baseline model and results
It has just been shown that a BHC’s decision to lobby is significantly
related to the financial variables in its portfolio of subsidiaries. Given
the explanation of this relationship, that BHCs’ lobbying may shield
their subsidiaries from an enforcement action, a plausible next step of
the analysis is to examine the impact of a BHC’s lobbying activity on
how likely its subsidiaries are to receive a regulatory enforcement action.
Following Lambert (2019), this analysis is performed on the subsidiary
level and therefore, the subsidiary sample described in Section 4.4 is
employed. In particular, the following Probit model is estimated:
SevereActioni,t =  (↵ +  1Governancei,t +  2Lobbyingi,t +  3Governance ⇤ Lobbyingi,t
+ 4Controlsi,t +  statek +  yeart ++⇣regulatorp + "i,k,t)
(4.6.1)
where i refers to Bank Holding Company, k to the state, t to the year and
p to the regulator. The dependent variable Severe action is a dummy indi-
cating whether or not a subsidiary has received a regulatory enforcement
action of the severe type. Due to the binary nature of the dependent
variable, a Probit model with robust standard errors is estimated. The
Lobbying dummy indicates whether or not a subsidiary’s parent com-
pany (BHC) has engaged in lobbying in a particular year. In addition,
Governance reflects the quality of the BHC’s corporate governance and is
controlled as a proxy for the quality that the BHC communicates to the
regulator in the lobbying process.11 Furthermore, in order to capture the
potential heterogeneity of the impact of lobbying on punishment across
banks with di erent levels of governance quality as hypothesised in the
theoretical model, the model controls for the interaction of these vari-
ables, the coe cient of which is of main interest. Furthermore, a set of
variables that capture the CAMELS components is controlled for, namely
capitalisation Capital, asset quality Asset, Earnings and Liquidity. More-
over, a bank’s Size and Age are taken into consideration. Results are
reported in Table 4.8.
The baseline specification of the model can be found in Column (1).
The lobbying dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 1%
11Although the subsidiary has its own board and governance policies, prior studies
(Adams and Mehran (2003)) have highlighted that there could be a potential influence
of corporate governance in a parent company on its subsidiaries.
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level. In light of the theoretical model and the closely related study by
Lambert (2019), who finds a negative and statistically significant impact
of lobbying on regulatory enforcement outcome, this result seems surpris-
ing at first glance. However, recall that the interaction of lobbying and
governance quality is controlled for so as to examine the impact of lobby-
ing on enforcement likelihood for di erent levels of corporate governance
quality. Therefore, the positive coe cient of the lobbying dummy needs
to be interpreted as the conditional relationship between lobbying and
punishment for subsidiaries of low-governance BHCs. Indeed, Prediction
3 suggests a negative relationship between lobbying and punishment
only for high-quality banks, and the negative coe cient of the interaction
term of lobbying and governance is in line with this.
Table 4.9, which depicts the predicted marginal e ects of the lobbying
parameter for di erent values of corporate governance quality, confirms
that this marginal e ect is indeed negative if governance quality is su -
ciently high and, thus, supports Prediction 3.12 The picture is even clearer
in Figure 4.6.1, which plots the marginal e ects. It is apparent that, as
the Governance score increases, the relationship between lobbying and
enforcement action likelihood becomes inverse.
In terms of the remaining control variables, most appear to be in
line with prior literature. In particular, the results show that banks
with low levels of capital and profitability are more likely to be punished.
These findings are to be expected, as these financial characteristics are
known to be important components of the CAMELS ratings and, thus, to
determine whether a bank is at risk of being penalized.
4.6.2 Robustness Analysis
In order to confirm the findings of the analysis obtain thus far, a set of
robustness tests are performed. Columns (2) – (9) of Table 4.8 show that
the main result of this Table, the negative coe cient of the interaction
of lobbying and governance quality, is robust for a number of sample
restrictions: First, high capitalised banks (Column 2) and low capitalised
(Column 3) banks are excluded, by removing the top and bottom 5%
of banks. The purpose of this test is to confirm whether the baseline
results hold when well or poor capitalised banks are removed from the
sample, as these cases could be driving the relationship observed thus
far. Second, large (Column 4) and small (Column 5) banks are excluded,
12 Ai and Norton (2003) outline potential complications regarding the interpretation
of interaction terms in non-linear models. Norton et al. (2004) however, provide several
alternative solutions in order to address these complications. These suggestions are
used to estimate the marginal e ects for di erent values of the Governance measure.
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by removing the top and bottom 5% of banks, respectively. As previously,
the main purpose is to isolate any potential impact from either very
large or very small firms present in the sample. Third, the years of the
financial crisis are excluded. The time frame of the study includes the
years during which the global financial crisis took place. This as an event
itself could potentially influence and drive the results obtained thus far.
Moreover, as shown in the summary statistics in Table 4.4, enforcement
actions increased during those years. The baseline model is therefore
re-estimated by excluding the years 2008-2011. Results are presented
in Column (6). The final set of tests refers to examining di erences
across regulatory agencies. The baseline model is re-estimated for FDIC
(Column 7), FED (Column 8) and OCC -only (Column 9) supervised
banks. Overall, after performing these exercises, the overall results of
the key variable of interest (i.e., the governance and lobbying interaction
term) remains the same in sign and significance in almost all cases. In
particular, the only case for which coe cients turn insignificant, is that
in Column (9), where the sample is restricted for OCC-supervised banks
only.
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Table 4.9: Average marginal e ects
at: Governance values: Average Marginal e ects
1 0.12 0.0517874 ***
(0.0193943)
2 4.13 0.0481306 ***
(0.0179884)
3 7.24 0.0453069 ***
(0.0169853)
4 23.39 0.0307739 **
(0.0130595)
5 50 0.0069816
(0.0112585)
6 79.93 -0.0203373
(0.0141127)
7 92.21 -0.0319473 *
(0.0163502)
8 95.32 -0.0349385 **
(0.0170232)
9 98 -0.0375343 **
(0.0176402)
Table 4.9 reports the average marginal e ects of the Baseline
model in 4.8, Column (1), obtained by the Detla-method. The
marginal e ects refer to nine values that correspond to the 1st-
99th percentile for the Governance index. The marginal e ects
are reported in Column (3).Standard errors are in parentheses.
The output post-estimation is based on Stata’s ’margins’ com-
mand (see Williams et al.,2012). The ***, ** and * signs denote
statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10% level.
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Figure 4.6.1: Margins plot
Average margins showcasing the moderating e ect of Lobbying on the probability of
enforcement for di erent values of the Governance index
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4.6.3 Addressing endogeneity
The evidence provided thus far suggests that lobbying is associated with
a lower probability of receiving an enforcement action if the BHC’s cor-
porate governance quality is high. An important concern at this point
is, however, that lobbying might be endogenous 13 . For instance, the
BHC’s lobbying decision might be correlated with some unobservable
variable that also drives the regulator’s enforcement decision. Alterna-
tively, BHCs might anticipate that their subsidiaries are at risk of being
penalized and accordingly choose to lobby the regulator. In either case,
the parameter estimates in Table 4.8 would be biased. Indeed, it has
been argued in the theoretical model and Subsection 4.5.1 above that
the financial situation of a subsidiary, which the regulatory enforcement
decision is partly based on, is also an important determinant for its BHC’s
lobbying decision.
In order to address these concerns, the determinants of BHCs’ lob-
bying decision are taken into account by simultaneously estimating the
lobbying decision and the impact of lobbying on enforcement actions. As
both of these dependent variables are binary, a recursive Bivariate Probit
(BIPROBIT) model is considered. Just like in a two-stage least square
model, the Bivariate Probit model requires an exclusion restriction, which
means that the estimation of lobbying must include at least one variable
or instrument that is not related to the enforcement decision.
As the decision of whether to lobby is made by the BHC, a strong
instrument will most likely be a variable on the BHC level. The analysis
in Subsection 4.5.1 provides some candidates for determinants of the
lobbying decision that are unlikely to be related to the enforcement deci-
sion. In particular, the Bank Holding Company’s geographical distance
to Washington, DC and the economic importance of the financial sector
in the BHC’s home state had highly significant coe cients in Table 4.7.
Another important result of Subsection 4.5.1 was that BHCs’ lobbying
decision seems to be influenced by the financial characteristics of their
portfolio of subsidiaries. Due to these variables’ relevance for the lobbying
decision, they are added as instruments in a second specification of
the Bivariate Probit model. They satisfy the exclusion restriction, as a
specific bank’s probability of being penalized is unlikely to be related to
the financial characteristics of the worst subsidiary in its BHC’s portfolio.
All of the BHC-level variables are included into the subsidiary-level
analysis by assigning their value to each subsidiary of this BHC.
13For a detailed background discussion regarding endogeneity, please see section
3.5.3.1.
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As further robustness checks, a linear probability model is considered
for the first stage (that explains the lobbying decision) and use IV-probit
to estimate this. Again, there is a specification that does not use the
average financial situation of a BHC’s subsidiary portfolio as instruments,
and another one that does.The results of these estimations are reported
Table 4.10. Columns (1) and (3) display the results for the Biprobit model,
and (2) and (4) those of the IV-probit specifications.
In order to obtain diagnostics regarding the validity of the instruments
and the overall identification of the equations, the model is independently
re-estimated in the first stage in order to obtain the values of the LR-
chi-square statistic. The p-value obtained is below 0.001, which confirms
the significance of the model.14 With regards to the results, the sign and
significance of the coe cients of the lobbying and governance variables
and their interaction in the enforcement equation are consistent with
the Probit estimations in Table 4.8 that did not correct for endogeneity,
and across the four models presented in Table 4.10.
14Recall that the significant coe cients of the instruments in the estimations in
Subsection 4.5.1 may serve as further evidence for their relevance.
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Table 4.10: Probability to receive a regulatory enforcement action: Ad-
dressing endogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Second stage results
Dep. Variable: Severe action
Lobbying 1.3911 *** 0.6806 *** 1.664*** 0.6400**
(0.3172) (0.24081) (0.3187) (0.2488)
Governance 0.0066 ** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.0053**
(0 .0027) (0.0028) (0.00266) (0.0029)
Lobbying x Governance -0.0119 *** -0.0114*** -0.01165*** -0.0107***
(0.0036) (0.00406) (0.0035) (0.0041)
Bank controls YES YES YES YES
State dummies YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES
Method of estimation Bi-probit IV-probit Bi-probit IV-probit
Panel B: First stage results
Dep. Variable: Lobbying
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fin. sector employment x x x x
Distance to DC x x x x
ROA (mean) x x
NPL (mean) x x
Bank controls YES YES YES YES
State dummies YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES
LR - stat 1407.45 1407.45 1453.15 1453.15
P-value 0 0 0 0
Table 4.10 reports the estimated results of a of a Bi-probit (Columns 1 and 3) and IV- probit
model (Columns 2 and 4). Sample period is 2002-2017. The dependent variable in the second
stage (Panel A) in all cases is the severe enforcement action indicator variable. The dependent
variable for the first stage regressions (Panel B) is the lobbying indicator variable. The
instruments used in the models in Columns (1) and (2) are "Financial Sector employment"
and "Distance to DC". In Columns (3) and (4) mean ROA and Non-performing loans of the
subsidiaries of each Bank Holding Company are added. Severe actions is a dummy variable
that takes "1" if a bank received a severe type of enforcement action in quarter t, "0" otherwise.
Lobbying is a dummy variable that takes "1" if the bank’s parent company lobbied in year
t, "0" otherwise. Governance is an index measuring a bank’s (parent company) commitment
and e ectiveness towards following best practice corporate governance policies. Fin. sector
employment is the natural logarithm of the total number of individuals employed in the financial
services and insurance industry at the state level. Distance to DC is they flying distance (in
km) from BHC’s headquarter location to DC. ROA (mean) is the average value of ROA of the
BHC’s subsidiaries in year t. NPL (mean) is the average value of non performing loans of the
BHC’s subsidiaries in year t. Governance index is obtained by Datastream. Financial data is
retrieved from SNL Financial. Financial sector employment is retrieved from the US Census
Bureau.Lobbying data is retrieved from the Center for Responsive Politics.
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4.7 Empirical analysis on Lobbying and per-
formance
In the theoretical model, it had been assumed that a higher type ✓ is linked
to higher performance of risky projects. As high-✓ banks choose these
risky projects in equilibrium, they also perform better in equilibrium
than low-✓ banks (Prediction 4).
In the empirical analysis, it has thus far been shown that those BHCs
are more likely to lobby that have better corporate governance scores and
whose subsidiaries are more at risk of receiving an enforcement action,
and that lobbying can reduce this penalty risk. However, no enquiries
have been made about the regulators’ potential motives for reacting to
lobbying in this way, whether it is due to information about governance
quality that lobbying banks reveal in order to convince the regulator that
it is socially optimal to let them go, or whether it is due to rent seeking
considerations such as exchanges of favours between lobbying banks and
regulators. Prior studies have found mixed evidence on the impact of
political connections on firm performance: For example, Gropper, Jahera
Jr, and Park (2013, 2015) find that banks connected to politicians through
important Finance Committees perform better, whereas, focusing on the
lobbying context, Lambert (2019) finds that in the short to medium run,
lobbying banks perform worse in comparison to non-lobbying banks.
Therefore, the analysis in this section tests how lobbying banks in the
sample perform some time after the lobbying has occurred. In particular,
the purpose is to try to explain future bank performance in the short
term (i.e., at t+1 years) and long term (i.e., at t+5) years. As a proxy
for performance, the Return on Assets ratio (ROA) is used as the depen-
dent variable. A linear regression model with bank fixed e ects is then
estimated. The core variable of interest is the lobbying dummy and its in-
teraction with governance quality. The model also controls for bank-level
characteristics, such as capitalisation, liquidity, non-performing loans,
size and age.
The results from this model are presented in Table 4.11. The findings
in Column (2) suggest that, after 5 years, lobbying banks perform better
than non-lobbying ones if they have high governance quality, which is
exactly what Prediction 4 suggested, and these results are robust to cor-
recting for endogeneity (Table 4.12, Columns 2 and 5).15 For subsidiaries
of low-governance BHCs, the opposite relationship holds. When correct-
ing for potential endogeneity of the lobbying dummy, these e ects can
15The diagnostics for over-identification (Hansen J) pass the recommended thresholds.
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even be found in a much shorter term (Columns 1 and 3).
Another interesting result of Table 4.11 is that punished banks per-
form slightly worse (better) in the short (long) run. This suggests that
the reputation e ect of a regulatory enforcement action might be rather
short-lived, whereas in the long run, the benefits of disciplining banks to
comply with the regulation seem to dominate.
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Table 4.11: Lobbying and performance
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Dep. Var: ROA t+1 Dep. Var: ROA t+5
Lobbying 0.203 -0.902**
(0.200) (0.413)
Governance 0.00223 -0.0159***
(0.00262) (0.00580)
Lobbying x Governance 0.00181 0.0199***
(0.00346) (0.00644)
Severe action -0.301* 0.335*
(0.161) (0.193)
Risk-based capital ratio 0.00267 -0.0177***
(0.00254) (0.00389)
Liquidity ratio -0.00321* 0.0249***
(0.00182) (0.00463)
Non performing loans ratio -0.0658*** 0.0234
(0.0136) (0.0213)
Size -0.297*** -0.257
(0.107) (0.186)
Age -0.0468*** -0.0967***
(0.0178) (0.0285)
Constant 8.813*** 14.13***
(1.361) (2.721)
Observations 2,002 734
R-squared 0.182 0.241
Number of snlid 544 168
Bank FE YES YES
Time dummies YES YES
R-sq 0.00112 0.00527
Table 4.11 reports the baseline results of a linear Fixed E ects model examining the impact
of lobbying on bank performance. Sample period is 2002-2017. The dependent variable in all
cases is the return on assets ratio. In Column (1) the dependent variable is the return on assets
ratio for year t+1. In Column (2) the dependent variable is the return on assets ratio for year
t+5. Lobbying is a dummy variable that takes "1" if the bank’s parent company lobbied in year
t, "0" otherwise. Governance is an index measuring a bank’s (parent company) commitment
and e ectiveness towards following best practice corporate governance policies. Severe actions
is a dummy variable that takes "1" if the bank received a severe-type regulatory enforcement
action in year t, "0" otherwise. The Risk-based capital ratio is equal to the total qualifying
capital divided by risk-weighted assets net of allowances and other reductions. The liquidity
ratio is calculated by dividing cash and cash equivalents plus US treasury securities with total
assets. Non-performing loans ratio is the non-accrual and restructures loans as a percent
of total loans and leases. Bank size equals the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the
natural logarithm of number of years that the bank’s parent company is operating. Governance
index is obtained by Datastream. Financial and enforcement actions data is retrieved from
SNL Financial. Lobbying data is retrieved from the Center for Responsive Politics. The ***, **
and * signs denote statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10% level.
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Table 4.12: Lobbying and performance: Addressing endogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Second stage results
Dep. Variable:
ROA t+1
Dep. Variable:
ROA t+5
Dep. Variable:
ROA t+1
Dep. Variable:
ROA t+5
Lobbying -0.3297** -1.04 *** -0.3297** -1.04 ***
(0.155) (0 .30437) (0 .155) (0 .30437)
Governance 0.0003 0.0021 0.0003 0.0021
(0.0012) ( 0.0026) (0.0012) ( 0.0026)
Lobbying x Governance 0 .0072*** 0.011*** 0.0072*** 0.011***
( 0.0023) ( 0.0039) (0.0023) ( 0.0039)
Bank controls YES YES YES YES
State dummies YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES
Method of estimation 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel B: First stage results
Dep. Variable: Lobbying
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fin. Sector employment x x x x
Distance to DC x x x x
ROA (mean) x x
NPL (mean) x x
Bank FE NO NO NO NO
Time dummies YES YES YES YES
Hansen J statistic 25.476 11.541 36.891 13.704
P-value 0 0.0031 0 0.0083
Table 4.12 reports the results of a Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) model, estimated to address endogeneity
concerns in regard to the model estimated in Table 4.11. Sample period is 2002-2017. The dependent
variable in all cases is the return on assets ratio. In Columns (1) and (3) the dependent variable is the
return on assets ratio for year t+1; whereas in Columns (2) and (4) the dependent variable is the return
on assets ratio for year t+5. Lobbying is a dummy variable that takes "1" if the bank’s parent company
lobbied in year t, "0" otherwise. Governance is an index measuring a bank’s (parent company) commitment
and e ectiveness towards following best practice corporate governance policies. Fin. sector employment is
the natural logarithm of the total number of individuals employed in the financial services and insurance
industry at the state level. Distance to DC is they flying distance (in km) from BHC’s headquarter location
to DC. ROA (mean) is the average value of ROA of the BHC’s subsidiaries in year t. NPL (mean) is the
average value of non performing loans of the BHC’s subsidiaries in year t. Governance index is obtained
by Datastream. Financial sector employment is retrieved from the US Census Bureau.Lobbying data is
retrieved from the Center for Responsive Politics. The ***, ** and * signs denote statistical significance at
the 1,5 and 10% level.
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4.8 Conclusion
The main focus of the present chapter is twofold. First, the main purpose
is to provide further explanation on the motives behind the lobbying
decision of Bank Holding Companies. This is linked to the conjecture
that Bank Holding Companies engage in lobbying on behalf of their
ailing subsidiaries. Therefore, the second aim is to provide evidence on
whether lobbying itself is linked to favourable supervisory treatment
in terms of lower probability of enforcement. The above objectives are
addressed in two ways. First, a theoretical model is developed that
rationalizes the responsiveness of regulatory authorities in regard to
lobbying, although lobbying banks appear to expose themselves to be
violating the regulation. This is explained by assuming that the purpose
of lobbying is to communicate some measure of bank quality that would
otherwise be unobservable to the regulator. Not penalizing lobbying,
high-quality banks allows the regulator to focus her costly enforcement
e ort on the lower-quality non-lobbying banks.
The theoretical model yields a set of predictions, which are tested
empirically. More precisely, a panel data set of 173 large US Bank Holding
Companies is used in order to examine the determinants of lobbying. A
key element of the analysis is that corporate governance is considered
as a proxy for the unobservable quality that is assumed that the Bank
Holding Company communicates by lobbying. The key findings suggest
that Bank Holding Companies with stronger corporate governance and a
poorly performing portfolio of subsidiaries are more likely to lobby. This
result is in line with the prediction that Bank Holding Companies whose
subsidiaries are at risk of being punished engage in lobbying in order to
reveal their quality to the regulatory agency.
In order to examine the second objective of the chapter, a panel data set
of the Bank Holding Companies’ subsidiaries is used. The main findings
suggest that, in line with the theoretical predictions, whether a bank
whose parent company has engaged in lobbying is more or less likely to
receive a regulatory enforcement action depends on the parent company’s
corporate governance quality: Subsidiaries of high-quality (low-quality)
Bank Holding Companies are less (more) likely to be punished when the
Bank Holding Company has lobbied. Finally, the analysis is extended by
showing that subsidiaries of lobbying, high-quality (low-quality) Bank
Holding Companies perform better (worse) in the long term than the
subsidiaries of their non-lobbying counterparts. These findings are robust
to alternative samples and econometric techniques aiming to address
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endogeneity issues.
In the theoretical analysis, it is assumed that the enforcement agent
can perfectly commit to an enforcement strategy beforehand, and that
her objective function is perfectly aligned with social welfare. In reality,
however, institutions that are in charge of the enforcement of regula-
tions typically have their own objective functions to optimize, as they are
held accountable for publicly observable targets, which may shift their
goal from maximizing social welfare and create incentives to switch to
ex-post optimal actions instead of ex-ante commitments.16 Adjusting the
assumptions so as to take these issues into account would not necessarily
change the predictions of this analysis, so that it is not possible to use the
empirical analysis to test whether these ine ciencies exist. However, the
theory presented in this analysis can guide policy making with regards
to the consequences of these problems for social welfare. For instance, if
commitment is not available in the model of the present analysis but the
enforcement agent still maximizes social welfare, she will use the ex-post
optimal strategy to refrain from penalizing any lobbying firm with ✓ > ✓̂,
which results in excessive lobbying. On the other hand, providing an
enforcer with too high-powered incentives by, for instance, rewarding
only the number of sanctions imposed, the optimal enforcement strategy
would entail insu cient lobbying even if the enforcer can commit, as a
rational enforcer would want to avoid those types of firms that have the
least incentives to comply with the regulation to be shielded from enforce-
ment via lobbying. These considerations demonstrate that the interplay
of lobbying and enforcement needs to be taken into account by legisla-
tors when designing the institutional details of delegated enforcement.
Finally, the results shed a new light on lobbying in the context of en-
forcement as they explain how lobbying can enhance welfare by allowing
an enforcement agent to focus on potentially more harmful cases. This
insight has important implications with regards to policy interventions.
In the data, it is high-quality banks that are more likely to lobby, and
lobbying high-quality banks are more successful than their non-lobbying
counterparts. On the other hand, regulators seem to take a quite di eren-
tiated approach when reacting to such lobbying, which supports the idea
that lobbying facilitates regulators’ targeting of low-quality banks. Over
all, the results are in line with a less sceptical view on lobbying and call
for recognizing the virtues of lobbying in making regulatory enforcement
more e cient. On a more general note, understanding how financial
16The literature on delegated enforcement discusses the consequences of these prob-
lems, such as Besanko and Spulber (1989), Bond and Hagerty (2010) or Büchel and
Mühlheußer (2016).
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regulators implement their enforcement tools, which form an integral
part of microprudential supervision, can contribute to the design of more
e ective policies and reforms aiming to restore safety and soundness of
the banking sector. This tasks remains a challenge of bank regulation
well beyond the US.
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Appendix 4A
Proof of Lemma 2
Let us first take a closer look at the functions ✓c(pN), ✓v(pN) and ✓̃(pN). A
bank prefers lobbying rather than complying with the regulation if and
only if S  ✓R   L, and the regulator prefers that bank to lobby rather
than to comply if and only if S   CpN  ✓R   (1  ✓)B   L. Both of these
are true if and only if ✓   ✓c(pN) = max{✓ci (pN), ✓cR(pN)} given by
✓
c
i (p
N) =
S + L
R
✓
c
R(p
N) =
S   CpN +B + L
R +B
Similarly, a bank prefers lobbying rather than violating the regulation
without lobbying if and only if pN(S   f) + (1  pN)✓R  ✓R  L, and the
regulator prefers that bank to lobby rather than to comply if and only if
p
N(S C)+ (1  pN)(✓R   (1  ✓)B)  ✓R   (1  ✓)B L. Both of these are
true if and only if ✓   ✓v(pN) = max{✓vi (pN), ✓vR(pN)} given by
✓
v
i (p
N) =
S   f + LpN
R
✓
v
R(p
N) =
S   C +B + LpN
R +B
The following features of these functions can be obtained immediately:
✓
c
i (p
N) is constant in pN , and all of the functions ✓cR(pN), ✓vi (pN) and ✓vR(pN)
are decreasing in pN . Furthermore, ✓c(pN), ✓v(pN) are continuous, so
that both are weakly decreasing in pN . As ✓cR(pN) and ✓vR(pN) both are
larger than ✓̂, so are ✓c(pN) and ✓v(pN). Last, ✓ci (pN) and ✓vi (pN) intersect
with each other at their intersections with ✓̃(pN), and ✓cR(pN) and ✓vR(pN)
intersect at pN = LC and ✓ = ✓FB.
Suppose that ✓c(pN)  ✓̃(pN). The first derivative of the enforcement
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agent’s objective function is:
W
L0(pN) =
 
S   CpN   ✓c(pN)R + (1  ✓c(pN))B + L
 
g(✓c(pN))
d✓
c(pN)
dpN
  1✓̃(pN )✓v(pN )p
N
✓
S   C   ✓̃(pN)R + (1  ✓̃(pN))B + L
pN
◆
g(✓̃(pN))
d✓̃(pN)
dpN
+ 1✓̃(pN )✓v(pN )p
N
✓
S   C   ✓v(pN)R + (1  ✓v(pN))B + L
pN
◆
g(✓v(pN))
d✓
v(pN)
dpN
  CG(✓c(pN)) + 1✓̃(pN )✓v(pN )
Z ✓v(pN )
✓̃(pN )
(S   ✓R + (1  ✓)B)dG(✓).
(4.8.1)
As ✓c(pN) is larger than ✓̂, the last line of (4.8.1) is negative. Furthermore,
the first line is equal to zero, as either ✓c(pN) = ✓ci , so that d✓
c(pN )
dpN = 0, or
✓
c(pN) = ✓cR(p
N), in which case the first factor in that line is equal to zero
by definition of ✓cR(pN). Last, note that whenever ✓c(pN)  ✓̃(pN), so is
✓
v
i (p
N). Hence, if, in this case, ✓̃(pN)  ✓v(pN), it must be that ✓v(pN) = ✓vR.
This immediately implies that the second line is negative and the third
line equal to zero. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 1
Part (a) is a corollary of Lemma 2.
Part (b) The availability of lobbying is strictly welfare enhancing if and
only if, under the optimal enforcement strategy against non-lobbying
banks when lobbying is available, pNL , the set T (pNL ) of lobbying types is
not empty. Both potentially relevant thresholds ✓c(pN) and ✓v(pN) are
weakly decreasing in pN (see the proof of Lemma 2), so that if T (pN) is
empty at all, this will be for low pN , for which ✓̃(pN) is small. Hence, there
will be lobbying in equilibrium if and only if the optimal enforcement
probability pNL is such that ✓v(pNL ) < 1. Using the definition of ✓v(·), this
is equivalent to L < pNL (R max{S   f,B   C}).
In order to complete the proof for this part, it remains to show that this
latter inequality is satisfied whenever L < pNNL(R max{S   f,B   C}),
which immediately follows from Part (d), which we will prove next.
Part (d) As explained in the proof of Part (b), there is no lobbying when-
ever pN  LR max{S f,B C} . Hence, in this interval, the first derivative of
the enforcement agent’s objective function, WL0(pN) = WNL0(pN). Fur-
thermore, recall that ✓c(pN), ✓v(pN) and ✓FB intersect at pN = LC . With the
fact that ✓̃(pNNL) < ✓FB, this implies that ✓̃(pNNL) < min{✓c(pN), ✓v(pN)}. For
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any pN > LR max{S f,B C} such that ✓̃(pN) < min{✓c(pN), ✓v(pN)}, the first
derivative of the enforcement agent’s objective function when lobbying is
available is:
W
L0(pN) =pN
✓
S   C   ✓v(pN)R + (1  ✓v(pN))B + L
pN
◆
g(✓v(pN))
d✓
v(pN)
dpN
(1  pN)
✓
S   Cp
N
 
  ✓̃(pN)R  (1  ✓̃(pN))B
◆
g(✓̃(pN))
d✓̃(pN)
dpN
  CG(✓̄(pN)) +
Z ✓v(pN )
✓̃(pN )
(S   ✓R + (1  ✓)B)dG(✓)
  WNL0(pN) 
Z 1
✓v(pN )
(S   C   ✓R + (1  ✓)B) dG(✓)
(4.8.2)
because the first line is positive due to ✓v(pN)   ✓vR(pN) and
d✓v(pN )
dpN < 0.
As ✓v(pN) > ✓̂, this implies that WL0(pN) > WNL0(pN). As we have not
established that either WNL(·) or WL(·) have a unique maximum, we
follow Milgrom and Shannon (1994) for the case where there the argmax
of either of these functions has more than one element by using the ’strong
set order’ approach to define comparative statics: We will write that, for
two objective functions a(p) and b(p), A := argmax a(p) is ’larger’ than
B := argmax b(p) if and only if, for any pa 2 A and pb 2 B, min{pa, pb} 2 B
and max{pa, pb} 2 A. Then, Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Shannon (1994)
and our result that WL0(pN) > WNL0(pN) for any pN > LR max{S f,B C} such
that ✓̃(pN) < min{✓c(pN), ✓v(pN)} imply the statement in the proposition.
Part (c) Because of Part (d) of this Proposition, pNNL > LC implies that
p
N
L >
L
C and, therefore, ✓v(pNL ) < ✓FB. If, in addition, ✓vi (pN)  ✓vR(pN) for
p
N = LC , which is the case if C   f <
B(B S)
R+B , we have established that
max{✓̃(pNL ), ✓v(pNL )} < ✓FB. ⌅
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Chapter 5
Political connections and
banking industry
performance: A cross country
analysis
5.1 Introduction
There is a connection between politics and finance and it is a complicated
one. Indeed, Calomiris and Haber (2015) emphasize the fact that politics
are "baked" into the property rights systems, which banks and financial
institutions operate in. Furthermore, they highlight that, in reality, it
is very di cult to compel independence between the government and
banks. The reason is that, it appears banking sectors across countries
are structured in such way that their political institutions will enable
them to. Moreover, the same authors discuss several issues regarding
property rights among majority shareholders, minority shareholders and
depositors, which need to be mitigated. For this to happen, government
involvement is essential. This creates a further issue though. When the
government is added to this interplay, conflicts of interest appear. For
instance, governments are responsible for allocating bank charters in
some countries or supervising and regulating banks, or enforcing bank
accounting standards in some other countries. Therefore, without doubt,
this implicates the government around various aspects of the banking
system. What is more, this creates room for opportunistic activity, such
as regulatory forbearance or bailout of certain banks, occurring at the
expense of taxpayers. At this point, it is also important to take note that,
the aforementioned relationship between politics and banking do not need
to be homogeneous across countries; especially when considering the fact
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that banking system structures vary significantly across countries (Barth
et al., 2013).
The linkage between politics and various aspects of today’s corporate
and banking sector environment has captured the attention of many
scholars. As discussed in Chapter 2, existing literature suggests that
corporate political strategies add value to organizations in various ways.
Empirical studies, for example confirm the notion that political connec-
tions are beneficial to firms in terms of increased corporate value (Faccio
et al., 2006; Cooper et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2013), lower cost of bank loans
(Houston et al., 2014), lower probability of corporate fraud detection (Yu
and Yu, 2011) and lower probability of enforcement actions (Correia,
2014; Lambert, 2019). This pattern is also supported by the findings of
the analysis carried out in Chapters 3 and 4.
Although the determinants and e ects of political connections have
been explored up to a certain extent, there is still much more to be done,
particularly in the area of banking. This helps to further understand
the determinants and e ects of political connections between banks,
governments and regulators. What is more, due to the complexity and
scarcity of gathering international data, there is lack of evidence when it
comes to exploring the issue on a cross country setting especially prior
to 2010. In fact, the work of Braun and Raddatz (2010) is the only
available comprehensive study focusing on political connections in the
banking sector using an international sample. Given that the political
and institutional environment di ers across countries, there is need to
further understand how this variation determines the impact of political
connections on bank behavior. This is especially crucial when taking
into consideration the fact that the banking sector is one of the most
regulated industries and, therefore, connections could be an even more
valuable asset (Gropper et al., 2015).
The purpose of the present chapter is to explore the impact of political
connections on banking sector performance, whilst taking into account
cross-country heterogeneity. It is worth discussing the reason for focusing
on the aggregate banking sector, rather than the bank-level performance.
As previously mentioned thus far, studies have assessed how political con-
nections of certain types influence performance related outcomes on the
bank-level. What has received less attention in this area of research has
to do with understanding whether and how the extent of banking sector
political connectednes influences the performance of the banking sector
as a whole. Focusing on the profitability of the overall banking sector pro-
vides an additional advantage to the present analysis, as this measure is
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possible to capture the impact of political connectedness in banking sector
stability and soundness. In fact, the International Monetary Fund since
2003 releases a list of variables, which names as "Financial Soundness
Indicators" and consists of certain financial characteristics, which the
IMF’s Board of Executives classifies as appropriate in capturing banking
sector financial soundness 1. These variables include measures capturing
key banking sector aspects such as capitalisation, loan quality, profitabil-
ity (including both the Return on Assets and Return on Equity ratios)
and liquidity. Empirical studies have explored the extent to which these
ratios are able to signal banking sector stability and soundness. Cihak
et al. (2012) use a large international sample in order to test whether
the "Financial Soundness Indicators" are predictors of banking crises.
Their findings show that although some indicators should be considered
with caution, they do find evidence suggesting that measures related to
capital strength and profitability are solid indicators of banking sector
stability and soundness.
Using a sample of 59 countries over the years 2003-2007, the findings
of the analysis to follow indicate that countries with higher levels of
political connectedness are linked to greater banking sector performance.
Political connections are captured by the aggregate connectedness mea-
sures provided by the study of Braun and Raddatz (2010). In particular,
they construct a set of measures based on politician and banker rela-
tionships in a large set of countries. To conduct the analysis, a model is
derived that incorporates variables measuring political connections and
controls for the drivers of banking sector profitability. The positive rela-
tionship between political connections and banking sector performance
holds when alternative measures of connectedness are taken into account,
and when the measure in use is filtered down to private banks only. More-
over, the results are robust to the use of additional country-level control
variables intended to capture areas such as institutional development,
banking sector regulation, corruption and economic freedom. Finally,
additional analysis is performed to alleviate endogeneity concerns. Us-
ing the level of country-level government e ectiveness as an instrument
and an Instrumental Variable analysis approach, the baseline findings
remain intact both in sign and significance.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2
provides a background discussion and presents the main hypothesis of the
empirical analysis. Section 5.3 presents the data, sample and variables
of the analysis. Section 5.4 focuses on empirical model and the results of
1Further information on the IMF’s "Financial Soundness Indicators" reports can be
found here: http://data.imf.org/?sk=51B096FA-2CD2-40C2-8D09-0699CC1764DA
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the study. Finally, Section 5.5 provides a summary of the objectives and
key findings of the analysis.
5.2 Background and hypothesis development
5.2.1 Key related studies and contribution to litera-
ture
This chapter relates and contributes to the strand of literature examining
the value relevance of political connections in the banking sector. More
specifically, it adds to the extant literature examining the impact of
political connections on performance-related outcomes. This section is
devoted to the discussion of the similarities and di erences of certain
studies that are tightly-related to the empirical work carried out within
this chapter. For a full overview of the generally related literature, please
see Chapter 2.
To begin with, there are five key studies, which, to the best of my
knowledge, are closely linked to the work of the present chapter. The first
four, refer to empirical work that examines the impact of certain types of
political connections on bank-level performance, which is captured either
through the use of accounting based measures or market-based variables.
The fifth study relates to this chapter mainly through its cross-country
nature. Let us discuss these in more detail below.
First, the study of Gropper et al. (2013) examines the impact of political
connections on bank performance using a sample of US banks during the
period 1989-2010. Political connections are captured by whether a bank
is headquartered in a state, where a politician chairs a committee that
oversees the banking and financial services industry. In order to assess
performance they focus on both an accounting -based measure to account
for operating performance and a market-based measure to capture stock-
market reaction. Their overall findings provide evidence supporting their
initial hypothesis that it "pays" to have firms in high places. Moreover,
in additional analysis they find that the so-called "Chair-e ect" is more
pronounced when: (i) committee chairs are aligned, in the sense that
they form part of the same political party, (ii) committee chairs are more
experienced, (iii) banks are concentrated in the same state, suggesting
that the potential benefits generated from chairmanship are in more
demand.
The second related study is that of Gropper et al. (2015), who basically
extend their initial analysis in Gropper et al. (2013) by exploring whether
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the "Chair-e ect" on bank performance is further driven or is conditional
on the level of a state’s economic freedom. Their analysis is similar to
their earlier work, however, what is di erent is that they include the
interaction of an index of Economic Freedom with their political connec-
tion variable. Their baseline results suggest that economic freedom is
indeed a conditional factor driving the "Chair-e ect". In particular, they
provide evidence suggesting that, in states with higher economic freedom,
the "Chair-e ect" is less pronounced, and, that is in states with lower
economic freedom that politicians with power exert greater influence.
Third, Lambert (2019) examines the impact of lobbying on bank perfor-
mance as a supporting exercise to his core analysis, which is to examine
whether and how lobbying influences regulatory enforcement actions
imposed against banks. His main hypothesis in the section examining
the interplay between lobbying and performance lies under the notion
that lobbying could be positively related to bank performance, as it could
potentially function as a channel to reveal further information of a bank’s
status to regulatory authorities. Using a sample of US Commercial and
Savings Banks, his findings do not provide evidence on the aforemen-
tioned hypothesis. Rather, the results indicate that lobbying firms tend
to under-perform their non-lobbying peers. This is examined from both a
contemporaneous and short-term time frame. Both cases yield similar
results.
Outside the US context, the fourth study by Hung et al. (2017) explores
whether politically connected CEOs lead to improvements related to the
performance and risk-taking appetite of banks, by employing a sample
of Chinese Commercial Banks for the time frame between 2007-2014. A
firm is considered as politically connected if its CEO had previously held
an o cial governmental position. In order to capture the profitability
and risk of banks they employ certain accounting-based measures. In
particular, the return on assets ratio is considered to account for prof-
itability, whereas the z-score and loan loss-provisions ratio to capture
risk. The overall findings of the study indicate that politically connected
banks have higher profitability, lower default and credit risk. These
results are further influenced by executives’ location of prior employment,
experience and costs related to travel and entertainment.
Last but not least, Braun and Raddatz (2010) use a large international
sample with identified information on politician-banker relationships, in
order to identify the bank-level stylised facts behind the drivers of politi-
cal connections. Given the advantage of an international sample, they
also provide insight on certain country-level characteristics. In particu-
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lar, they highlight the importance that economic development has on the
presence of political connections. They also suggest that connectedness
appears to be higher in countries were institutions are weaker and gov-
ernments have increased power, but are of lower accountability. Turning
to characteristics of the banking sector, they provide evidence suggesting
that the aforementioned pattern is more pronounced when regulation is
more "pro-banker" and the overall development of the banking sector is
lower.
It is important to recall at this point that, the core purpose of this
chapter is to delve into the impact of political connections on aggregate
banking sector performance whilst accounting for country-level char-
acteristics. Therefore, the analysis to be carried out di ers from the
aforementioned related studies in certain ways, which are outlined as
follows. The di erence between the present analysis and empirical prece-
dent, lies around the intention to examine the "aggregate" e ect between
the political connection and performance nexus, rather than the firm-
level e ect, which dominated in the empirical studies discussed earlier in
this section. This also holds in regard to the work of Braun and Raddatz
(2010), who although explore, up to a certain point, the impact of political
connections on firm outcomes (such as size, profitability, leverage), they
focus on assessing these issues at the bank-level. That is because their
analysis is performed with the intention to capture within-country varia-
tion and also include country-level fixed e ects to reduce noise stemming
from country-level traits.
By making use of banking sector aggregate profitability ratios also
provides another di erentiating element, as it enables to assess how
political connections could impact banking sector stability. Another key
element that di erentiates the work of the present analysis with the
first four, is that it aims to provide evidence using a sample of multiple
countries, rather than a single one. Therefore, it enables assessing
whether similar results hold when making use of an international sample
of countries with a diverge background. To sum up, the work of this
chapter di erentiates from the aforementioned studies as the analysis is
intended to explore how the extent to which a country’s banking sector
is considered to be politically connected influences overall banking sector
performance, whilst taking into consideration variation across country
level characteristics.
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5.2.2 Hypothesis development
The existing literature suggests several channels through which political
connections can influence performance outcomes. To begin with, banks
in many cases may adopt rent-seeking behaviour by choosing to follow
corporate political strategies (such as lobbying or campaign contributions)
with the ultimate aim to influence the decisions of regulators or govern-
ment o cials. For instance, Igan et al. (2012) explore the di erence in
the behaviour of lobbying and non-lobbying lenders around the financial
crisis period. Their findings confirm di erences in behaviour of lobbying
and non-lobbying lenders, and moreover highlight that certain lenders
seemed to benefit more than others when looser regulatory policies where
implemented. In fact, this group of lenders shared some characteristics:
they engaged in "aggressive" lobbying.
There are explanations for such events. The political economy lit-
erature for instance points out that politicians are indeed concerned
about their re-election prospects and are therefore likely to adopt strate-
gies which are in line with the "requests" of their supporters (McNoll-
gast, 1999). Apart from rent-seeking behaviour, political influence and
favourable outcomes could be driven by access to information, or else
"information-transmission" channel, as it is known, which reduces in-
formation asymmetries between banks and regulators/ politicians. As
pointed out by Gropper et al. (2015), superior returns encountered by
connected firms could be associated with easier access to information
that otherwise could not have been available to them. In the presence
of either of the aforementioned routes, a positive relationship would be
observed between political connectedness and bank performance. On the
basis of the above discussion the following hypothesis is formed:
H1: Political connections increase banking sector profitability
5.3 Sample, data and variable selection
5.3.1 Sample description and data sources
In order to address the main objective of the present chapter, information
is collected from various sources. First, political connection measures
are drawn by the work of Braun and Raddatz (2010). Second, financial
variables are retrieved from SNL Financial Database. Finally, macroe-
conomic and other country-level variables are collected from sources
such as the World Bank, Fraser Institute and the work of Barth et al.
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(2013). The working sample focuses on the analysis of 59 countries over
the 2003-2007 period, which results in a final (unbalanced) sample of
182 country-year observations. It is important to mention that Polit-
ical connection measures drawn by Braun and Raddatz (2010), were
constructed using information regarding board composition during the
year 2005. Assuming that in the short term changes in the figures of
political connections would be negligible, the time frame of the working
sample is expanded to +/- 2 years, thus creating a panel dataset. In
order to eliminate potential concerns regarding the validity of the results
obtained, the baseline model of the analysis is re-estimated for the year
2005 as explained in further sections. Table 5.1 provides a description of
all variables included.
5.3.2 Variable Selection
5.3.2.1 Banking industry performance
Following empirical precedent (Braun and Raddatz, 2010; Gropper et al.,
2013, 2015; Lambert, 2019), banking industry performance is captured
by the Return on Assets ratio (ROA). It is calculated dividing income
(loss) before applicable income taxes and discontinued operations by total
assets.
In order to examine the typical financial soundness of each country, I
aggregate bank-level data into country-level ones via the computation of
the average bank return on assets ratio within countries. Therefore, for
the construction of the aggregate performance measure, two steps are
followed. First, all bank-level data available is collected from the SNL
Financial Database. This information will be used to calculate variables
of interest at the bank-level. In particular, once bank-level variables are
derived, the next step is to aggregate them at the country level. That is,
for each bank-level variable calculated in the first step; the mean values
per country and per year are derived, in order to construct a sample with
country-year observations.
As an additional test I also employ already aggregated data provided
by the world Bank’s Global Financial Development Indicator series 2,
which provides a set of financial - related variables for a range of countries.
The calculation of the aggregate measures is of similar notion. The
di erentiating element between their methodology and the one employed
in the current analysis is that they take into consideration the median
rather than the average bank. In particular, according to their data
2Further information on the database can be found here:
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/global-financial-development
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definition handbook the raw data for the years of interest are drawn from
Bankscope. Both numerator and denominator are aggregated at the
country level prior to computing the finalised profitability ratio. Their
aggregation method employs the median as point of reference.
5.3.2.2 Political Connection measures
In order to include a proxy for the extent of banking sector political con-
nectedness at the country-level, the information provided by the study
of Braun and Raddatz (2010) is considered 3. More precisely, Braun
and Raddatz (2010) make use of a dataset that provides information
on a large number of politicians, whose positions vary among cabinet
members, financial sector regulators and central bank governors. They
use this information to match politicians and bank board members, with
the ultimate purpose of providing measures of political connectedness in
the banking industries of the countries for which information is available.
Once politician-banker matches are identified, they then consider the
frequency of these matches to derive several measures of connectedness
between bankers and politicians 4. In the present analysis the key mea-
sure of connectedness is FRACBANKS, which captures the fraction of
connected banks at the country level. In particular, it represents the
number of banks in a country with at least one former politician on the
board of directors as a fraction of the number of banks for which there
are available data on board members provided by the database utilised
by Braun and Raddatz (2010). There are two variations provided for this
variable. The first version relies on calculating matches between politi-
cians and bankers for all banks of Braun and Raddatz (2010)’s sample.
The second version refers to matches found for fully private banks only.
As an additional proxy of connectedness, in further analysis the variable
FRACBANKERS, which captures the fraction of connected bankers at
the country level, is also considered. Similar to the first key measure,
the private bank variation (FRACBANKERSPR) of this variable is also
considered.
In both cases, higher values declare an increased level of connect-
edness between banks and politicians in a particular country. Table
5.1 provides full description of the political connection variables. It is
important to highlight that Braun and Raddatz (2010) point out that
FRACBANKS represents a measure of institutional connection between
3For the original aggregate data on measures of connectedness across countries
between banks and politicians, see Braun and Raddatz (2010) Table 1, pp 241-245.
4For a detailed description on the sources and methodology followed in the study
please see Section I in Braun and Raddatz (2010)
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a country’s banking sectors and political scene, rather than a personal
connection. In regard to the second variable, FRACBANKERS, this mea-
sure is useful in identifying the extent at which politicians "populate"
the boards of banks.
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5.3.2.3 Financial and country-related variables
Several financial attributes of banks are taken into account. These
measures have been shown by empirical precedent to function as drivers
of bank profitability. Please note that financial-related variables are
aggregated in the same manner as described in Section 5.3.2.1.
• Capitalisation (EQUI) by considering the equity to assets ratio.
This measure is able to capture the financial safety and soundness
of financial institutions and is expected to have a negative impact
on bank performance (Gropper et al., 2015; Athanasoglou et al.,
2008). However, there are cases where capital strength could exert
a positive impact on performance, as discussed by Molyneux (1993).
• Liquidity (LIQUI), by calculating the ratio of liquid assets to total
assets. The main expectation for this measure is for it to have a
positive association with bank performance (Bourke, 1989).
• Non-performing loans ratio (NPL),which equals the ratio of nonper-
forming loans (net of guaranteed loans) to the sum of loans (before
reserves). As prior literature has reported (Gropper et al., 2015),
an inverse relationship is expected between non performing loans
and bank performance.
• Bank size (SIZE), through the natural logarithm of total assets.
The impact of bank size on performance could be either positive
or negative. As pointed out by Staikouras and Wood (2004), size
is a proxy that reflects di erences in regard to cost (due to size),
but also the capability of larger institutions to diversify. That said,
size could have a positive impact of bank performance in the case
where economies of scale exist. At the same time, it could also have
a negative impact if raised diversification is associated with lower
levels of risk, which could be related to lower levels of returns.
In addition to the aforementioned variables I also control for sev-
eral country-level characteristics, which could potentially be driving the
relationship between banking sector connectedness and performance:
• Traditional macroeconomic factors: (i) GDP growth (GDPGR) , (ii)
inflation (INFL) and (iii) unemployment (UNEMPL), in order to
capture the overall environment in which banks operate.
• Institutional environment, captured by an index provided by the
World Bank (WGI). This index is constructed by calculating the av-
erage of six governance sub-indicators which focus on the following
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dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence
of violence, government e ectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of
law and control of corruption.
• Economic freedom (ECFREEDOM) by using the relevant index
provided by the Fraser Institute. The reason for considering this
measure lies on the findings from prior literature (Gropper et al.,
2015) suggesting that economic freedom does indeed influence bank
performance.
• Banking sector and market conditions (i) Government ownership of
banks (OWE) and (ii) stock market capitalisation (STOCKMARK).
• Banking regulation and supervision. Relying on the data provided
by the study of Barth et al. (2013), measures related to the level
of activity restriction (ACTRES), supervisory power (SPVPOWER)
and capital regulations (CAPREG) are included.
It is important to note that these country-level variables are not
introduced simultaneously in the model, but rather on an individual
basis or grouped (depending on the purpose each time). Further details
on this are discussed in the following sections.
5.3.3 Descriptive statistics
This section presents the key descriptive statistics of the variables con-
sidered in the analysis of this chapter. Table 5.2 provides the descriptive
statistics for the full sample. In particular, the mean ROA of the sample
equals to 0.011, with minimum being equal to 0.003 and maximum equal
to 0.023. Panels B and C of Table 5.2, provide the descriptive statistics,
having split the sample for countries that have above and below mean val-
ues in regard to the connection variables of interest. Panel B reports the
descriptive statistics for the sample above mean values of FRACBANKS,
whereas Panel C reports the descriptive statistics for the sample with
below mean values of FRACBANKS. The mean ROA for countries that
score above mean in FRACBANKS is slightly higher to that reported for
below mean values of FRACBANKS.
Table 5.2 also provides the descriptive statistics for the political con-
nection variables. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 depict the variation of the con-
nectedness measures across countries for any type of bank (private and
non-private). Figures 3.1 and 3.4 depict the variation of the connectedness
measures across countries for private banks only. Overall, there seems
to be an interesting variation across countries, which can be observed
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in these figures. In particular, for FRACBANKS, Georgia, Malta and
Belarus appear to have more than half banks considered as connected;
whereas France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and the United
Kingdom have lower levels of banking sector connectedness. When fo-
cusing on private banks only in Figure 3.1, Georgia still tops the list.
However, it is followed by the United Arab Emirates and Belarus. In the
case of FRACBANKERS, Figure 3.3 shows that Georgia, Malta, Moldova
Republic and Belarus are amongst the countries with higher fraction of
connected bankers; whereas, Brazil, Belgium and Vietnam amongst the
countries with the least. When restricting the same measure to private
banks only, as shown in Figure 3.4, the pattern remains more or less the
same.
Finally, Table 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the remaining
control variables and Table 5.3 provides the correlation matrix. Panel
A reports the descriptive statistics of the full sample. Panel B reports
the descriptive statistics for the cases where the core political connec-
tion variable, FRACBANKS, takes above-mean values, whereas Panel
C reports the descriptive statistics for the opposite cases. In regard to
the financial-related characteristics, the average value of banking sector
equity to assets, liquidity and non-performing loans ratio is equal to
8.07, 31.42 and 5.52 respectively. Average banking sector size equals to
17.73. Certain di erences can be pointed out across the figures reported
in Panels A, B and C. For instance, in the case of countries scoring above
average in the political connectedness measure, size is lower (16.91) and
nonperforming loans are higher (7.09) when compared to the figures
reported in the full sample. For the measures capturing capitalisation
and liquidity, figures do not di er substantially between above mean con-
nectedness and full sample. However, when turning to banking sectors
with below mean values of the political connection measure, the equity
to assets ratio and non performing loans ratio is lower (7.92 and 4.96),
while size is larger (18.064) when compared to the mean values of the
full working sample.
In terms of the macroeconomic characteristics, countries in Panel B
appear to record higher average GDP and slightly lower inflation and
unemployment as opposed to the full sample countries. In turn, countries
in Panel C, appear to have slightly lower mean GDP and inflation, and
slightly higher unemployment in comparison to the full sample. Simi-
larly, for the remaining country-related variables certain di erences can
be observed across sample means. In regard to WGI, it appears that
countries with higher than average connectedness have lower average
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score (i.e., lower institutional quality) than the average of the full sample.
The opposite holds for countries with lower than average connectedness.
Stock market capitalisation is on average lower for countries with above
average political connections and higher for countries with below average
political connections. Activity restriction, supervisory power and capital
regulation are certain measures used aiming to capture some key bank-
ing sector characteristics. Although the first two measures do not vary
significantly across samples, capital regulation appears to be lower for
countries with higher than average political connections and higher for
the below than average political connected countries. According to the
reported figures, government ownership of banks is higher in the case of
countries that score higher than average in the political connectedness
measure, whilst the opposite hold for the alternative group of countries.
Finally, the measure of economic freedom appears to be more or less the
same for the two groups of countries when comparing values with full
sample means.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Full sample
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
ROA 182 0.0115352 0.01021 0.0056361 0.0033969 0.0235842
FRACBANKS 181 7.314917 3 13.3298 0 100
FRACBANKSPR 181 6.292818 2 13.22865 0 100
FRACBANKERS 182 0.6703297 0 1.35071 0 8
FRACBANKERSPR 179 0.6201117 0 1.517996 0 8
EQUI 182 8.075759 7.80625 2.534171 4.216707 12.84167
SIZE 182 17.73077 18.07189 2.029454 12.59546 21.35409
LIQUI 169 31.42163 30.77375 10.40997 14.03667 52.30667
NPL 151 5.527989 3.672941 5.187253 0.322 18.69857
GDPGR 182 4.975015 4.95574 2.807688 -0.93421 11.88939
INFL 182 4.639547 3.376255 4.26546 -1.61698 24.55229
UNEMPL 176 6.386341 5.83 3.278137 0.879 19.07
WGI 182 0.7703665 0.9686 0.8271209 -0.9619 1.8939
STOCKMARK 168 78.04613 62.18 63.53621 3.91 464.72
ACTRES 170 6.826471 7 1.980871 3 12
CAPREG 164 6.103659 6 1.656291 3 9
SPVPOWER 175 11.33202 11.66667 2.368813 5.384615 16
OWE 145 14.91041 5.05 18.71433 0 75.27
ECFREEDOM 173 7.336763 7.98 0.8011184 5.33 9.16
Panel B: FRACBANKS bove mean
ROA 53 0.013797 0.0143535 0.0057401 0.0033969 0.0235842
EQUI 53 8.433659 8.192 2.686704 4.216707 12.84167
SIZE 53 16.91971 16.91288 2.477446 12.59546 20.89837
LIQUI 49 31.36196 30.82813 12.08326 14.03667 52.30667
NPL 40 7.09787 5.9 5.800767 0.322 18.69857
GDPGR 53 5.757546 5.17615 2.843041 0.44341 11.88939
INFL 53 4.829844 4.07241 3.820228 -0.80797 16.52602
UNEMPL 53 6.077717 5.83 3.333852 0.879 13.81
WGI 53 0.6096491 0.6879 0.7547032 -0.9619 1.6966
STOCKMARK 46 69.56326 52.195 81.62029 6.62 464.72
ACTRES 51 6.882353 6 2.214923 3 12
CAPREG 50 5.63 5 1.596584 4 9
SPVPOWER 51 11.88446 12 1.712367 8 15.5
OWE 45 17.06578 12.16 17.34469 0 74
ECFREEDOM 51 7.464314 8 0.7690208 6.08 9.16
Panel C: FRACBANS below mean
ROA 129 0.0106059 0.0093188 0.0053427 0.0033969 0.0235842
EQUI 129 7.928715 7.61 2.464518 4.216707 12.84167
SIZE 129 18.064 18.31902 1.71649 13.06696 21.35409
LIQUI 120 31.44599 30.76545 9.700226 14.03667 52.30667
NPL 111 4.962265 3.372 4.85211 0.322 18.69857
GDPGR 129 4.65351 4.00111 2.739674 -0.93421 11.39578
INFL 129 4.561363 3.31609 4.447205 -1.61698 24.55229
UNEMPL 123 6.519325 5.83 3.258534 1.641 19.07
WGI 129 0.8363977 1.1006 0.8490707 -0.9611 1.8939
STOCKMARK 122 81.24459 70.79 55.28375 3.91 263.75
ACTRES 119 6.802521 7 1.881239 3 10.5
CAPREG 114 6.311404 6.5 1.645899 3 9
SPVPOWER 124 11.1048 11.66667 2.562686 5.384615 16
OWE 100 13.9405 4.4 19.3042 0 75.27
ECFREEDOM 122 7.283443 7.94 0.811293 5.33 8.94
Table 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis. Panel A reports the statistics for the
full sample, Panel B for the sample with above mean figures of FRACBANKS and Panel C for the sample with below mean
figures of FRACBANKS. The sample period is 2003-2007. ROA is the net income as a percent of total assets (country
level).FRACBANKS is the fraction of banks with a former politician on board. FRACBANKSPR is the fraction of banks with a
former politician on board (private banks). FRACBANKERS is the fraction of bank directors that had a previous political
position. FRACBANKERSPR is the fraction of bank directors that had a previous political position (private banks). EQUI is
the total equity capital as a percent of total assets (country level). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets (country level).
LIQUI is the ratio of liquid securities to total liabilities (country level). NPL is the non performing loans as a fraction of total
loans (country level). GDPGR is the GDP growth. INFL is the consumer price index. UNEMPL is the ratio of unemployment
as a percentage of the total labor force. WGI is an aggregate index reflecting institutional environment at the country level.
STOCKMARK is the stock market capitalisation. ACTRESS is a measure of overall restriction on banking activities. CAPREG
is a measure of capital regulation. SPVPOWER is a measure of supervisory power. OWE is the extent to which the banking
system’s assets are government owned. ECFREEDOM is an index of economic freedom. Political connection variables are
retrieved from the study of Braun and Raddatz (2010). Financial variables are retrieved from SNL Financial. Macroeconomic,
institutional and market related variables are retrieved from the World Bank. Banking regulation indices are retrieved from
Barth et al. (2013). Economic freedom is retrieved from the Fraser Institute.
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Figure 5.3.1: Fraction of connected banks per country - Private banks
only
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Figure 5.3.2: Fraction of connected banks per country - All banks
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Figure 5.3.3: Fraction of connected bankers per country - All banks
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Figure 5.3.4: Fraction of connected bankers per country - Private banks
only
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5.4 Empirical framework and results
5.4.1 Empirical model and baseline results
In order to address the core objective of the present section, the following
model is derived, representing bank profitability as a function of political
connections, a set of key determinants of bank profitability, as well as a
variety of country specific characteristics:
Performancei,t = ↵ +  1Connectioni,t +  2Controlsi,t +  yeart + "i,t
(5.4.1)
where Performancei,t is the profitability measure for country i in year
t; Connectioni,t is the core variable of interest and represents a political
connection proxy for country i in year t. Controlsi,t is a set of variables
characterising the banking sector of country i in year t. All specifications
include year dummies. Finally, "i,t is the error term of the model. The
empirical analysis starts with a simple baseline model given in Equation
5.4.1, which then envelops to be saturated with country-level controls.
Table 5.4 reports the obtained results when estimating the baseline
model outlined in Equation 5.4.1. In particular, it reports the estimate
coe cients and standard errors in parentheses. The estimations of
the baseline model are carried out by making use of robust standard
errors to address heteroskedasticity problems, as in Gropper et al. (2013),
who follow White et al. (1980). The baseline model is estimated for
two di erent variations of the political connection measure: (i) fraction
of connected banks (Column 1) and (ii) fraction of connected private
banks (Column 2). In all cases the dependent variable represents the
profitability of a country’s banking sector, using ROA as a proxy. It is
important to mention that the baseline model is also estimated by making
use of certain alternative approaches such as: (i) making use of standard
errors clustered at the country level and (ii) Mundlak terms, proposed by
Mundlak (1978). This approach was proposed as an alternative solution
to the debate between the choice of a random or a fixed e ects model when
handling panel data. In particular, the fundamental di erence between
the two approaches boils down to how one approaches individual e ects 5
in a classic panel data model. Is it a random e ect, or is it a fixed e ect?
In the former case, the individual e ect is seen as a random variable,
whereas in the latter case it is seen as a parameter to be estimated
for each cross-section observation. Wooldridge (2010) argues that this
5Often this is also called "individual heterogeneity", see for instance Wooldridge
(2010), p.251
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discussion is more often than not wrongheaded, claiming that it almost
always makes sense to treat this parameter as a random draw from
the population, much like the dependent and regressors are thought of.
In fact, he argues that "this approach is certainly appropriate from an
omitted variables or neglected heterogeneity perspective" Wooldridge
(2010, pp 252). However, as the author also acknowledges, the main
issue with the individual e ect is whether or not it is correlated with
the remaining co-variates in the model, with a random e ects model
being synonymous of zero correlation between the two. To relax this
assumption, Mundlak (1978) suggested the addition of cross-sectional
means. As the baseline model contains time-invariant variables, such as
those of interest (i.e., the political connection measures), a fixed e ects
model is practically impossible to implement as it would lead to omitting
the variable of interest. However, Mundlak terms can be added as an
alternative solution. In technical terms, in order to estimate the baseline
model using this technique, the group-means of the time-variant variables
are included in the random e ects model as additional regressors. This
is also referred to as a "hybrid model", as it combines within and between
e ects 6
The baseline model is also estimated by including observations only
for year 2005, in order to address potential concerns in regard to the
assumption of the connecteness measure being constant in the short term.
Finally, the baseline model is also estimated by using the World Bank’s
Global Development Indicators Database aggregate data. The results
remain the same with those to be presented below. The reported results
suggest that, for any of the political connection measures considered,
there is positive and statistically significant impact on banking sector
performance which ranges between the 5% and 1% level. Having a
closer look at the magnitude of the coe cients of each of the political
connection proxies; one can observe that the fraction of connected private
banks measure has a slightly more prominent e ect on banking sector
profitability. In particular, the measures related to connected banks (all
or private only) have a coe cient equal to 0.0000757 (on average). This
can be translated to that as the fraction of connected banks increases
in a country, the profitability of its banking sector increases by 0.007% ,
ceteris paribus.
6See for instance Allison (2009) and Schunck (2013) for a more detailed discussion.
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Table 5.4: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Dep. Variable: ROA
FRACBANKS 7.57e-05** 6.02e-05*
(3.26e-05) (3.28e-05)
FRACBANKSPR 0.000124*** 8.79e-05**
(3.99e-05) (3.71e-05)
EQUI 0.00119*** 0.00119*** 0.000717*** 0.000775***
(0.000174) (0.000160) (0.000175) (0.000166)
SIZE -2.87e-05 3.41e-05 -0.000265 -0.000205
(0.000297) (0.000289) (0.000237) (0.000240)
LIQUI 7.37e-06 2.18e-05 7.67e-06 1.67e-05
(3.43e-05) (3.30e-05) (2.99e-05) (2.95e-05)
NPL 3.81e-06 2.40e-05 -2.20e-05 -1.92e-07
(7.64e-05) (7.44e-05) (7.78e-05) (7.50e-05)
GDPGR 0.000410** 0.000342**
(0.000161) (0.000155)
INFL 0.000407*** 0.000371***
(0.000122) (0.000118)
UNEMPL 0.000171 0.000153
(0.000117) (0.000118)
Constant 0.000883 -0.000899 0.00419 0.00288
(0.00677) (0.00674) (0.00502) (0.00515)
Observations 148 148 146 146
Time dummies YES YES YES YES
R-sq 0.406 0.468 0.552 0.575
Table 5.4 reports the baseline results obtained when the baseline model in Equation 5.4.1 is estimated using
robust standard errors. Estimated coe cients are reported and standard errors in parenthesis. Results in
Columns (1) and (2) control for financial characteristics, whereas Columns (3) and (4) additionally control
for country-level characteristics. Sample period is 2003-2007. A set of full time dummies are included. The
dependent variable, ROA, is the net income as a percent of total assets (country level).FRACBANKS is the
fraction of banks with a former politician on board. FRACBANKSPR is the fraction of banks with a former
politician on board (private banks). EQUI is the total equity capital as a percent of total assets (country
level). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets (country level). LIQUI is the ratio of liquid securities to
toal liabilities (country level). NPL is the non performing loans as a fraction of total loans (country level).
GDPGR is the GDP growth. INFL is the consumer price index. UNEMPL is the ratio of unemployment as
a percentage of the total labor force. Political connection variables are retrieved from the study of Braun
and Raddatz (2010). Financial variables are retrieved from SNL Financial. Macroeconomic variables are
retrieved from the World Bank. The ***, ** and * signs denote statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10%
level.
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Given the cross-country nature of the analysis, the baseline model is re-
estimated by including a set of measures that capture the macroeconomic
environment in each country. In particular, GDP growth, inflation and
unemployment are included. Results are reported in Table 5.4, Columns
(3) & (4).
Turning to the coe cient of the remaining control variables, capitali-
sation is statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas size, liquidity
and non-performing loans ratio appear not to be statistically significant.
In particular, the coe cient of capitalisation is positive, which suggests
as banking sector capitalisation increases, banking sector performance
increases as well. Although this finding di ers to that of Gropper et al.
(2013); as mentioned earlier the relationship between bank capitalisa-
tion and bank profitability could be positive or negative. Regarding the
remaining variables, liquidity, non performing loans, and surprisingly,
size appear not to be significant. In regard to the macroeconomic related
variables, GDP growth and inflation have a positive and statistically
significant sign ranging between 5%- 1%, whilst unemployment enters
the regression with an insignificant sign.
These findings thus suggest a positive relationship between political
connections (irrespective on their definition) and banking sector perfor-
mance. The overall finding, is in line with studies examining the interplay
between political connections and bank performance at the firm level,
such as that of Gropper et al. (2013, 2015).
5.4.2 Robustness Analysis
In this section an additional set of regressions is performed in order to
confirm the baseline results reported previously. The additional analysis
relates to: (i) considering alternative model and sample specifications
(ii) controlling for further country-level characteristics, (iii) exploring
alternative proxies for political connections (iv) addressing endogeneity
concerns.
5.4.2.1 Alternative model and sample specifications
In this sub-section, the main purpose is to explore whether the baseline
results obtained thus far, remain the same when alternative specifica-
tions of the core model and sample are altered. The first set of tests refers
to confirming whether results persist, both in sign and significance when
countries with large/ small banking sectors drive the baseline results
reported in the previous section. Prior studies, such as that of Lambert
(2019), have performed similar exercises. For the purpose of the analysis,
167
the baseline model is re-estimated by first excluding countries whose size
of banking sector is amongst the largest (i.e., variable size take values
that fall in the top 1% percentile) or smallest (i.e., variable size take
values that fall in the bottom 1% percentile). Results are reported in
Table 5.5. Columns 1-2 refer to the obtained results when top 1% in size
banking sectors are excluded, whereas columns 3-4 report the obtained
results when bottom 1% in size banking sectors are excluded.
Second, an additional test performed relates to the connection vari-
ables. As evident in Table 5.2 all connection variables have a minimum
value of zero. Braun and Raddatz (2010) point out in their study that
one of their concerns refers to the reliability of the data regarding coun-
tries with zero connections, and, therefore, as a robustness check they
re-estimate their core model by dropping countries with no connections
(i.e., countries for which political connection matches are not identified).
In a similar spirit, the baseline model described in Equation 5.4.1 is also
re-estimated by dropping observations for which the political connection
proxy is equal to zero. Results are reported in Table 5.6. It is also im-
portant to highlight at this point that this additional test is not only
useful to further confirm the findings reported in the previous section,
but it is valuable in terms of exploring another source of variation of
the data. In particular, by dropping the zero values in the connectedess
measures enables to assess variation at the intensive margin, that is for
cases where connections are identified only.
Finally, the last test performed intends to assess the impact of political
connections on banking sector performance taking into consideration an
alternative proxy of political influence provided by the study of Braun
and Raddatz (2010). This proxy, similar to the measures taken into
consideration thus far, has two versions: one referring to "all-banks" (as
identified in the sample of Braun and Raddatz (2010) and another, more
"constrained", version referring to private banks only. This additional
measure, which according to Braun and Raddatz (2010) is used as an
alternative to "FRANCBANKS" named as "FRANCBANKERS", captures
connectedness from another distinct angle. In particular, it reflects
the fraction of connected bank directors that previously had a political
position. As in the main political connection proxy, higher values declare
an increased level of connectedness. This proxy replaces the measures
taken thus far into consideration in the baseline model. Results are
reported in Table 5.6 Columns 3-4.
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Table 5.5: Robustness analysis (1)
Excl. top 1% Excl. bottom 1%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Dep. Variable: ROA
FRACBANKS 7.60e-05** 9.59e-05**
(3.27e-05) (3.79e-05)
FRACBANKSPR 0.000124*** 0.000118***
(3.99e-05) (3.98e-05)
EQUI 0.00118*** 0.00119*** 0.00120*** 0.00120***
(0.000175) (0.000161) (0.000170) (0.000162)
SIZE -2.34e-05 3.48e-05 -0.000145 -5.90e-05
(0.000302) (0.000292) (0.000287) (0.000291)
LIQUI 7.13e-06 2.17e-05 2.91e-05 3.07e-05
(3.43e-05) (3.29e-05) (3.34e-05) (3.24e-05)
NPL 4.12e-06 2.40e-05 3.52e-05 4.40e-05
(7.65e-05) (7.45e-05) (7.36e-05) (7.25e-05)
Constant 0.000804 -0.000909 0.00215 0.000454
(0.00685) (0.00679) (0.00670) (0.00677)
Observations 147 147 146 146
Time dummies YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.402 0.464 0.444 0.479
Table 5.5 reports the results obtained when the baseline model in Equation 5.4.1 is estimated by (i) excluding
top 1% in size banking sectors (Columns 1 and 2) and (ii) excluding bottom 1% in size banking sectors
(Columns 3 and 4). Estimations are made by using robust standard errors. Estimated coe cients are
reported and standard errors in parenthesis. Sample period is 2003-2007. A set of full time dummies
are included. The dependent variable, ROA, is the net income as a percent of total assets (country
level).FRACBANKS is the fraction of banks with a former politician on board. FRACBANKSPR is the
fraction of banks with a former politician on board (private banks). EQUI is the total equity capital as a
percent of total assets (country level). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets (country level). LIQUI is
the ratio of liquid securities to toal liabilities (country level). NPL is the non performing loans as a fraction
of total loans (country level). GDPGR is the GDP growth. INFL is the consumer price index. UNEMPL
is the ratio of unemployment as a percentage of the total labor force. Political connection variables are
retrieved from the study of Braun and Raddatz (2010). Financial variables are retrieved from SNL Financial.
Macroeconomic variables are retrieved from the World Bank. The ***, ** and * signs denote statistical
significance at the 1,5 and 10% level.
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Table 5.6: Robustness analysis (2)
No connections Alternative connection measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Dep. var: ROA
FRACBANKS 0.000113***
(3.51e-05)
FRACBANKSPR 0.000150***
(4.40e-05)
FRACBANKERS 0.000870**
(0.000361)
FRACBANKERSPR 0.00130***
(0.000229)
EQUI 0.00118*** 0.00127*** 0.00113*** 0.00115***
(0.000185) (0.000182) (0.000179) (0.000153)
SIZE 0.000388 0.000388 5.12e-06 4.17e-05
(0.000285) (0.000284) (0.000304) (0.000282)
LIQUI 1.75e-05 6.71e-05* 4.67e-08 5.35e-06
(3.45e-05) (3.93e-05) (3.29e-05) (3.18e-05)
NPL 2.03e-05 0.000125* 1.70e-06 3.49e-05
(8.06e-05) (7.25e-05) (7.50e-05) (7.24e-05)
Constant -0.00770 -0.0102 0.000988 -0.000186
(0.00610) (0.00615) (0.00683) (0.00655)
Observations 120 101 148 148
Time dummies YES YES YES YES
R-sq 0.435 0.531 0.410 0.498
Table 5.6 reports the results obtained when the baseline model in Equation 5.4.1 is estimated by (i)
excluding cases where no connections are identified (Columns 1 and 2) and (ii) alternative measures
of connectedness are used (Columns 3 and 4). Estimations are made by using robust standard errors.
Estimated coe cients are reported with standard errors in parenthesis. Sample period is 2003-2007. A set of
full time dummies are included. The dependent variable, ROA, is the net income as a percent of total assets
(country level).FRACBANKS is the fraction of banks with a former politician on board. FRACBANKSPR is
the fraction of banks with a former politician on board (private banks). FRACBANKERS is the fraction of
bank directors that had a previous political position. FRACBANKERSPR is the fraction of bank directors
that had a previous political position (private banks). EQUI is the total equity capital as a percent of total
assets (country level). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets (country level). LIQUI is the ratio of
liquid securities to toal liabilities (country level). NPL is the non performing loans as a fraction of total loans
(country level). GDPGR is the GDP growth. INFL is the consumer price index. UNEMPL is the ratio of
unemployment as a percentage of the total labor force. Political connection variables are retrieved from the
study of Braun and Raddatz (2010). Financial variables are retrieved from SNL Financial. Macroeconomic
variables are retrieved from the World Bank. The ***, ** and * signs denote statistical significance at the
1,5 and 10% level.
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As previously, the output reported indicates a positive and statisti-
cally significant relationship between the connectedness measure and
banking sector performance. It is worth mentioning that the coe cients
of this measure are slightly higher than those of the core measure of
connectedness, reflecting that political connections of this type increase
bank performance by 0.10% on average.
5.4.2.2 Controlling for country-level characteristics
Given the cross-country set-up of the analysis, in this section additional
analysis is conducted to further envelop the model and saturate it with
country-level characteristics that capture additional heterogeneity. In
particular, the following are explored: (i) Quality of government and
institutions, (ii) Government ownership of banks, (iii) Economic freedom,
(iv) Banking sector characteristics and (v) Income level.
To begin with, a country’s quality of government and institutions
consists an area necessary of taking into consideration. One straightfor-
ward way to control for this, is to take into account information from the
"World Governance Indicators" project. Briefly, this project provides an
aggregate measure of country-level governance that reflects the following
key areas: (i) Voice and accountability, (ii) Political Stability and absence
of Violence, (iii) Government E ectiveness , (iv) Regulatory quality, (v)
Rule of Law, (vi) Control of corruption. The baseline model in Equation
5.4.1 is re-estimated by including the measure provided by the "World
Governance Indicators" project (WGI). Results reported in Table 5.7,
Columns 1-2, confirm that even when controlling for this aspect the the
political connection measures utilised in this study remain the same in
sign and significance, however, the WGI itself is insignificant.
Additionally, the baseline model is further saturated by controlling
for banking sector characteristics. This is motivated by the fact that
there is significant heterogeneity in banking regulatory and supervisory
policies accross countries (Barth et al., 2013). Drawing information from
the World Bank Database and the survey of Barth et al. (2013) 7, the
following areas are controlled for: (i) Stock market capitalisation, (ii)
overall restrictions on banking activities, (iii) index for capital regulation
and (iv) extent of o cial supervisory power. Please see Table 5.1 for
a detailed description of the variables. Results are reported in Table
5.7, columns 3-4. In regard to the country-level variables, the proxy for
7The surveys have been conducted in waves for the following years: 1999, 2003, 2007,
2011. Information used in the current analysis is for the second wave (i.e., 2003), given
the time-frame of the present analysis. It is worth noting however, that for the variables
of interest, the are no considerable changes in the values from one survey to the other.
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stock market capitalisation appears to be the only significant measure,
which enters the regression with a positive sign. However, the remaining
proxies of banking-sector characteristics are insignificant. Turning to
the core variables of interest, they do retain their sign and significance
across the two specifications.
An additional aspect that is controlled for, is the extent to which a
government owns banks. The reason being is that government owner-
ship of banks could potentially be a way of "bringing" closer banks and
government o cials and, therefore, this could lead to di erences in the
behavior of banks across countries. Athanasoglou et al. (2008) suggest
that the relationship between ownership and profitability of banks is not
straightforward, as some studies find supporting evidence in favor of an
existing relationship (Short, 1979), whereas others find none (Bourke,
1989). For the purpose of the present study, information is collected by
the database of Barth et al. (2013) on the extent to which the banking
system’s assets are government owned. In particular, information is
gathered on the "percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that
are 50% or more government owned". This variable is quantified as a
percentage. Information is obtained from the second survey wave (2003)
and results are reported in Table 5.7, Columns 5-6. The results confirm
the baseline findings both in sign and significance, however ownership
itself appears to be insignificant.
Furthermore, the level of Economic Freedom is considered in the
analysis. This particular aspect, has been shown in prior literature
to have an impact on bank performance. In particular, Gropper et al.
(2015) find that state-level economic freedom has a statistically significant
impact on bank performance. Given that the aim of this chapter is to
assess the interplay between political connections and banking sector
performance at the country level, the Economic Freedom Summary Index
provided by the Fraser Institute is utilised. In particular, this index
measures the extent of economic freedom in a variety of countries around
the world based on the following sub-sections: (i) size of government,
(ii) legal structure and security of property rights, (iii) access to sound
money, (iii) freedom to trade internationally, (iv)regulation of credit,
labour and business. Given that the intention is to comprehensively
account for these matters, the overall index instead of the individual
indicators (i)-(iv) is considered. Higher values of the index reflect greater
Economic Freedom and vice versa. The baseline model in Equation 5.4.1
is therefore re-estimated including this index. Results are reported in
Table 5.7, Columns 7-8.
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Although the index itself appears not to be significant, the coe cients
of the core variable of interest remain intact.
Finally, the main objective of the study is explored whilst controlling
for the income group they are classified in. The World Bank classifies
countries by income group in the following categorization: low income,
lower middle income, higher middle income and high income 8.For the
purpose of the present analysis, dummy variables are constructed, re-
flecting each of the four income groups and are included in the baseline
model. Results reported in Table 5.7 (Columns 9-10) suggest that the
positive relationship between political connections and banking sector
performance remains intact.
5.4.3 Addressing endogeneity concerns
The present section is dedicated to alleviating potential concerns linked
to endogeneity. In particular, such concerns mainly refer to key issues
commonly referred to omitted variable bias, measurement error, as well
as reverse causality up to some extent 9. One or more of these issues could
be influencing the obtained results and, therefore, it is essential that
they are addressed.Therefore, dealing with these concerns can further
confirm the robustness of the reported results.
Prior to discussing the technical part, it is worth explaining further
the reasons for which the aforementioned issues could be present in
the setting of the analysis and thus, arising these endogeneity concerns.
Firstly, omitted variable bias and measurement error could be present
due to the fact that the impact of political connections on banking sector
performance may be driven by other factors that have not been accounted
for or are unobservable and therefore, would not be able to be accounted
for, in the first place. Despite specifying the baseline model in such
way that firm and country-level characteristics that have been shown by
prior literature to be drivers of bank performance are included; there is
still the possibility that certain elements have not been considered. In
addition, another relevant issue could be that measurement error exists
regarding the control variables taken into consideration and this could
have an impact in the reported results. Last but not least, another source
of endogeneity could be linked to reverse causality. More precisely, one
could argue that it is not the case that banking sector connectedness
8For further information please see http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
DATASTATISTIC/0,,contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:64909257~pagePK:64909151~piPK:
64909148~theSitePK:6950074,00.html
9See Section 3.5.3.1 of this thesis and Wooldridge (2010) Sections 4.3. and 4.4. for
detailed discussion.
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influences bank performance, but, rather that performance drives the
extent of connectedness of a country’s banking sector. In order to alleviate
such concerns the baseline model is re-estimated by implementing two
commonly employed Instrumental Variables (IV) techniques: (i) Two-
stage least squares model (2SLS) and (ii) Two-stage Residual Inclusion
model (2SRI) 10. It is worth noting that a Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity
is performed. The p-values obtained is equal to 0.0000, which indicates
that OLS is not consistent and that an instrumental variable technique
is suitable.
In order to conduct the analysis, the following two-stage model is
estimated:
Connectionsi,t = ⇣ + ⌘1GovEffectivenessi,t + ⌘2Controlsi,t + yeart + ri,k,t
(5.4.2)
Performancei,t = ↵ +  1Connectioni,t +  2Controlsi,t +  yeart + "i,t
(5.4.3)
where i refers to country i, and t refers to year t. Equation 5.4.2 is the
first stage equation, where the dependent variable is the connection
metric (i.e., any of the proxies considered thus far), which is considered
as the endogenous variable of the model. Government e ectiveness is
the selected instrument, the reasoning behind which is explained in
the following paragraph. This measure is obtained by the World Bank
database. In regard to Equation 5.4.3, this is the response equation and
is of similar specification to the base model. The model is estimated using
the 2SLS and 2SRI approach as an additional test. As outlined earlier
both are executed through a two stage estimation approach. Although
the first stage in both models are estimated in the same way, what
di erentiates the two techniques is the estimation of the second stage.
In regard to the 2SLS approach, the predicted values from the first stage
replace the endogenous variable. In the case of the 2SRI approach, the
residuals from the first stage are saved and inserted as an additional
explanatory variable in the second stage.
It is of utmost importance at this point to highlight that instrument
selection in such models is a crucial task. The reason being the relevance
10For further details on the technical aspects, similarities and di erences between
these two techniques are discussed in section 3.5.3.1 of this thesis. Also, Terza et al.
(2008) and Wooldridge (2010) o er an in depth discussion.
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of these instruments needs to be appropriate from both a conceptual
and a methodological perspective. As such, it is essential for the instru-
ment taken into account to be relevant to the dependent variable of the
first stage equation (i.e., the endogenous variable, which in this case is
Connection). At the same time, the selected instrument must not be in
any way associated to the residuals of the second-stage equation. These
are formally stated via the following conditions: (i)relevance criterion ,
where there needs to be a relationship between the instrument and the
endogenous variable and (ii) exclusion restriction, which suggests that
the instrument must not be correlated to the error term of the first-stage
regression. When the chosen instrument fulfils both (i) and (ii) then it is
a candidate instrument.
For the purpose of the present analysis, the chosen instrument is the
extent of Government E ectiveness at the country level. This measure
captures the overall quality of a government in terms of the public and
civil services it provides, its independence from political pressures, the
policies it designs and implements, as well as its commitment to realise
these policies.The motivation behind the selection of this measure has to
do with the fact that the extent of how close politicians and bankers are
within a country, is determined up to a certain point with how permissible
"by design" a country’s institutions are to allow this (or not) and how well-
functioning they are. A suitable instrument therefore would be linked to
a trait that reflects this aspect. On a general viewpoint, prior studies have
shown that political connections exists in countries where institutions
are considered to be weak (Faccio et al., 2006) and corruption is high
(Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Cingano and Pinotti, 2013).
This therefore, confirms that the selected measure fulfils that relevance
criterion. In the meantime, for government e ectiveness to be a suitable
instrument, it need not to be directly influencing the dependent variable of
the second stage equation (that is, banking sector performance). Indeed,
this is not the case, as the extent of how e ective a government may be
is not per se a direct determinant of performance and the only way that
it could influence performance should be through political connections.
This therefore, provides adequate reasoning to consider this measure as
a candidate instrument.
The estimation output of the analysis is provided in Table 5.8. This ta-
ble presents the results when the two Instrumental Variables techniques
are estimated for both measures of political connectedness. In particular,
Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the 2SLS approach, whereas
Columns (3) and (4) present the results for the 2SRI approach. Panel A
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reports the results of the second stage and Panel B for the first stage. To
begin with, the core variables of interest, i.e., the political connectedness
variables retain their sign and significance across the two methodologies
implemented, as well as the two alternative measures of interest. Turn-
ing to the first stage results presented in Panel B, it appears that the
instrument is negative and significant at the 5% level. From the 2SLS
regressions, certain diagnostics are reported concerning the validity and
strength of the instrument. In particular, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistic, which reflects the strength of the instrument is in both cases
within the ranges of the critical values reported. The Kleibergen-Paap
rk LM statistic reflects whether under identification exists in the model.
In both cases, the null hypothesis is rejected and therefore the model is
identified.
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Table 5.8: Addressing endogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel a: Second stage
Dep var: ROA
FRACBANKS 0.00073*** 0.00094 ***
(0.00027) (0.00018)
FRACBANKSPR 0.00059 *** 0.0006***
(0.00018) (0.0.0001)
1st st. residuals -0.00088 *** -0.0005 ***
(0.000191) (0.0.0001)
Observations 168 168 148 148
R-squared 0.43 0.65 0.4946 0.5367
Controls YES YES YES YES
Time dumies YES YES YES YES
Method of estimation 2SLS 2SLS 2SRI 2SRI
Panel b: First stage
Dep var: Pol. Connections
GOVEFF -3.14 ** -3.88 *** -3.19 ** -3.19 **
(1.2228) (1.2532) (1.311) (1.521)
Time dumies YES YES YES YES
Wald test of chi2 (p-value) - - 0.0022 0.0021
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 13.364 13.630 - -
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 0.0006 0.0004 - -
Table 5.8 reports the results obtained when estimating a 2SLS (Columns 1 and 2) and 2SRI model (Columns 3 and 4) described
in Section 5.4.3. Panel a reports the second stage results, whereas Panel b indicates the first stage results. Sample period is
2003-2007. A set of full time dummies are included. The dependent variable in the second stage analysis, ROA, is the net
income as a percent of total assets (country level). The dependent variable in the first stage analysis is the political connections
proxy. FRACBANKS is the fraction of banks with a former politician on board. FRACBANKSPR is the fraction of banks
with a former politician on board (private banks).GOVEFF is the instrument used in the first stage regression and reflects
the extent of a country’s government e ectiveness. Political connection variables are retrieved from the study of Braun and
Raddatz (2010). Financial variables are retrieved from SNL Financial. Government e ectiveness is retrieved from the World
Governance Indicators project. The *, ** and *** signs denote statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10% level.
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5.5 Conclusion
The primary objective of the present chapter is to assess the impact of
political connections on banking sector performance, while accounting
for country level heterogeneity. The majority of research has thus far
explored the interplay of political connections on firm outcomes of finan-
cial and /or non-financial firms mostly by focusing on a single country
(usually the US). There is still limited evidence on cross country variation
regarding how political connections influence firm outcomes.
In order to meet the objective of the chapter the analysis relies on the
use of a cross-country sample of 59 countries during the years 2003-2007.
The extent of political connectedness at the country level is captured by
the measures made available by Braun and Raddatz (2010). Two are
the main proxies considered: (i) the fraction of banks in a particular
country that had former politicians on board (any type of bank) and (ii)
the fraction of banks in a particular country that had former politicians
on board (private banks only) . Following empirical precedent (Gropper
et al., 2013, 2015), the Return on Assets ratio is used as a proxy to capture
banking sector performance.
The findings of the analysis suggest higher banking sector perfor-
mance in countries with higher levels of political connectedness. This
pattern is consistent despite the measure of political connectedness used
each time. In order to confirm the main findings the baseline model is re-
estimated by making use of alternative model specifications, measures of
connectedness, as well as certain sample restrictions. In addition to that,
given the international scope of the analysis, a set of additional exercises
are performed in order to account for cross-country heterogeneity. For
this purpose, the analysis is extended to capture traits related to institu-
tional environment, extent of government ownership, economic freedom,
income level, as well as other banking sector and market characteristics.
Finally, the analysis is also extended in order to address potential endo-
geneity concerns. By considering country-level government e ectivenss
as an instrument, an instrumental variable technique is implemented.
Overall, after performing the aforementioned tests the core findings of
the study remain the same.
Political connections provide certain benefits to firms as shown by prior
literature. These benefits are even more pronounced in heavily regulated
industries, such as banking. The results of this analysis certainly point
out that political connections are a potential driver of banking sector
performance. It is important to mention that this finding is in line
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with prior studies with single-country focus. While the evidence of the
present study does confirm the existence of the interplay between political
connections and banking sector performance on a cross country set -up,
there is still room for further analysis around this context. In particular,
a major drawback of the analysis is the time-frame utilised. Due to the
scarcity of connection data across countries, the analysis relies on data
obtained quite back in time. Therefore, a great improvement of this
analysis would be to make use of more contemporary data, which would
enable to observe changes throughout time, as well as the behaviour of
certain sectors during times of crisis.
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Chapter 6
Concluding remarks,
limitations and future
research
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an overall summary and
evaluation of the key findings of this thesis. Moreover, it discusses policy
implications, certain areas of limitation and outlines avenues of future
research.
6.1 Summary of key findings
The main topic of interest of the present thesis is to shed light on how polit-
ical connections "fit-in" the banking industry. To explore this, the present
thesis consists of three substantive chapters, each of which explores a
distinctive research question that lies under the common thematic topic
of political connections in banking. The first two chapters concentrate
on a bank-specific viewpoint, whereas the third entails a more general
approach. In particular, Chapters 3 and 4 explore whether and how
certain types of political connections influence the decision making of
financial regulators, whereas Chapter 5 focuses on the aggregate e ect
that political connections exert over banking sector performance.
To begin with, the main purpose of Chapter 3 is to explore the extent
to which regulatory decisions can be influenced by elected o cials with
power in Congress. Following the studies of Gropper et al. (2013, 2015),
political influence is captured by whether a bank is headquartered in
a state where there is an elected o cial that chairs a committee that
oversees the financial services industry. As in the following chapter,
regulatory decisions are captured by the regulatory enforcement actions
issued against banks. The findings of this analysis extends the work
181
of Lambert (2019), by providing further evidence on how alternative
methods of connectedness can influence regulatory outcomes. In order to
explore this objective, a panel data set of the universe of U.S Commercial
Banks is constructed for the years 2000-2015. The key findings show that
banks that are headquartered in states where an elected o cial chairs a
committee that oversees the financial services industry are less likely to
receive a regulatory enforcement action. The results hold when exploring
alternative methodological approaches and implementing several sample
restrictions. Moreover, the baseline model is estimated using an instru-
mental variable approach and propensity score matching in order to
mitigate endogeneity concerns. The analysis of this chapter is extended
in order to explore whether the baseline findings are conditional to state-
level characteristics, such as economic freedom, corruption, religiosity
and political polarization.
The primary objective of the second chapter (Chapter 4) is to provide a
solid explanation on the motives behind the lobbying activity of banks. To
do so, a theoretical model of lobbying as a means for banks to communicate
otherwise private information on their quality rationalizes regulators’
responsiveness to lobbying, although lobbying banks inadvertently ex-
pose themselves as violators of the regulation. The novel element of this
chapter primarily lies under the theoretical model developed, which o ers
a set of predictions that are eventually tested empirically. The output
contributes therefore, to prior empirical studies examining the interplay
between lobbying and regulatory outcomes, such as the work of Lambert
(2019). In order to meet the objectives of this chapter, a panel data-set of
173 large Bank Holding Companies and their subsidiaries is constructed
for the time frame from 2002 to 2017. Political influence in this chapter
is captured through the lobbying activities of Bank Holding Companies.
Moreover, a composite governance indicator is considered as a proxy for a
bank’s quality. Regulatory decisions are captured by considering regula-
tory enforcement actions enacted against banks. The empirical findings
from this analysis are in line with the theoretical predictions. In particu-
lar, the results obtained show that lobbying banks with high corporate
governance quality, but poor performing subsidiaries are more likely to
lobby. In addition, findings suggest that subsidiary banks, of high corpo-
rate governance quality parent companies that engage in lobbying, are
less likely to be punished. These results hold when exploring alternative
model specifications and definition of sample. Moreover, results retain
their sign and significance when implementing an instrumental variable
approach of Bi-Probit and IV-probit specification, in order to address
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potential endogeneity concerns. Last but not least, banks whose parent
companies have lobbied perform better (worse) after five years if the bank
holding company has a high (low) governance indicator.
Finally, Chapter 5 aims to examine the extent to which political con-
nections influence banking sector performance by using an international
sample. Empirical precedent (Gropper et al., 2013, 2015; Lambert, 2019)
provides conflicting evidence on the direction of impact of political con-
nections on bank performance. The majority of available studies focus
on assessing bank-level profitability, rather than overall banking sector
performance. The analysis of this chapter therefore, contributes to the
aforementioned studies by providing additional evidence in regard to the
aggregate e ects of political connections on performance. Moreover, the
output of this chapter contributes to the limited strand of studies examin-
ing political connections under a cross-country set up. In order to address
the objective of this chapter a sample of 59 countries over the years from
2003-2007 is employed. As a measure of banking sector connectedness,
proxies provided by the study of Braun and Raddatz (2010) are taken into
account, measuring the fraction of banks in a particular country that
have former politicians on board. Banking sector performance is captured
through the return on assets ratio. After estimating the baseline model
with an OLS regression with year dummies, the baseline results suggest
a positive association between political connections and banking sector
performance, which is in line with the single country results reported
by Gropper et al. (2013, 2015). The results are robust to the use of al-
ternative model specifications, measures of connectedness and sample
restrictions. Moreover, the baseline results hold when controlling for
additional country-level characteristics. Finally, the baseline model is
estimated using an Instrumental Variables approach in order to alleviate
potential endogeneity concerns.
6.2 Contributions, policy implications and
limitations of research
This final section aims to provide an overview of the overall contributions
and policy implications of the thesis. Moreover, it intends to discuss the
limitations of each chapter and provide suggestions for further research
in this field. To begin with, there are three key contributions to be
highlighted. First, from the analysis executed in Chapter 3 the overall
output adds to the further understanding of how less direct forms of
political influence can impact regulatory enforcement. Thus far, the
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literature provides evidence on how lobbying, a direct form of political
influence, can impact regulatory enforcement (Lambert, 2019). The
literature has also shown that politicians with power in Congress, a
less direct channel of influence, may impact bank performance (Gropper
et al., 2013, 2015). However, none has yet explored how the latter type of
influence can shape regulatory enforcement - which is the key objective
of Chapter 3.
Second, the theoretical model developed in Chapter 4 sheds light on
the motives and extent of success behind the lobbying activity of banks,
by considering lobbying as a mechanism that enables the communication
of otherwise unrevealed information to the supervisory agency. From
a theoretical perspective, the literature thus far has only considered
lobbying as a mechanism of exchange of favours and not as a mechanism
of communication. Additionally, from an empirical approach, the extant
literature has not explored the extent to which corporate governance
quality could be driving the relationship between political influence and
regulatory enforcement. These are certain key points that the analysis
in Chapter 4 engages in.
Third, the analysis carried out in Chapter 5 enhances our under-
standing in regard to the interplay between political connections and
performance on the aggregate level, whilst considering an international
sample. This in addition highlights and contributes to the global scope
of the topic. Empirical precedent has explored the impact of political
connections of both direct or indirect types on bank-level performance
(e.g. Lambert, 2019; Gropper et al., 2015, 2013). The research carried out
in this chapter intends to shed light on whether the presence of political
connections can influence overall banking sector safety and soundness.
It is important to mention that the output of the thesis contributes
from a policy-making perspective as well. Chapters 3 and 4 incorporate
supervisory enforcement in the core of their analysis and explore their
interplay with two alternative types of political connectedness. The
findings from these chapters therefore, enable regulators to assess and
improve current supervisory and regulatory practises in order to achieve
banking sector safety and soundness. Moreover, turning the focus towards
the political connectedness aspect, the output of the thesis may also
support the further understanding of the mechanism behind lobbying,
whilst directing policy makers to design appropriate rules that aim at
enhancing social welfare.
Given the above, it is worth discussing the broader implications of
political connections. Despite the type of connection considered - i.e.,
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whether it is a direct type, such as lobbying, or an indirect type, such
as "geographic" or social ties, empirical and theoretical findings within
this strand of literature reveal both supporting and opposing evidence
on the causes and e ects of political connections. Moreover,considering
the distinct nature of the banking sector, it forms it a rather challenging
task to assess the pros and cons of political connections. In fact, political
connections can be described as a "double-edged sword". Academic stud-
ies - including the output obtained from the present thesis - do report
supporting evidence of the "benefits" of connectedness. For instance,
politically connected banks appear to experience a boost in their perfor-
mance, both in terms of operational, as well as in terms of stock market
returns. Other aspects include the preferential treatment of regulators
and access to government funding schemes or other resources. However,
prior to vaulting to the conclusion that political connections could be
related to positive aspects - for the bank’s side at least-, it is crucial to
consider the certain elements.
First, an important factor relates to "who is connected". As demon-
strated theoretically and confirmed empirically in Chapter 4, the quality
of a lobbying bank plays an important role in terms of determining the
decision to lobby in the first place, as well as the success of its outcome.
Second, another crucial aspect involves the projection of how would a
potential wronging of the connected institution impact wider society. This
once more relates to the previous point regarding quality. That is, if a
"connected" bank that possesses a portfolio of risky projects (i.e., is of low
quality) fails, then the broader impact of this failure will pose a greater
threat to society’s welfare, as opposed to a "connected" bank possessing a
portfolio of less risky projects (i.e., is of high quality). Third, the incen-
tives behind banks engaging in corporate political strategies is another
crucial aspect. That is, do banks approach regulators and politicians to
share and reveal otherwise unobservable information, thus facilitating
the complex and costly in most cases regulatory and supervisory environ-
ment? If that is so, then as discussed in Chapter 4, if high quality banks
are revealing to their regulator their true intentions and profile then this
would enable supervisors and regulators to devote their costly investiga-
tions in more "harmful" and riskier institutions. On the other hand, if
motives are driven by corrupt intentions and rent-seeking behavior, then
this would hinder the achievement of creating and sustaining a safe and
sound banking sector. Therefore, it is apparent that when observing the
broader picture of this issue, it is essential to have in mind that there is
no decisive answer regarding the extent of connections being a positive or
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negative aspect. Consequently, it is important to narrow-down and assess
the aforementioned critical points, whilst considering the institutional
environment of the country or region that these incidents take place.
The analysis presented throughout the three chapters comes of course
with its limitations. First, due to data limitation, the analysis in Chapter
5 was performed for a specific time-frame (2003-2007), where the political
connections measures where held constant. Although the current set-up
does a good job in providing supporting evidence on the positive associa-
tion of political connectedness and banking sector performance; future
studies in this area could seek to the construction of political connection
measures in consecutive points in time in order to study the dynamic
impact of the connection-performance nexus under a cross country set
up. Moreover, expanding the time frame would also be interesting to
explore how di erent countries responded around the years of the crisis,
as up until now there is available evidence for the US banking sector only.
Second, although the evidence from Chapters 4 and 5 sheds light on the
influence of political connections on regulatory decisions, the evidence
is still far from conclusive. The reason being is that as various other
types of observable and unobservable connections could be influencing
the pattern observed in the studies of the related literature. Last but not
least, an interesting avenue for future research would be to explore the
real e ects of political connections in banking, in terms of their impact
on a country’s macroeconomy.
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